4.1.1 The nature of justification

The earliest Christian writings outside the New Testament bear witness to an understanding of justification as both a forensic and an effective action, and, while a given source may emphasize either aspect (i.e. the forgiveness of sins or being made righteous), these often seem to be understood as two sides of a single coin. For example, in the Epistle to Diognetus (c.125 CE) both effective and forensic senses are found, in a passage that is clearly reminiscent of the Pauline writings. The author begins by describing God’s effective work, by which

we who in the former time were convicted by our own deeds as unworthy of life might now by the goodness of God be made worthy, and, having clearly demonstrated our inability to enter the kingdom of God on our own, might be enabled to do so by God’s power. (Epistle to Diognetus 9.1; Holmes 2007)

The text then powerfully describes the forgiveness of sins, using language often read as primarily forensic:

For what else but his righteousness could have covered our sins? In whom was it possible for us, the lawless and ungodly, to be justified, except in the Son of God alone? O the sweet exchange, O the incomprehensible work of God, O the unexpected blessings, that the sinfulness of many should be hidden in one righteous person, while the righteousness of one should justify many sinners! (Epistle to Diognetus 9.3–5, Holmes 2007; cf. similarly Barnabas 16.6–10)

For interpreters who see an effective aspect as either subordinate or absent within the New Testament texts themselves (see, for example, the influential study of Torrance 1948), it may be striking how frequently patristic readers understand justification in terms of either being or becoming righteous. Along with the instances from the apostolic fathers noted by Torrance – including 1 Clement, Ignatius, Barnabas, and Hermas (Torrance 1948: 50, 67, 106, 117) – one may add Irenaeus (c.180 CE), whose restatements of Pauline justification passages similarly focus on the effective sense. Irenaeus describes how Christians, like Abraham, have been made righteous by faith (cf. Gen 15:6, Rom 4:3), so that they too are free from any requirement to follow the Mosaic law, which Paul says was not established for the righteous (1 Tim 1:9; Demonstration 35, 87; Against Heresies 4.16.2–3; cf. also Justin, Dialogue 23, 92, 119). Similarly, Clement of Alexandria (c.190 CE) identifies Paul’s sense of justification as effective in commenting on 1 Cor 6:11 (‘You were justified in the name of the Lord’): ‘Ye are made, so to speak, by Him to be righteous as He is, and are blended as far as possible with the Holy Spirit’ (Miscellanies 7.14, Roberts and Donaldson 1994; see also Origen, Against Celsus 4.7; Eusebius, Demonstration 1.6).

This effective sense is what explains how early patristic sources simultaneously speak of justification as an entirely gracious gift from God, which is impossible for humanity to attain on its own, and also one that involves a heightened degree of accountability for the believer, who will be judged in accordance with their works (see e.g. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.27, Demonstration 56). While these points seem contradictory for readers who understand justification in a strictly forensic sense (see again Torrance 1948), the patristic conception is intelligible when it is recognized that justification is understood to be transformative in nature, so that the believer is enabled to live in a way that will be judged favourably at the last day.

Fewer patristic texts provide evidence for an incorporative sense of justification, with a noteworthy early exception. The first epistle of Clement (c.69–96 CE) describes how – like Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the rest of Israel’s descendants – Christians are justified by the faith that arises from God’s will and calling rather than their own works or piety (1 Clem 31–32). While forensic or effective interpretations of this passage are possible, the likeliest sense here may indeed be that of incorporation, since it is participation in Abraham’s heritage that is the blessing under discussion (rather than forgiveness of sins or becoming righteous; cf. Irenaeus, Demonstration 93). 

4.1.2 The means of justification

Patristic sources frequently restate the principle of justification by faith, which is closely linked with baptism (cf. Tit 3:4–7) and tends to be understood in terms of an active fidelity which is paired with other biblical virtues. For example, 1 Clement recounts the justification of Abraham by commending his faith, hospitality, and obedience (1 Clem 10), and similarly describes Rahab as saved by faith and hospitality (1 Clem 12; cf. Jas 2:25, Origen, Romans 4.1.12). Irenaeus sees justification by faith as closely linked with obeying the ‘natural’ precepts of the law which the righteous patriarchs observed, such as to love God and one’s neighbour, which Christ fulfils and extends in the new covenant (Against Heresies 4.13.1, 4.17.1; cf. similarly Justin, Dialogue 43–46; Tertullian, Answer 2). Indeed, for Irenaeus faith and obedience to God are practically equated, as he writes succinctly: ‘To believe in him is to do his will’ (Against Heresies 4.6.5, Roberts and Donaldson 1994; cf. similarly 2 Clem 3:4). Faith is thus understood to be both the means by which God’s gracious gift is received and the fidelity which holds on to this gift in subsequent obedience. The close coordination of faith and works in patristic sources also means that little commentary (much less controversy) is to be found on James’ rejection of ‘faith alone’ within this early period (Mooney 2020).

Interestingly, early fathers such as Origen, who describe faith and works as closely linked (see e.g. Romans, 2.13.23, 4.1.6), can also use the phrase ‘faith alone’ to describe the basis on which this justifying gift is received (see Romans 3.9.2–3, 3.10.10). In some instances, the phrase appears to function as a synecdoche for faith, hope, and love (with ‘alone’ used to negate either the law or prior works; cf. Scheck 2001: 39–42). In others, faith alone can be referred to as the foundation of all other theological virtues, and the root from which the fruit of good works is borne. As Origen explains:

For faith which believes in the one who justifies is the beginning of being justified by God. And this faith, when it has been justified, is firmly embedded in the soil of the soul like a root that has received rain, so that when it begins to be cultivated by God’s law, branches arise from it, which bring forth the fruit of works. The root of righteousness, therefore, does not grow out of the works, but rather the fruit of works grows out of the root of righteousness, that root, of course, of righteousness which God also credits even apart from works. (Romans 4.1.18, Scheck 2001; cf. similarly Ignatius, Ephesians 14.1–2)

With respect to the other side of the Pauline dichotomy, early patristic sources consistently interpret ‘works of the law’ as referring to the prescriptions of the Torah, with circumcision, Sabbath, food laws, and sacrifices frequently noted (Thomas 2020; cf. Wiles 1967: 66–69; Calvin, Com. Rom. 3.20). These practices are regarded as identifying one with the Jewish nation and covenant, which they attest to now have been superseded by Christ and his empowering grace in the new covenant (see especially Justin, Dialogue 11.5; Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.16; Origen, Romans 8.7.6).

As noted above, such an understanding of works of the law does not mean that any other works are the source of justifying grace, which has as its only origin the mercy of God alone (see e.g. 2 Clem 1; Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3.18.2, 3.20.3, 5.21.3). Further, to insist upon the reality of judgment according to works for Christians – a frequent theme in patristic texts – does not mean that such works should serve as a basis for confidence or boasting: even for those who have done all they have been commanded, Christians should continue to recognize themselves as unworthy servants, since it is God’s power which makes such works possible (Irenaeus, Against Heresies 5.22.2; Origen, Romans 3.9.6).

4.1.3 Location and timing of justification

With respect to the location of justification, the effective emphasis witnessed in many patristic writings naturally corresponds with an internal understanding of justification’s activity, which is stated explicitly in a handful of sources. For example, the Shepherd of Hermas (c. late first–mid-second century CE) speaks of God’s action of instilling righteousness in his people so that they might be justified (eph’ humas staxantos tēn dikaiosunēn, hina dikaiōthēte, 17.1). Irenaeus similarly speaks of righteousness as being set within the individual to preserve the body and soul for immortality, and of Christ implanting the righteousness of the law in believers (Against Heresies 2.29, 4.13). However, it must be remembered that these sources did not write with the questions of later centuries in mind, and this period does not show evidence of disputes regarding the location of justification.

The timing of justification in patristic sources shows greater variability, which is unsurprising given that the term can be functionally equivalent to sanctification in this period. Justification is often referred to as an initial act that takes place at baptism, though it can also be used to refer to the final vindication that will take place at the last day (see e.g. Irenaeus, Demonstration 3; Tertullian, Resurrection 23). Sources can sometimes speak of justification as a process as well, such as Clement of Alexandria’s remarks on the partial justification that came by philosophy and the law (Miscellanies 1.4–5, 1.20; cf. Gal 3:24), and Tertullian’s comments on how Christians ‘by believing God are the more thereby justified’ (magis proinde iustificamur) like their forefather Abraham (Against Marcion 5.3, Evans 1972).

4.1.4 Dissenting views

The stability of early patristic interpretation on justification does not mean the period was without dissenting views. One such dissent is attested to have come from the Ebionites, whom Tertullian identifies as holding to the positions of Paul’s opponents in Galatians, and who continued in observing and defending circumcision and the law (Prescription 33.5). Hippolytus attests that the Ebionites claimed to be justified by the law of Moses, which they regarded as the source of Christ’s own justification (Refutation 7.34.2). Rather than rejecting the Mosaic law, then, the Ebionites rejected Paul instead, and held him to be an apostate (Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.26.2). A quite different controversy arose in the mid-second century with Marcion, who sought to eradicate the Jewish elements from Christianity by use of his redacted ten-letter Pauline collection. Marcion is sometimes regarded as a precursor to Luther, due to his rejection of the idea of Christ as a judge and his ‘law-gospel’ distinction (see famously Harnack 1924; cf. Tertullian, Against Marcion 1.19). However, this connection is easily overstated, as Marcion’s fundamental objection is to the God worshipped by the Hebrews rather than law or works (cf. Rensberger 1981: 154–55). The fragments of Marcion’s remaining works thus leave us little by way of a distinct theology of justification.

4.5.1 Lutheran

The first thing to be noted about Luther and the subsequent tradition that followed from him is the degree to which it rests in continuity with its medieval Catholic (and ultimately Augustinian) theological heritage, with particular inspiration drawn from the teachings on grace and predestination in Augustine’s later writings. Nevertheless, while sometimes based on seemingly minor theological distinctions, Luther’s areas of divergence from his prior tradition – and especially from Augustine – led to a distinct understanding of justification that still proves influential today. We can examine these Lutheran features under three headings: (1) the nature of justification, (2) the place of justification, and (3) the means of justification.

Luther’s distinct emphases are most intelligible when understood as a reaction against the aforementioned late-medieval conceptions of justification – exemplified by Gabriel Biel, whose theology the early Luther at first imbibed, then fully rejected – in which a competitive understanding of divine and human action led to the work of justification being thought of as divided between God and the autonomous individual. For Luther, such conceptions seemed particularly objectionable when humanity’s contribution could be subject to manipulation, such as with the purchase of indulgences to reduce time in purgatory for one’s self or others. It is essential to note that Luther’s response shares his opponents’ philosophical presupposition that human and divine agency function on the same plane, and this underlying framework would prove to be a source of contention in later disputes with other Christian bodies. Nevertheless, it is clear that Luther’s objections are rooted in Catholic and biblical instincts: the notion that humanity’s justification was somehow only partially affected by God simply seemed a sub-Christian idea, and Luther powerfully exposed it as such. At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that the distinctive Lutheran perspective on justification emerges from this traditional conviction of God’s complete action for the individual’s salvation, combined with the more recent nominalist philosophical framework which conceived human and divine action as an either-or proposition.

We can see this new perspective illustrated in how Luther conceives of humanity’s striving for righteousness. While the preceding tradition had cautioned that even grace-empowered works should not be a source for boasting or confidence, to seek righteousness was not itself problematized. For Luther, such striving is not only a sin, but the epitome of all human sin: since justification can only be received as a gift from God, human efforts to attain righteousness are attempts to rob God of his role as saviour. Those who strive to achieve salvation thus become self-idolaters and anti-Christs, denying God and setting themselves up in his place (see especially Lectures on Galatians, LW 26.257–259).

This either/or understanding of divine and human action explains Luther’s more radical statements like ‘sin doesn’t harm us as much as our own righteousness’ (LW 54.34): since righteousness can only be received as a gift from God, any apparent righteousness in humanity will take away from the true source of justification, and thus ultimately harm even more than sin. This framework also explains Luther’s various comments against free will, which radicalizes Augustine’s teaching on predestination in a way that seems perplexing to many readers. As Luther writes in his seminal Bondage of the Will, while free will is a pernicious myth, even if it were real he would not want it (LW 33.288–289). What can explain such a statement? It rises, again, from the conviction that to add anything of our own to justification is necessarily to arrogate it from God, which would constitute an unthinkable kind of divine robbery, with salvation itself invariably being lost in the hands of fallible humanity. 

While such an interpretation of humanity’s role in justification appears quite distinct in relation to the prior Christian theological tradition, it must be said that this conception (1) draws upon and powerfully restates traditional theological ideas for its affirmations, and (2) is a logically consistent interpretation if one holds to the nominalist philosophical presuppositions regarding divine and human agency. 

The distinctions between Luther’s conception of justification and the prior tradition were frequently noted by Luther’s opponents, and also acknowledged by Luther himself, which would hold true even with his beloved Augustine (LW 54.49; cf. McGrath 1982). Nevertheless, Luther’s consistent reply to charges of innovation is that Augustine and other church fathers themselves recognized scripture as the authority to which they were subject, and so if his understanding of justification in Paul is indeed correct, then the fathers would agree this right understanding must take precedence even over their tradition of interpretation (e.g. LW 41.25–27, 35.150).

The conviction that justification is entirely the work of God apart from humanity’s response leads to new ways of understanding the nature of justification within Luther’s thought. While initially continuing to conceive of justification in ways that included transformation, after 1532 Luther interprets justification as a strictly forensic act which refers only to the forgiveness of sins. (It should be noted that the degree of development in Luther’s thought is the subject of ongoing debate; see e.g. Trueman 2003; Vainio 2008.) The effect of Luther’s limitation is to eliminate participatory or contingent elements of justification: to be justified by Christ is independent of the work of sanctification, so that no part of justification can be understood as reliant upon man’s response rather than God’s action. Correlated with this is a distinct understanding of the location of justification: rather than representing a change that takes place inside the believer, justification is now understood to be ‘outside us, solely in the grace of God and in His imputation’ (LW 26.234; cf. McGrath 1982). This interpretation also tends to narrow justification to an initial act which subsumes both future and ongoing aspects: final judgment (or final justification) does not involve the Christian, and purgatory – together with its accompanying system of indulgences – is made irrelevant (LW 22.380, though cf. LW 34.167).

These ideas lead to a distinct understanding of the means of justification and the relationship between faith and works. Since humanity is unable to contribute in any way to its justification (and indeed to do so would be robbery from God), the righteousness of faith is understood to be entirely passive, whereby ‘we work nothing, render nothing to God; we only receive and permit someone else to work in us, namely, God’ (LW 26.4–5). Luther’s Lectures on Galatians particularly target the traditional idea that justifying faith is ‘faith formed by love’ (Gal 5:6), an idea he identifies as ‘a trick of Satan’ designed to establish a righteousness of works in place of faith in Christ (LW 26.168, 273). Luther counters that a person is justified by faith alone apart from love or any other human condition, and insists that in Gal 5:6 Paul ‘is not discussing justification’ (LW 27.29).

On the other side, Luther rejects both the early patristic and Augustinian interpretations of ‘works of the law’: rather than the Mosaic law’s prescriptions or all works done apart from God’s grace, Luther insists that the exclusion of works of the law must be understood to exclude works empowered by God’s grace as well, since these too can be seen as compromising God’s full agency in salvation and arrogating something to humanity (LW 26.122–24; cf. LW 54.10). On matters of justification, the dichotomy between faith and works must therefore be absolute; as he writes in his Lectures on Galatians (1535), ‘we do not confuse the Law and grace, or faith and works; but we separate them as far as possible (LW 26.152; cf. 26.137).

Luther’s understanding of this absolute contrast between faith and works would set him in distinction with both Catholics and other Protestants, as Luther explains in refuting ‘the papists, the Zwinglians, the Anabaptists’, and all others in error:

For this is what they teach: ‘Faith in Christ does indeed justify, but at the same time observance of the Commandments of God is necessary; for it is written (Matt 19:17): ‘If you would enter life, keep the Commandments’. Here immediately Christ is denied and faith is abolished, because what belongs to Christ alone is attributed to the Commandments of God or to the Law. (LW 26.143)

Luther is also candid that such an understanding is difficult to reconcile with the teaching of James on justification by works, which for him means that James is not to be regarded as a canonical authority (LW 34.317; 35.395–397; 54.424–425). While such a judgment appears quite radical, for Luther the doctrine of justification provides a standard whereby even the relative value of canonical writings can be measured, with some preserving it more faithfully than others (LW 35.361–362).

While Luther was especially concerned to preserve a clear distinction between faith and works in relation to justification, the same should not be said for the role of the sacraments, and particularly baptism, which he understands to confer faith. Indeed, it is often striking to modern readers how closely Luther links faith and baptism, such that the two terms sometimes seem indistinguishable in his theology. As Luther writes:

If anyone denies here, as the fanatical spirits do today, that righteousness and salvation are granted to an infant as soon as he is baptized […] such a person utterly deprives Baptism of salvation and attributes salvation to works. (LW 26.241–242)

Another feature of the Lutheran perspective which can appear paradoxical, especially given Luther’s emphasis on predestination, is that justification can be lost. The Augsburg Confession, written primarily by Melanchthon 1530 under Luther’s auspices, condemns the (allegedly Anabaptist) teaching which denied that the justified can lose the Holy Spirit (Article 12), and Luther’s sermons often speak of those who fall away into unbelief (e.g. LW 20.137; 23.397–399; 24.234, 256; 30.190). While difficult to reconcile with Luther’s statements elsewhere, it appears for him that while justifying faith can only be received unilaterally (and passively) as a gift from God, it is nevertheless a gift that can be rejected – not by works, but by unbelief.

While Luther’s presentation of God’s action in justification was widely influential, his precise views on each of these issues proved difficult to maintain within subsequent Lutheranism, which was to receive its enduring form under the influence of Philip Melanchthon. While initially agreeing with Luther on predestination and the complete bondage of the human will, Melanchthon’s views on these questions shifted towards the end of Luther’s life, which led him to eventually affirm an understanding of justification which more closely coordinated faith and works (cf. Pelikan 1985: 143–144). It is ecumenically significant that the final breakdown in official Lutheran/Catholic dialogue on justification at the 1557 Colloquy of Worms was caused not by conflict between the official disputants but by the fracturing of the Lutheran party into dissenting factions on this doctrine, with the ‘Gnesio’ (‘genuine’) Lutheran party led by Matthias Flacius accusing Melanchthon and his followers of betraying Luther over the questions of free will and whether good works were necessary evidence for salvation (cf. Dingel 2012: 126–129).

4.5.2 Reformed

The Reformed Protestant perspective on justification, exemplified most prominently by the writings of John Calvin, can be said to be summarized with two general tendencies: (1) a preservation of the distinctive features of Luther’s perspective on justification, including a strong emphasis on predestination and a competitive understanding of divine/human agency (see e.g. Institutes of the Christian Religion [Institutes] 3.11.13); and (2) a closer coordination of justification and sanctification, which would prove to be an enduring distinction between the Lutheran and Reformed traditions. 

The mainstream Reformed tradition is very close to the Lutheran regarding two of the three major features that set Luther apart from the preceding tradition on justification. First, justification is strictly a forensic act entailing the forgiveness of sins (which is often presented as both the non-imputation of sins and the positive imputation of Christ’s righteousness, a point of emphasis within much Reformed thought; cf. Institutes 3.11.2). Second, justification takes place outside of the believer, so that in justification the Christian is accepted ‘as if we were righteous’ apart from any internal transformation (Institutes 3.11.2, 6). Calvin memorably illustrates this conception with an analogy (repurposed from Ambrose): Christians are like Jacob wearing the garments of Esau, who, while not internally changed, nevertheless receives the blessing of Isaac (Institutes 3.11.23).

The distinction between Lutheran and Reformed perspectives on justification can be well illustrated by Luther and Calvin’s divergent responses to the 1541 Colloquy of Regensburg (Ratisbon). This attempt at Protestant/Catholic reconciliation produced Article 5 on justification, which Calvin, himself an attendee at the colloquy, praised as containing ‘the substance of our true doctrine’, so that ‘nothing can be comprehended within it which is not to be found in our writings’ (cf. Lane 2006: 56). Luther, however, inveighed against the colloquy’s statement on justifying faith being that which works by love (Colloquy 4.5, cf. Gal 5:6), and judged that ‘no more harmful writing had been directed against the Reformers since the beginning of their gospel’ (WA Br 9:486, cited in Lane 2020: 4).

While insisting with Luther that justification is distinct from sanctification, for Calvin faith and works are not separable: as he writes in his commentary on Ezekiel, ‘faith can be no more separated from works than the sun from his heat: yet faith justifies without works, because works form no reason for our justification’ (Commentary on Ezekiel 18:14–17; cf. Institutes 3.11.6). The closer coordination of faith and works in the Reformed tradition can also be witnessed in the Westminster Confession’s (1646) teaching on justification: while stating that faith is ‘the alone instrument of justification’, it specifies that such faith ‘is ever accompanied with all other saving graces’ and ‘works by love’ (11.2; cf. Gal 5:6, Institutes 3.11.20). This inseparability is also what helps Reformed interpreters to avoid direct conflict between Paul and James (see, as one example, Institutes 3.17.11–12). Speaking generally, it can be said that, while the Lutheran tradition holds more closely to the preceding tradition on the role of the sacraments within justification, the Reformed holds more closely on the role of evangelical obedience.

Given the closer coordination of justification and sanctification within the Reformed tradition, one topic of enduring discussion has been precisely how works and the final judgment relate to justification by faith. One solution, which is (controversially) attributed to Calvin and explicitly stated by other Reformers like Bucer, has been a doctrine of ‘twofold’ or ‘double’ justification. This teaching holds that primary justification, consisting in the forgiveness of sins, is confirmed by a subordinate or secondary justification, which has as its requirement works that are necessary evidence of faith (see e.g. Institutes, 3.17.3, 8–10; cf. Coxhead 2008; Lugioyo 2010: 177–178). Such a view (with variations) has been held by Reformed theologians such as Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499–1562; Castaldo 2017), Richard Baxter (1615–1691; Boersma 2003), and Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758; McDermott 2007), among others. However, it should be said that such a paradigm is not universally affirmed, as critics have objected that this introduces an element of conditionality into justification, which proves to be too similar to the Catholic paradigm to which the Reformed is to be a corrective. 

As noted above, the Reformed theologian Martin Bucer (1491–1551) represents a significant minority report on the nature of justification: while acknowledging the strictly forensic interpretation of Melanchthon and the Lutheran party, Bucer nevertheless concludes that justification includes an effective aspect, which he bases on the weight of the history of interpretation and on the context of Paul’s own argument in Romans 3 (cf. Fink 2007: 512–513; McGrath 2020: 218–220). The distinction between Calvin and Bucer on this question can be witnessed by their varying interpretations of Rom 8:4: while Calvin (as with Luther) insists that the law’s righteous requirement is only fulfilled for believers by Christ extrinsically (Institutes 3.11.23), Bucer follows earlier readers like Chrysostom by maintaining that this righteousness is indeed brought to fulfilment in Christians.

4.5.3 Catholic

Given the deeply polemical nature of the sixteenth century conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, it may come as a surprise to the contemporary reader how much the official Catholic response to Protestant developments – the Council of Trent’s 1547 decree on justification – shares in common with Lutheran and Reformed perspectives. For example, the council states that humanity cannot be justified by free will without the prevenient grace of God (chapter 5), and declares as follows in its first Canon: ‘If any one saith, that man may be justified before God by his own works, whether done through the teaching of human nature, or that of the law, without the grace of God through Jesus Christ; let him be anathema’. The council’s decree restates traditional perspectives on justification in light of the new questions of the era (McGrath 2020: 277–339) and establishes clear areas of distinction which can be summarized under the following headings:

1. Whereas the Protestant tendency is to emphasize one part of the Augustinian heritage at the expense of others (such as his views on the pervasive influence of sin, but not the nature of justification), Trent offers a more straightforward restatement of Augustine’s theology of justification without the amendments made by Lutheran and Reformed perspectives, though without passing judgment on his more controversial statements on predestination (cf. McGrath 2020: 320–332).
2.  A rejection of perceived Protestant errors, many of which have roots in the late-medieval nominalist tradition. For example, Canon IV rejects a competitive view of divine and human action which would prevent the will’s consent and cooperation with grace in justification, and Canon V rejects the idea that free will is completely lost in unregenerate humanity.
3. Continued variability in the meaning ascribed to terms by various parties, which in the long term contributes to theological misunderstandings between them. Here we may take the example of ‘justification’, which is employed not just for initial forgiveness or final judgment, but also the continuing process of renewal (i.e. ‘becoming just’). This definition makes discussion of ‘increase of justification’ intelligible and even appropriate (chapter 10), but opaque to a Protestant who understands justification to pertain either to the initial forgiveness of sins or vindication at the final judgment, neither of which seem intelligibly subject to increase. 

4.5.4 Anabaptist

The early Anabaptist understanding of justification is attested by Luther to be identical to the prior Catholic doctrine. Luther charged the Anabaptists with being ‘new monks’ who corrupted the doctrine like their Catholic forebears (LW 21.258–259; 26.28), explaining that – by making justification in some way contingent on humanity’s response – Anabaptists and Catholics were collectively ‘wolves joined at the tail’ (LW 27.150).

While the accuracy of these statements is difficult to assess precisely, since Anabaptism itself was a diverse movement with no single official doctrine, it is true that the Anabaptist objections to the medieval church were not fundamentally based on the doctrine of justification. A further challenge to assessing these claims is that Anabaptism’s focus on right practice was such that confessional statements themselves were regarded with some suspicion (which, ironically, did not prevent a great number of them from being written). One confession which found enduring influence as representative of Anabaptist thought was the Short Confession of Hans de Ries (1610/1618), which was ‘unique in being the first Anabaptist-Mennonite confession which systematically treats all of the major doctrines of the faith’ (Dyck 1964: 6). The confession is also significant in that it was drafted during the period of collaboration between the Anabaptists and the early Baptist leader John Smyth, whose congregation also signed the confession (Koop 2019: 135–136; Lee 2003: 87).

The Confession’s comments on justification provide clear examples of what drew Luther’s ire. Indeed, it is remarkable that, while making no explicit appeal to church history, the confession represents a preservation of traditional pre-Lutheran views on many disputed questions. For example, God’s justifying action is regarded as compatible with humanity’s free will and not determined by predestination (Article 7); justifying (‘living’) faith is that which works through love (Article 20); justification is both the forgiveness of sins and the transformation from unrighteousness to righteousness (Article 21). While specifying that children are not to be baptized, since faith must precede baptism (Article 31), it is noteworthy that justification is described as being brought about by baptism, which is itself a sign of Christ’s work in purifying the believer’s soul (Article 30, 32).

4.5.5 Anglican

As with many areas of theology, Anglican conceptions of justification have historically played an important role in charting a middle course between various Protestant and Catholic perspectives, which have made them particularly significant as ecumenical resources in subsequent centuries. The foundational texts for the Anglican church on justification are the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion (1563), which – as is common for Anglican sources – can admit of more than one interpretation, but which show greatest affinity with the Reformed tradition. This reading is confirmed by Thomas Cranmer’s Homily of Justification to which the articles refer, though even here Cranmer’s conception of the nature of justification as ‘making righteous’ is strikingly Augustinian (cf. McGrath 2020: 232–233). Many early Anglican perspectives on justification are reminiscent of Reformed figures who themselves defy easy categorization, such as Martin Bucer, who spent the last two years of his life teaching in England at Cranmer’s invitation. A prominent example is Richard Hooker (1554–1600), who simultaneously insists upon (1) forensic justification by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, which grants ‘the right of inheriting’, (2) an internal sanctifying righteousness (also called ‘justification’), which grants ‘the actual possessing of eternal bliss’, and (3) participation in Christ via baptism and the Eucharist as the means by which both kinds of justification are attained (Hooker 1888; cf. Foord 2000; McGrath 2020: 235–236).

One common tendency among Anglicans has been to give sustained attention to patristic conceptions of justification, rather than to be strictly constrained by either distinctly Protestant ideas or the Catholic reactions against them at Trent. Two important examples are John Wesley (1703–1791) and John Henry Newman (1801–1890), who, while typically associated with Methodism and Catholicism, both wrote on the doctrine as priests of the Church of England. Wesley’s reliance upon patristic writers caused him to diverge from certain Lutheran teachings on the doctrine, such as the denial of free will and strictly forensic justification, and his own story reflects the complex relationship between Anglicans and Reformation sources in this area. (McGrath 2020: 270–274; Weeter 2007: 37–56). On the one hand, Wesley’s 1738 Aldersgate experience – the climactic deepening of his conversion in which he felt his heart ‘strangely warmed’ – took place during a reading of Luther’s Preface to the Epistle to the Romans, and Wesley would follow Luther in preaching the centrality of justification by faith for the rest of his ministry. On the other hand, Wesley came to object quite strongly to Luther’s distinctive separation of justification from sanctification after reading Luther’s Lectures on Galatians in 1741, as Wesley expressed in a sermon: ‘Who has wrote more ably than Martin Luther on justification by faith alone? And who was more ignorant of the doctrine of sanctification, or more confused in his conception of it?’ (Cox 1964: 88).

Like Wesley, John Henry Newman’s influential 1838 Lectures on Justification make use of the church fathers to guide a path between the polarities represented by Luther and Trent. It is characteristic of the Anglican via media that Newman’s study is able to affirm central claims of each side, agreeing with Protestants that justification is primarily a declaration of God, and with Catholics that as God’s word it necessarily effects what it declares (Newman 1908: 62–103).

4.5.6 Orthodox

The Orthodox perspective on justification has focused on restating the earlier patristic consensus, and, with one notable exception, the response of the Eastern churches to the Protestant developments on the doctrine of justification has been a negative one. This should not be attributed to lack of engagement, as Lutherans made a number of early appeals to the Eastern churches, which was logical given that both parties found themselves in opposition to the papacy. However, a theological alliance, whether on justification or elsewhere, was never to gain traction.

Two events in particular are noteworthy for the Orthodox response on justification. The first is the correspondence regarding the Augsburg Confession between the Lutheran theologians of Tübingen and Patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople from 1574 to 1581 (Mastrantonis 1982). The correspondence consists of three cycles of letters in which the Lutherans present their understanding of the faith and the Patriarch responds with the Orthodox view, which on each subject contains varying degrees of approval and correction. Given Luther’s disagreement with the church fathers on justification, and the authority accorded to their interpretation in the Orthodox tradition, it is unsurprising that the correspondence ended without convergence on this doctrine. The patriarch expresses particular concern with how good works, alms, and penances are problematized within the Lutheran confession, and frequently appeals to the testimony of church fathers like Chrysostom and Basil to redirect their interpretation of scripture. The Patriarch is especially pointed in responding to the Augsburg Confession’s article on faith and good works:

The twentieth article says that you do not forbid good works. Yet you characterize feasts, ceremonies, fixed fasts, brotherhoods, monastic life, and other similar works as useless. This is not good, nor does it agree with the Holy Fathers. For if you love all good works, as you say you do, you should love these also because they are good works. (Mastrantonis 1982: 83)

It is also evident that divergent understandings of how human and divine action relate to one another underlie their differences as well, with the Patriarch citing Chrysostom to show that they are compatible rather than competitive in humanity’s salvation: ‘What then? Does nothing depend on God? Indeed, everything depends on God, but not so that our free will is violated’ (Mastrantonis 1982: 78; cf. 42; see Homilies on Hebrews 12.5).

The Lutheran reply rejects such compatibilism as tending towards idolatry:

[I]t is a matter lacking merit that our salvation be divided between us and Christ, as if we are able to absolve our own sins together with God in such a manner that a part of the achievement of the Mediator Christ would be attributed to us, also, and that it might happen to be said that we would in some way also be saviours, which would be an extreme absurdity. For the honour is owed only to the Mediator Christ and absolutely to no one else. (Mastrantonis 1982: 254, original emphasis)

The second major event is the publication of the Confession of Patriarch Cyril Lucaris in 1629, which was eventually refuted by the Confession of Dosethius at the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672 (Pelikan 1977: 282–293). Cyril’s Confession purported to have been written by the Orthodox Patriarch, and espoused Calvinist teachings, including on justification, such as an external location of justification, faith alone justifying, and a denial of free will in the unregenerate (Robertson 1899: 197–199). The Confession caused an uproar within Orthodoxy and was condemned by several regional councils (with many refusing to acknowledge it as a genuine production), before being rejected formally at the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672. The Synod states that it is faith formed by love which justifies rather than faith alone, and specifies that justification takes place inside the faithful, rather than by taking hold and applying Christ’s righteousness externally (Decree 9, 13; Robertson 1899: 122, 132).

5.2.1 Lutheran-Catholic convergence

The most significant ecumenical development on the doctrine of justification in recent decades – and indeed perhaps since the Reformation era – has been the 1999 Lutheran/Catholic Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ). Culminating a long process of ecumenical dialogue (see Lane 2006), the JDDJ statement represents ‘a consensus on basic truths concerning the doctrine of justification’ (section 13), according to which both sides are free from condemnation by either the Council of Trent or the sixteenth-century Lutheran Confessions. Acknowledging that the two sides have historically used similar language in different ways and with varying emphases, the JDDJ presents distinctive Lutheran and Catholic conceptions on various questions on justification and shows how they can be understood in mutually intelligible ways. With respect to content, the JDDJ describes justification as both forensic and effective, taking place at baptism and incorporation into Christ’s body (section 11), with the means of justification described as follows:

Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works. (Section 15)

In general, the Lutheran contribution tends to reflect Melanchthon’s moderating tendencies more than Luther’s sharper edges (such as with the identification of justifying faith as active through love, section 12; Gal 5:6), which has contributed to the statement’s rejection by some confessional Lutherans. The Joint Declaration has nevertheless been adopted and affirmed by other Protestant bodies (such as the Church of England, the World Methodist Council, and the World Communion of Reformed Churches) and has spurred further Lutheran/Catholic collaborative research, most notably From Conflict to Communion in 2013. While the JDDJ has been subject to critique on both Lutheran and Catholic sides for using verbal ambiguity to cover over enduring doctrinal differences (see e.g. Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod 1999; Malloy 2005), it is nevertheless true that both with respect to tone and content, the JDDJ represents an important convergence between these historically adverse parties.

5.2.2 Divine and human agency

A related development has been the recognition that disputes over justification have often been conditioned by underlying philosophical presuppositions regarding divine and human action, which has likewise contributed to increasingly constructive dialogue between various perspectives. On the Catholic side, one may take the example of Louis Bouyer (1913–2004), whose work insists on the genuine catholicity of Luther and Calvin’s central assertions with respect to God’s action in justification, with critique reserved instead for the philosophical system that forced them into untenable positions regarding humanity’s response to divine action (Bouyer 1956). On the other side, Lutheran theologian Robert Jenson offers a re-evaluation of the nominalist framework as it applied to the early Lutheran conflicts between the followers of Philip Melanchthon and the stricter ‘Gnesio-Lutherans’:

Both sides assumed the basic question, what can man in and of himself do about fulfilment? The Philippists answered: ‘A little bit’; and the Gnesio-Lutherans answered: ‘Nothing’. But the trouble was the interpretation hidden in the question, that there is any such reality as man-in-himself. (Quoted in Tanner 2005: 142, note 49)

It is noteworthy from an ecumenical standpoint that it is now Protestants who represent many of the leading proponents of compatibilism, such as the aforementioned John Barclay, who argues that Paul’s language of ‘energism’ necessarily incorporates the full participation of divine and human agency (see e.g. Phil 2:12–13, where Paul enjoins the Philippians to ‘work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for God is the one working in [energōn] you both to will and to work [energein] for his good pleasure’; Barclay 2015: 441–442; cf. similarly Wright 2013: 940, 955–956). Though a turn to such a non-competitive framework among Protestants has not been unanimous, contemporary critics of compatibilism nevertheless acknowledge that the view now represents ‘something of a standard view for academic theologians across confessions’ (Zahl 2019: 200).

5.2.3 Union with Christ

Finally, another trend across confessional lines has been to see justification as inextricably linked with union with Christ, the reality to which Paul appeals in his explanation of justification in Gal 2:19–21. This approach is often associated with the so-called ‘Finnish School’ of Lutheranism, which draws attention to the prominence of this theme in Luther’s writings on justification, which they assert has been obscured by a later over-emphasis on forensic categories (Mannermaa 2005; Vainio 2017). While not necessarily resolving significant matters of detail, understanding justification as a function of union with Christ can be a way of accounting for both forensic and effective aspects of justification, as well as an incorporative sense, since Paul also identifies the church itself with Christ’s own body (1 Cor 12:7; cf. Rom 12:5, Col 1:18, 24; Eph 1:22–23). This ecumenical convergence can be witnessed in Benedict XVI’s comments on union with Christ, which for him offers a framework for understanding and affirming Luther’s sense of justification:

‘Being just’ simply means being with Christ and in Christ. And this suffices. Further observances are no longer necessary. For this reason Luther’s phrase: ‘faith alone’ is true, if it is not opposed to faith in charity, in love. Faith is looking at Christ, entrusting oneself to Christ, being united to Christ, conformed to Christ, to his life. And the form, the life of Christ, is love; hence to believe is to conform to Christ and enter into his love. (Benedict XVI 2012: 82; quotation marks added)

While it may be asked whether this statement would overcome Luther’s objections to coordinating faith and love in justification, it is nonetheless true that such a formulation is closely reminiscent of Luther and Calvin’s own ideas. We can see this stated by Calvin in his Institutes: ‘For how does true faith justify unless by uniting us to Christ, so that being made one with him, we may be admitted to a participation in his righteousness?’ (3.17.11; cf. 3.11.10) The justifying union with Christ is described in similar terms in Luther’s Lectures on Galatians:

So far as justification is concerned, Christ and I must be so closely attached that He lives in me and I in Him. What a marvellous way of speaking! Because He lives in me, whatever grace, righteousness, life, peace, and salvation there is in me is all Christ’s; nevertheless, it is mine as well, by the cementing and attachment that are through faith, by which we become as one body in the Spirit. (LW 26.167)