Image of God (Imago Dei)

Peter Søes

The image of God (imago Dei) is a key concept in theological anthropology. This article examines its biblical use in Genesis and in Paul. In both cases, a crucial question is whether the image of God denotes certain aspects of human existence or signifies a reality in God in which humans participate. Further, the article presents some of the most influential interpretations of the concept in the history of theology, including mimetic, relational, and dynamic understandings. Finally, it presents selected examples of the concept’s use in contemporary interdisciplinary dialogue.

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1 Introduction

The imago Dei is the most important anthropological concept in Christian theology. However, it is mentioned only rarely in the Bible, and synthesizing the Old Testament usage in the book of Genesis with the New Testament usage in Paul is no simple or straightforward task. In the history of theology, the use of the concept is immense, complex, and diverse, with no consensus on how the imago Dei should be interpreted or on its role in Christian doctrine.

Both the rare biblical references and the vast, ambiguous interpretations in theology present significant challenges for making positive theological use of the concept. One might even suggest developing theological anthropology on a broader basis, without referencing the imago Dei. However, two factors make ‘the image’ indispensable for any presentation of Christian anthropology:

Firstly, although the biblical references to imago Dei are few, they hold an undeniably prominent place at the very beginning of Scripture. From the perspective of the Christian canon, they function as a heading or summary of biblical anthropology. Regardless of how ‘the image’ should be interpreted, it serves as the initial Scriptural encapsulation of the complex biblical understanding of humanity in the context of God’s creation.

Secondly, and consequently, imago Dei has been the focal point of discussions on theological anthropology throughout the history of Christian theology. This makes it impossible to bypass or overlook. As C. Gunton stated, ‘...we cannot articulate a doctrine of the human creature without putting this concept somewhere near the center, because it is the vehicle of so much discussion on the topic’ (Gunton 1998: 195; cf. Jenson 1999: 53).

This article examines the biblical use of imago Dei in both the Old and New Testaments (section 2). It then discusses some of the historically most influential theological understandings of the human resemblance of God implied in the concept, categorized as mimetic, relational, and dynamic interpretations of ‘the image’ (section 3). Finally, it presents selected interdisciplinary perspectives demonstrating how the imago Dei concept functions in modern theology in dialogue with non-theological anthropology on issues of human nature, human dignity, and humanity’s place in the cosmos in light of the current ecological crisis (section 4).

2 The imago Dei in the Bible

2.1 The Old Testament

The imago Dei is only explicitly mentioned three times in the entire Old Testament (Gen 1:26–27; 5; 1–3; 9:6). The latter two references clearly echo the first, which is the primary text. It comprises four declarations: (a) God’s statement: ‘Let us make humans בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ כִּדְמוּתֵ֑נוּ’ (in our image, after our likeness, v26a), (b) God’s statement that humans shall rule over the animals (v26b), (c) God’s creation of humans בְּצַלְמ֔וֹ (in his image, 27a), (d) God’s creation of humans זָכָ֥ר וּנְקֵבָ֖ה (as male and female, v27b), followed by divine blessing and the commandment to be fruitful, multiply, fill and subdue the earth, and have dominion over the animals (v28).

Interpreting the imago Dei in this context involves determining the nature of the human resemblance of God and, specifically, whether the human role and function vis-à-vis the rest of creation is the very essence of being created in God’s image or a consequence of it. A key question in this regard concerns the preposition ב in the phrase בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ (in our image). It can be taken either as bet essentiae, implying that humans are created as the image of God, or as bet normae, indicating that humans are created according to the image of God (cf. LXX: κατ᾿ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν, Jervell 1980: 492). This question cannot be resolved solely on grammatical grounds. Essentially, it revolves around whether ‘the image’ denotes something inherent to humans, suggesting that humans are themselves the image (whether due to human constitution or their function or role in the cosmos, as Jervell suggests), or if it denotes something about God and his manner of relating to creation, thereby defining the anthropological significance of בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ as a certain ‘in-the-divine-image-ness’.

The account of human creation in 1:26–27 must be viewed within the broader context of Genesis 1. This highly stylized narrative depicts the construction of the cosmos over the six days of creation. Since around 1960, Old Testament scholarship has inclined towards interpreting Genesis 1, including ’the image’, in light of Ancient Near Eastern parallels (Herring 2013: 192–195). This trend favours a functional interpretation, taking the image to mean the human to task to represent God by exercising his royal dominion in and over creation. Hence, the directive in v28f to be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth, subdue it and have dominion over the animals, etc., is understood as the very content of the imago Dei. Humans are the image of God insofar as they exercise this function.

In recent scholarship, many have pointed out that Genesis depicts the creation of the world as the construction of a cosmic temple, culminating in the seventh day of Sabbath rest when God indwells his cosmos (Middleton 2005; Brown 2010). At the innermost part of the temple, there was always a physical representation of the deity, typically in the form of an anthropomorphic image or statue. If the interpretation of Genesis 1 as a depiction of the world’s creation as God’s cosmic temple is valid, the implied reader of the text would have expected to find this image in it.

The Hebrew word צֶלֶם can mean both image and statue (Janowski 2002). Its usage referring to a deity statue in 2 Kgs 11:18 and other texts indicates that we should interpret the word similarly Gen 1:26. This text, then, portrays the created world as a cosmic temple for the Lord, where ‘the image’ serves as his representative, exercising his dominion akin to how the king, in Ancient Near Eastern mythology, acts as the deity’s representative and wields divine power.

Along these lines Bernd Janowski has interpreted the human being as ‘the living statue of God’ (Janowski 2004), suggesting a kind of identity between the God, who speaks in first person plural, at the human being created in his image. This aligns with Ancient Near Eastern royal ideology, where the king, as the image of the deity, doesn’t just represent a (absent) god but rather embodies the god in the world, serving as ‘a body giving physical form to the deity’ (Janowski 2004: 190).

However, such an identification or quasi-identification of God and his human creature through the concept of imago Dei appears to be strongly contradicted by the prevalent ‘aniconism’ that characterizes the entire Old Testament (cf. Hendel 1997 terming this ‘transcendent anthropomorphism’). Not only is any form of cultic worship of created entities forbidden, but even the mere depiction of any created being in a cultic setting is prohibited (Exod 20:4), as it embodies the essence of the idolatry opposed by the creation account of Genesis 1 (and the entire Old Testament). Therefore, it is noteworthy that there is no suggestion of any religious worship of the human being, as one might expect if the text supported the kind of divine-human identity that Janowski seems to propose.

Further, the term צֶלֶם (image) is part of the double expression בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ כִּדְמוּתֵ֑נוּ (in our image, after our likeness). Genesis uses the two terms (as well as the prepositions ב‎ and כ) interchangeably in the double expression (Gen 5:1.3), which seems to contradict Janowski’s interpretation, since דְמוּתֵ֑ (likeness) is never used elsewhere in the Old Testament in reference to cultic images or statues, and since the term here most likely is an explanatory gloss that specifies the exact meaning of בְּצֶ֥לֶם (Wenham 1987: 29).

One must therefore question whether an interpretation of Genesis 1 based on Ancient Near Eastern parallel texts, which identifies human beings as the image (bet essentiae) and then identifies the image with the deity or the divine body, is able to capture how the Biblical text makes use of the shared Near Oriental temple symbolism. If, on the other hand, one understands the text as an attempt to articulate how the God of Israel relates to his creation in contrast to the beliefs held by the surrounding nations about their gods, the difference becomes clear. The point of the image is, then, not that human beings are embodiments of the deity or other identity-interpretations, which blur the boundary between Creator and creature, or which make humans replace God in relation to the created order. Such interpretations run counter to the entire Old Testament and in particular to Genesis 1. Rather, the point is that God is near in his creation, and that this proximity is mediated to the created order through human participation in his image. The human ‘in-the-divine-image-ness’, then, simply is this participation, which in Gen 9:6 is the basis of the special status or dignity expressed in the prohibition against shedding human blood.

If this is the case, the creation of humans בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ does not imply that God through creation acquired an image, he did not have earlier. Rather, it suggests that God already had an image, according to which the human being was created, and in which humans in some way participate. This participation is the unique human kind of relation to God. Consequently, humanity’s special status and task within the created order (dominion over the animals and the rest of creation, Gen 1:28) are not the content of ‘the image’ but a consequence thereof. Humans are installed as priests in the cosmic temple of creation, with the task of mediating God’s presence and rule to the entire created order. This task is to be carried out in accordance with ‘the image’ (bet normae), which is why the ethical-functional aspect is the prominent feature of Genesis’ unfolding of the implications of ‘the image’.

This understanding of the image appears to be the trend in the explicit references to imago Dei in Second Temple Jewish literature (Kugler 2022) listing twenty-two explicit references to ‘the image’ outside of Philo and 118 occurrences in Philo). Of particular interest for the later New Testament use of the concept of ‘the image’ is the ‘sapientialisation’ that can be observed in many of these texts. The most evident example is Wisd 7:26, describing wisdom as an ‘image of God’s goodness’ (εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ). Here, wisdom is depicted as an entity in God, serving as the mediator of creation and as means of God’s presence in the created order (Collins 1998: 199–200). In Philo, this plays a crucial role in his ‘intermediary logos doctrine’, and he identifies logos with God’s εἰκών in several instances. This identification functions as the exegetical argument in Philo to understand logos as the pattern of the creation of both the human being and the cosmos (Cox 2009: 116–26; Dillon 1977: 158–61).

2.2 The New Testament

The concept of imago Dei is not very frequent in the New Testament either, explicitly mentioned only in 1 Cor 11:7; 15:49, 2 Cor 4:4, Rom 8:29, Col 1:15–16, Jas 3:9, and assumed in the Gen 1:26 – allusions of Eph 4:24, Heb 1:2 and possibly Phil 2:6.

At first glance the most striking fact is that none these texts are about the human creature, but about Christology, soteriology and ethics. They do not address anthropology (with the possible exception of 1 Cor 11:7) or human dignity, except for Jas 3:9, where creation in the image of God, possibly alluding to Gen 9:6, is the basis for the admonition against cursing a fellow human being.

2.2.1 Imago Dei in Paul

Apart from this last text, all New Testament mentions of imago Dei are found in the Pauline letters, and for Paul, the starting point is a direct identification of ‘the image’ with Jesus Christ: ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ (2 Cor 4:4). In the context of 2 Corinthians, the gospel is defined as ‘the gospel of the glory of Christ’, and the text clearly expresses a kind of identification of Christ with the Creator of Genesis 1, particularly emphasising the Creator’s divine presence in the world, which is expressed through Christ’s glory (δόξα, 2 Cor 4:6). The point, firstly, is that ‘the one God of creation is himself revealed in and as his Glory and image, Jesus the Messiah, whose face Moses was not allowed to see (so LXX Exod 33.20) but Christians are allowed to see’ (Kugler 2022: 137, who terms this ‘divine Christology’). Secondly, that this entails a transformation of believers to resemble Christ/‘the image’, meaning that through faith (= the act of seeing Christ as the image of God), believers are transformed into his likeness (2 Cor 3:18).

A thought similar to the first (Christological) point can be found in the hymnic tradition in Col 1:15–20, which states the superiority of Christ over the ‘thrones and rulers, powers and authorities’ that have in some way been of interest for adherers of the ‘Colossian Heresy’. In contrast to this, v15 presents Christ as the ‘image of the invisible God’ (ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου) and, hence, as the firstborn of creation. Thus, the text identifies Christ as mediator of creation and emphasizes that he exactly because of this is able to reconcile all things to himself through his blood on the cross.

A thought similar to the second (soteriological) point of transformation of believers according to the image can be found in Rom 8:29, which speaks of God predestining believers to be conformed to the image of his Son (συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ). In this text there is no reference to any seeing of ‘the image’, but Paul clearly presents the ‘image of God’s Son’ as the paradigm and teleological goal for salvation of believers.

2.2.2 Adam Christology or Wisdom Christology?

Regarding Paul’s Christological use of ‘the image’, a key question is whether it represents an ‘Adam Christology’ or a ‘Wisdom Christology’. James D. G. Dunn has argued in favour of the former in his Christology in the Making. Essentially, he understands Paul’s reference to Christ as imago Dei as way of saying that ‘Jesus is the indispensable model or pattern’ for the transformative process of salvation (Dunn 1989: 106; 2012). In saving believers, Christ performs an ‘Adamitic’ act, for just as Adam’s fall became prototypical for the sin and death of the entire human race, Christ’s resurrection and exaltation became prototypical for salvation. Therefore, Jesus can be designated as God’s ‘image’ just as Adam in Gen 1:26 (assuming the interpretation of בְּצַלְמֵ֖נוּ, which identifies the human creature as God’s image, that is, understanding of ב as bet essentiae, as mentioned above). Dunn argues that Paul (and the tradition preceding him) understood this as implying that Christ accomplished the true human existence, which Adam failed (based on a reading of Ps 110 in light of Ps 8). In Dunn’s words, ‘The divine program for man, which broke down with Adam, has been run through again in Jesus – this time successfully’ (Dunn 1989: 110). Hence, it is only as the resurrected and exalted Christ that Jesus is ascribed this prototypical and ‘Adamitic’ significance. Not by virtue of preexistence or of his mediating role in creation (Dunn 1989: 120, 124, 128). In short, for Dunn, ‘image of God’ is solely a human category. It expresses the true ‘Adam-humanity’, which Jesus fulfilled in his resurrection, and which is reproduced in believers.

Dunn’s understanding has exerted significant influence, also regarding the interpretation of Paul’s use of the Hellenistic Jewish concept of wisdom (Wold 2020). However, it has also faced considerable criticism (Fee 2007: 13–14, 164–165, 607–608; Bauckham 2008: 203–204, 207, cf. Tilling 2012: 170–76). While Dunn acknowledges Paul’s incorporation of the wisdom category and the identification of wisdom with Logos and εἰκών in Philo, he appears to underestimate the profound implication in Second Temple Jewish thought that ascribing the act of creation to ‘the image’ entails divinity. Hence, a kind of divine Christology must be inherent, if not in the concept of imago Dei as such, then in Paul’s specific use of it. It seems, therefore, more advisable to align with Ronald Cox and others (Cox 2009: 182) and emphasize Paul’s use of these Wisdom speculations. Thus, Paul’s Christological application of imago Dei must be interpreted as an expression of his parallel identification of ‘the image’ with wisdom. This identification is crucial both in Philo’s Logos doctrine and already established in Wisd 7:26, as mentioned previously. In this case the Pauline designation of Christ as ‘image’, ‘firstborn’ (πρωτότοκος), ‘beginning’ (ἀρχή), etc., does not, as Dunn suggests, refer to a human category but to a divine one. That is to say, ‘the image’ represents the divine pattern for creation, in accordance with which both the cosmos and the human being are created.

Given this understanding of Paul, it raises the question of whether and to what extent Paul simply adopts the Middle Platonic Intermediary Doctrine. This is a complex question that involves various factors, including how Middle Platonism reinterprets Plato’s use of the εἰκών concept in Timaeus by incorporating Stoic thought. It also pertains to how this understanding of a mediating figure in creation is reflected in Philo and other Second Temple wisdom literature. While some argue for a close alignment between Philo and Paul, and subsequently between Plato and Paul (Kooten 2008), others assert that there are notable distinctions between Philo and Paul, particularly concerning the bodily aspect of the divine image (Lorenzen 2008). The question cannot be said to be settled.

2.2.3 Imago Dei and paraenesis

In Col 3:10, the concept of imago Dei is presented within a paraenetic context using the metaphor of clothing. Believers are exhorted to live in accordance with the reality that they have, through faith and baptism, put off the old human being and put on the new, which is being renewed in the image of its Creator (κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν). A similar thought can be seen in the Gen 1:26 allusion in Eph 4:24, where the new human being is described as being ‘created according to God’ (τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα).

As in 2 Cor 4:4.6, the likeness to the image of God is expressed in terms of knowledge. However, the specific content of this likeness is manifested in a certain ethical behaviour. Col 3:12–17 elaborates on this behaviour, which includes qualities such as compassion, kindness, and forgiveness. It takes on the character of imitating Christ (Imitatio Christi). This should not be understood in opposition to the soteriological transformation of believers that ‘the image’ brings about (2 Cor 3:18; Rom 8:29), but rather as an embodiment of it and a vital component within the salvation experienced by believers. Thus, ‘the image’ goes beyond boundaries, breaking down distinctions among believers in Christ, including those of circumcision and ethnicity (Col 3:11). It represents a similarity to God in conduct that aligns believers with God’s own behaviour and nature (cf. Rom 15:5ff; 1 Thess 1:6). Further, Christ’s forgiveness serves as both the foundation and the model for believers’ forgiveness of one another (Col 3:13). As Jervell puts it: ‘Conformitas and imitatio belong together’ (Jervell 1980: 496). The same thought can be found in the possible Gen 1:26-allusion in in Phil 2:6.

2.2.4 Imago Dei and eschatology

In 1 Cor 15:49, Paul describes the eschatological resurrection of believers as ’bearing the image of the heavenly one’ (φορεῖν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου), presenting Christ as ‘the heavenly human being’. In this passage, he uses εἰκών terminology within the framework of an Adam-Christ typology. The background may be Gen 5:3, where Adam’s son Seth is born ‘after his image’ (כְּצַלְמ֑וֹ). Paul may have taken this to mean that just as God has an image (Christ), who serves as pattern for the creation of humans, and in whom humans therefore participate, there exists a corresponding ‘pattern’ in Adam that is passed down to his descendants, who thereby participate in Adam’s image (τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ).

It is important to note that Paul is not referring to the created state of humanity but rather to human life under sin in the state of perishability, dishonour and weakness (the psychic body, 1 Cor 15:42–46). The eschatological salvation, therefore, entails the complete replacement of participation in Adam’s sin and perishability with participation in the glory of Christ. The point is that the transformation undergone by believers, by virtue of Christ being the image of God, finds its ultimate eschatological fulfilment in the resurrection body (cf. Phil 3:21, where the same thought is expressed, albeit using the term μορφή instead of εἰκών). Again, this should not be understood as an addition to or contradiction of the soteriological transformation of believers into Christ-likeness, but rather as the consummation of this transformation. The fact that Christ is the image of God in which humanity was originally created underscores Paul’s view that eschatological salvation entails the restoration of the created state and order.

3 Aspects of the interpretation of imago Dei in the history of theology

Both the understanding of the ‘image of God’ in Scripture and its meaning in theological anthropology have varied tremendously throughout the history of theology. Given the vastness of the material, it is not possible to present even a nearly representative selection in this article. Further, there is no consensus on how to differentiate between types of understanding, although the distinction between a ‘substantial’ and a ‘relational’ understanding, often credited to Paul Ramsey (Ramsey 1950), has gained wide acceptance.

However, it is possible to overview the historically most influential understandings by starting with the God-human similarity implied in the expression ‘image and likeness of God’, and then focusing on the following three key questions:

  1. What is the content of the similarity between God and humans, and how does it relate to the specifically human way of existing in the world, including human abilities and capacities (such as reason, will, conscience, knowledge), human relationality, and the role and function of humans in the created order?
  2. Does this similarity arise from humans being created as the image of God (bet essentiae, cf. above), whereby ‘the image’ is an inherent reality in the structure of human existence, or does it arise from human participation in a divine image, which is a reality in God (created in accordance with God’s image, bet normae, cf. above)?
  3. Is the human being-created-in-the-image-of-God a universal reality that applies to every human being, or is it a dynamic reality that can be acquired either punctually, through faith in Christ, or progressively through a process of formation?

3.1 Imago Dei and human constitution: mimetic understandings of human resemblance of God

3.1.1 Irenaeus

Irenaeus is the first prominent seconnd-century theologian to fundamentally engage with Gen 1:26. His highly original interpretation must be understood as part of his anti-gnostic apologetics, as εἰκών (image) was a soteriological and anthropological key concept in the gnosis-oriented understandings of Christianity he opposed.

Irenaeus’ most influential contribution to the interpretation of Gen 1:26 is his distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ (imago and similitudo, Adversus Haeresis V,6,1; 16,2). This distinction subsequently became the standard terms for, respectively, that of original created humanity, which remains after the Fall, and that which is lost and only regained through salvation in Christ.

In Irenaeus, this is understood within a tripartite anthropology (body, soul, spirit), where the Spirit denotes the Spirit of God, and the soul is what animates the human being (the breath) and enables it to receive the Spirit (Jacobsen 2006). In the soul-bodily unity of flesh and reason, humans are imago Dei by virtue of their created human structure (in plasmate), but they can only acquire imago Dei by receiving the Spirit of God. For Irenaeus, imago is a dynamic concept. Humans were created to grow in likeness to God and thus into perfection. Therefore, the likeness was not perfect from the; Adam was created as a child who needed to grow, and for Irenaeus, similarity to God is the goal of human life. The Fall can be partially explained by this original imperfect similarity, and salvation as restoration is understood as reestablishing the original process of growth. Adam was (like) a child, who was to grow but fell instead. Through Christ, the possibility for new growth is provided. This occurs when the true image and likeness of God becomes present in the world through the Incarnation and manifests itself in the salvation of believers. In this way, Irenaeus combines a salvation-historical soteriology of the restoration of creation with a soteriology of growth.

With the concept of the indestructible imago, Irenaeus has provided language to express that even in humanity’s fallen state, there remains a capacity within human constitution to receive God’s Spirit/salvation/perfection (imago). In this respect Irenaeus’ imago-doctrine has had a significant influence.

3.1.2 Tertullian

His younger contemporary, Tertullian, has not been nearly as influential at this point, perhaps due to the fact that his image-anthropology is shaped by Stoic categories and the Stoic concept of natura (Søes 2019: 48–50). However, this very aspect of Tertullian may be said to anticipate relational understandings of imago Dei, as relation is essential to the Stoic concept of ‘natura’. Creation in the image and likeness of God, then, expresses created humans’ relation to God, which in turn simply is human nature. It implies a resemblance to God, as humans can be said to correspond to God (Adversus Marcionem II,5,6) in two respects, namely freedom and goodness.

For Tertullian, ‘nature’ is a dynamic concept, signifying God’s ongoing process of creating humans in his image through communication with them. The Imago, so Tertullian, is universal and applies to all humans because God never ceases to create. He finds it evident in human conscience, where he believes God to speak, and in human phenomena such as understanding, sensation, emotion and even bodily movement. Attributes like reason and will, which later tradition identified with the divine image in humans, are viewed by Tertullian as ‘signs’. They are not identical with the divine image, but they point to the created human’s participation in it. Moreover, the Fall doesn’t corrupt neither the sign-function of human capabilities nor created human goodness. Instead, it introduces a second and alien nature that coexists with the created nature in each individual (De Anima 42,6). Hence, according to Tertullian, participation in the divine image (i.e. the relation to God) is an enduring reality, but it’s not the whole story. Additionally, every human has an equally significant relation to the Devil. Consequently, humans have a dual nature and experience a sense of internal division.

3.1.3 Augustine

The most influential understanding, at least in Western theology, comes from Augustine: his complex interpretation of imago Dei evolves over his lengthy life. Unlike his Latin Christian predecessors such as Tertullian and Hilary of Poitiers, Augustine directly employs imago Dei as an anthropological term. While they distinguished between Christ, who is the image of God, and humans, who are created according to the image (secundum imaginem), Augustine asserts that humans are images of God (De Trinitate VII,6,12). However, he also employs ‘image’ in a Christological sense, akin to the Pauline writings. This duality stems from his profound engagement with Plotinus’ metaphysics and concept of image, particularly with the point that an image participates in what it resembles, and that the similarity of the image with the prototype hinges on the degree of participation. Thus, Christ possesses a unique degree of similarity with God, being one with Him. While all other humans are indeed images of God, they remain distinct from (Boersma 2016).

In his early writings, particularly in De vera religione, Augustine develops the important distinction between ‘using’ (uti) and ‘enjoying’ (frui). The true goal of human life is to enjoy God, and everything in the created world, other humans included, becomes false images or idols when they become objects of the ‘enjoyment’ that belongs exclusively to God. On the other hand, fellow human beings can be loved ‘in God’ (De vera religione 47,91). This is the proper use of the image of God in others and a part of the path to ‘enjoy’ God.

For this, and thus for human ascent to enjoy God, humans need grace. In this regard, Augustine differs from the Neoplatonists, whose concept of image he otherwise aligns himself with. Grace is mediated through Christ, specifically through the Incarnation as it was Christ’s way to become the true image of God in the world. Through grace, humans are led to God, gradually becoming more and more like him, until they are eschatologically renewed in His image and likeness (De vera religione XXVI,49).

In early Augustinian thought, ‘the image’ is thus participation in God, actualized only through grace. Augustine can even describe the image as being erased from the human soul by sin (Markus 1964: 142). However, he changes his mind on this point in the later parts of De Trinitate (Kany 2007: 228–29), where he presents his famous doctrine that, even after the Fall, humans continue to be an image of God, as the structure of the human mind is a triad, mirroring the Trinity.

Augustine associates this with various triadic structures in the soul, such as ‘mind, love, and knowledge’ (De Trinitate IX,4,4) or ‘memory, inner vision, and will’ (XI,3,6). These are examples of what he terms the ‘outer trinities’ of the human being. However, the triad that forms an image of the triune God is the ‘inner trinity’ (X,11,18) of memory (memoria), intellect (intellectus) and will (voluntas). This trinity resides in the rational soul (XIV,4,6) and serves as the means, by which humans know – or at least have the potential to know – God. This structural trinity of the soul is indelible in humans, even in the state of sin (XIV,14,19) implying that humans are inclined toward and possess a particular capacity for participation in God (XIV,8,11; 12,15). Augustine occasionally employs the distinction between imago and imago, although this terminology is not pervasive in his works. Nonetheless, the point is that divine grace in imago builds upon and completes imago, but that this completion occurs solely through grace, that is, through participation in divine wisdom.

3.1.4 Aquinas

The late Augustine provided the basic framework of the doctrine of imago Dei in the medieval scholastic tradition. Aquinas addresses it in Question 93 of the first part of the Summa Theologiae, arguing that humans bear the image of God by virtue of having an intellectual soul (I,93,2) and that humans resemble God in the intelligible actions of the soul. The soul is the image of God most perfectly in the act of knowing and loving God, and Aquinas can conceptualize this distinction in degrees of perfection using the differentiation between imago and imago (Brown 2014), though this terminology is not very frequent in him neither. Regarding the question of whether the image of God is universal in the sense that it is present in every human being, he responds by distinguishing between the image by nature, grace, and glory (I,93,4). By nature, all rational souls have a certain knowledge of God, and thus, they are images of God. However, only the righteous partake in the habitual knowledge of and love for God, which grace brings about by perfecting nature. And this God-similarity of the righteous is, in turn, most perfect in the beatific vision of God of the blessed. Thus, Aquinas aligns himself with Peter Lombard, who in the Sententiae carried out the same tripartition by distinguishing between imago creationis (naturae), imago recreationis (gratiae) and imago similitudinis (gloriae) (Peters 1980: 508).

To suggest that Aquinas and scholasticism view the natural imago solely through the lens of human abilities and capacities would be inaccurate. Aquinas’s conception of image-bearing encompasses human agency and action (Deane-Drummond 2012: 937), even concerning humans prior to faith. But the crucial point is that this is understood as something that grace, in some sense, builds upon and completes by adding the supernatural gifts of holiness and righteousness.

3.1.5 The Reformers: Luther and Calvin

However, exactly this is at the heart of the reformers’ critique. In the Genesis Lecture, Luther rejects both the distinction between imago and imago and the Augustinian idea that the Trinity is depicted in the soul’s triadic structure, on the grounds that if it were true, humans would be able to bring about their own salvation by the powers of their nature (WA 42,45,38–39, cf. 39/1,176,32–34). Instead, according to Luther, the image of God is the life of the first humans before the Fall: a paradisiacal life where Adam had greater strength, keener senses, was wiser and more beautiful than humans after the Fall because he lived out of original righteousness and was content with God’s grace (contentus gratia Dei, WA 46,47,11). For Adam, this involved a similarity to God in terms of life, righteousness, holiness, wisdom, etc. (WA 42,49,15–16; 42,242,10–12).

This image-life is completely lost through sin, so Luther. There is nothing left in human nature that grace can build upon or cooperate with when the image is bestowed anew in justification by faith. Thus, justification can be described as a restoration of the image (WA 42,48,11), which is a unique work from God’s side (opus Dei singulare, 42,46,11) that continues in a lifelong process and is fully completed only in the eschatological life yet to come (WA 42,48,27; 42, 242,21).

The fact that the image is lost means that it is unknown and incomprehensible to reason (WA 42,48,32–33). This is addressed in disputatio de homine: Reason (philosophy) is limited to understanding the human being as it is in itself, without referring it to its true source and cause, namely God (WA 39/1,175,36). Faith (theology), by contrast, regards the human being in its relation to God, coram Deo (Ebeling 1989: 409–10). Thus, faith is both soteriological and noetic a redefinition of the human person. Through faith the human becomes externally grounded (in God) by justification, and faith is exactly the human recognition of oneself as grounded in God (Slenczka 2014). On the contrary, sin is precisely the self-overestimating perception of oneself as self-grounded. Therefore, only faith can see the human in the relation to God that defines the believer as imago Dei.

Like Luther, Calvin starts from the premise that it is impossible to know God without knowing oneself, because the recognition of God without the recognition of oneself (as created, fallen and redeemed) is a mere philosophical abstraction: ‘...they [the philosophers] were seeking in a ruin for a building, and in scattered fragments for a well-knit structure’ (Inst. 1559, I,15,8; Calvin 2006: 195–196). Thus, the human person in the fallen state is characterized by perversity, depravity and corruption. Sin entails a spiritual death where the image of God is annihilated and destroyed. Therefore, the image of God can be known only in its restoration through Christ, brought forth in believers through God’s sovereign providence and predestination (Lane 2009: 286–287).

The content of the imago Dei is, then, that the believer is conformed to Christ, the true image of God, by reflecting God’s glory as in a mirror. The metaphor of the mirror is crucial for Calvin, and it means that ‘the image’ is present only to the extent that God is currently reflected in human life. Although this clearly implies an ethical renewal, it is not to be understood in a moralistic sense. Fundamentally, it concerns the rectitude (rectitudo) in relation to God and to fellow human beings, which characterizes intelligible reception of and response to God’s word (Torrance 1949: 35–36.64). To be in the image of God is to be a child of God (Vliet 2009: 118–20).

3.2 Relational understandings of human resemblance of God: imago Dei in Bonhoeffer and Barth

The point of speaking of the imago Dei as lost, both in Luther and Calvin and among those who think like them, is to deny that anything in human nature contributes to salvation or cooperates with God in justification. Moreover, it underscores the Pauline understanding of the image as Christ-conformity, brought forth by the Spirit.

However, it is fair to ask if there is any textual basis in Genesis to assert that ‘the image’ was lost due to sin, whether one interprets imago Dei as a direct anthropological term or as indicating human participation in God. Both Gen 5:1–3 and Gen 9:6 seem to exclude any talk of the loss of the image. Further, one can argue that the very idea of a universal human dignity, encompassing all humans, including those in fallen state, as in Gen 9:6 and Jas 3:9, contradicts the idea of a lost image. Even further, it is at least debatable whether the Reformers adequately addressed the restoration or renewal of the image of God in Christ as a true renewal of creation. If the created imago Dei solely refers to a completely lost original state, and if humanity in its present state merely ‘material for God with regard to the coming form of life’ (WA 39/1,177,3–4), then the connection between God’s work as Creator and as Savior seems to be blurred.

These objections are part of the background for the renewed interest in the imago Dei in the first half of the 20th century, which led Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth to propose a relational understanding. According to Bonhoeffer, human resembles God by being free. This freedom does not lie in human nature, but in the dependence on the fellow human that constitutes created humanity. It is a ‘being-free-for-the-other’, in which God as a free gift lets the God-Christ relationality be depicted in human relationality. Bonhoeffer terms this analogia relationis (Bonhoeffer 2007: 58–62.74).

Barth develops this original idea significantly in the third section of Church Dogmatics from 1945 onwards. Human ‘I-Thou-existence’, that is, human relationality, reflects the Trinitarian relationality in God. According to Barth, the created relation between man and woman is the original form of human relationality, and he understands the second part of the statement in Gen 1:26 (‘male and female He created them’) as an apposition to the statement of creation in the image and likeness of God (Barth 1945: 220).

The crucial point, then, is that human relationality anticipates the covenant relation with God, for which human life is eternally determined. In this sense, says Barth, humans are ‘capable of covenant’ (Barth 1945: 267–68). One can ask whether Barth thereby introduces a created ‘point of contact’ for divine grace or a form of natural theology, as he had previously rejected it in Emil Brunner’s case. Brunner understood Barth that way (Brunner 1951: 123–31). But Barth himself did not. On the contrary, he held God’s revelation to be logically and ontologically prior to creation and insisted that the analogy between God and humans exists only in the revelatory use that God’s Word makes of human relationality. Hence, it is recognisable only through faith (Søes 2019: 108–113).

3.3 Imago Dei and (trans)formation: dynamic understandings of human resemblance of God

As we have seen, the doctrine of imago Dei largely concerns how human beings can attain knowledge of God and participate in His saving grace. This is the most prominent theme throughout the history of theology, whether in the early Church, in medieval scholasticism, in the Reformation or in 20th-century relational understandings.

The same applies to the various dynamic models that have gained influence in modernity, where ‘the image’ is understood as the goal or destiny of human life. A significant figure in the development of this understanding is the Renaissance humanist Pico della Mirandola, whose Oration on the Dignity of Man plays a crucial role. According to Pico, the human is a ‘creature of indeterminate image’ (indiscretae opus imaginis, §18, Mirandola et al. 2012: 116), that is: without fixed identity. Precisely by reflecting the imageless God, humans have the freedom to shape and form themselves. Thus, the image of God is the goal of this dynamic process of formation rather than the starting point.

Some 300 years later this thought is further developed by the philosopher and theologian J.G. Herder, who understands the creation in the image of God as the guiding principle in a kind of ‘formation process towards humanity’. The underlying idea is that unlike animals, humans are created in an unfinished state, which enables them to transcend their instincts and be spiritually guided by the divine image (Herder 1965a: IV,6, 159–162; IX,5 377–378). Therefore, imago Dei guides and directs human life though it will be fully reached only in a future existence of immortality. Thus, Gen 1:26 should be understood as a calling to become the image of God. Herder believes this process of formation, both in the history of the human race and in individual humans, to be driven by divine providence expressed in God’s ‘sacred laws of nature’, through which humans are summoned to bring forth all that is noble and excellent (Herder 1965b: XV,1). Consequently, imago Dei in Herder is closely tied to a high degree of developmental optimism concerning humanity and culture.

This approach is also adopted in liberal theology, as seen in Schleiermacher, in whom the image of God does not concern humanity’s original state but rather the goal of the ‘predisposition for God-consciousness’ inherent in every human being (Schleiermacher 1884§60,1: 309–311; §61,1: 314–315). The Christological affirmation that Jesus is the true image of God, then, refers to his profound God-consciousness.

In the 20th century, Wolfhart Pannenberg has developed a comprehensive theological anthropology that, in crucial respects, builds upon and reworks important elements from Herder. Pannenberg agrees with Herder that the imago Dei is the goal and destiny of human life (Pannenberg 1979), yet still in the process of becoming, as it is ultimately an eschatological reality. Pannenberg also incorporates the fundamental Herderian idea that humans are created incomplete, characterized by instinctual reduction, and that human freedom and the uniquely human ‘openness to the world’ derive from this condition. This thought is elaborated in Pannenberg by the works of A. Gehlen and others. The distinct human object-awareness implies a religious dimension because human existence is structured in such a way that the centre of human life lies outside itself (Pannenberg 1983: 57–71. See also Kelsey 2009 who develops this idea in a different way). It is an eccentric existence.

The similarity with God, implicit in the concept of imago Dei, is not a question of morality. Rather, it lies in human participation in God’s life, achieved by relinquishing one’s own centrality. Thus, it entails obedient submission to and self-distinction separation from God. However (and on this point Pannenberg differs from Herder, Søes 2019: 192–195), human formation does not occur by divine providence but solely through the eschatological in-break in history, which took place in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. In him, the eschatological image of God is definitively anticipated (Pannenberg 1991: 250–266). Thus, conformity to this Christological imago and human resemblance of God through participation in God’s life occur precisely when humans actively renounce the desire to be like God (Gen 3:5). Though Pannenberg emphasizes that humans are responsible subjects, it is not up to human striving to produce or actualize the Christ-conformity of the image-life. In fact, it consists precisely in renouncing the significance of one’s own striving.

4 The imago Dei in contemporary interdisciplinary discussion

Pannenberg’s approach has had significant influence. Particularly important is the Christological interpretation of human destiny, which draws on Paul’s understanding of Christ as the true image of God. This anchors theological anthropology not only in the doctrine of creation but equally in Christology. However, unlike Barth, for whom true humanity ultimately consists in being a fellow human of Jesus (Barth 1948: 159), Pannenberg in a distinct manner relates his theological understanding of humanity to biology, psychology, sociology, and history. This, in turn, corresponds with a Christology where Jesus’ eschatological anticipation of true humanity is what links him to God.

At the same time, Pannenberg is an early representative of a broader trend that characterizes recent decades of work on theological anthropology across various traditions, including many that hold a more traditional understanding of the incarnation than Pannenberg does. Common to this trend is a dynamic understanding of the imago Dei as the goal of human life, forming the basis for a multifaceted use of the concept that seeks to incorporate both relational and functional aspects, as mentioned earlier. This trend is often referred to as ‘christological anthropology’ due to the explicit understanding of from Christology (Cortez and Hill 2023). It is notable that theological anthropology in this framework is related not only to biology, psychology, and so on but also with issues that touch on broader public and even political discourse, such as human dignity, disability, race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, humanity’s role in the current ecological crisis, human uniqueness in relation to artificial intelligence, and transhumanism.

Hence, in contemporary systematic theology, the imago Dei is not merely a concept for understanding biblical texts or Christian doctrine but also serves as a means for interdisciplinary dialogue and engaging theology in in public discourse. This field is diverse, and the issues mentioned in this section are just notable examples. What they share is that the focus on the image of God brings Christology into the conversation. Thus, it is not just about addressing contemporary issues from religion or from a general and vague concept of the divine, but from a specifically Christian understanding of Jesus.

4.1 Human nature and human dignity

As we have seen, the tradition from Irenaeus and Augustine understood human nature as a set of attributes inherent in the structure of created human existence. Following ancient philosophy, this natural endowment was seen as what distinguishes humans from animals and as the basis for unique human value and dignity. By referring to this as imago Dei, the tradition emphasized that it is precisely this human nature that enables humans to enter into relation with God. However, whether focusing on intellect, language, will, or morality, this raises the obvious question of whether human individuals with limited possession of these attributes, such as small children, disabled, or severely ill, are included in universal human dignity. This question also applies to modern proponents of this understanding (Stenmark 2012).

Relational interpretations of imago Dei view the specifically human as something that comes to humans from outside, from God (Welz 2016: 33). Regarding human dignity, it means that ‘human dignity must be understood as creatively posited by God with the fact of human existence. It is not dependent on the existence of a quality which humans possess. Rather, it is the presupposition for all qualities humans possess and the criterion of their exercise’ (Schwöbel 2006: 51). This avoids the problem of whether individuals lacking certain human-defining attributes possess human dignity. However, relational interpretations and their claim that all humans have dignity by virtue of their relation to the Creator can be accused of being a no more than a theological postulate or an ‘unwarranted claim’ (Henriksen 2020) without empirical basis.

Dynamic understandings of imago Dei as something that comes into being through a (trans)formational process, naturally do not claim that human dignity simply is an empirical reality. Rather, it consists in the notion that ‘God calls forth a distinctive awareness of ourselves as being more and other than what we actually are and do’ (Henriksen 2023: 110). Nonetheless, attributing dignity to fellow humans is a universal practice that can be examined phenomenologically. Ingolf U. Dalferth has pointed out that this ‘common practice with other human persons’ is itself a part of what is uniquely human, and that ‘this dignity is said to be inviolable just because its bearers can be, and often are, violated’. (Dalferth 2018: 82.92.98–100). Thus, it is a complex phenomenon where the human insistence on universal dignity is upheld precisely in the face of its denial. Dalferth is quite critical of how the concept of dignity has historically been used in a particularistic and elitist manner. Nevertheless, he maintains that the theological concept of imago Dei serves as a symbol in this context, sustaining this duality and interpreting it in light of both creation and Christology.

4.2 Theological anthropology and the ecological crisis

In his now-classic essay, Lynn White argues that the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation is the historical basis for the conception of nature that has led the world into ecological crisis: ‘Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen’ (White 1967: 1205). This is primarily due to the doctrine of imago Dei, which has separated humans from the rest of nature. For White, this was about environmental issues, but his argument is often applied to the current human-induced climate changes. Since the turn of the millennium, the concept of the Anthropocene has gained traction as a term to describe the significant impact humans have on Earth, including on universal ecosystems, global warming and its many destructive consequences for life on the planet, the loss of biodiversity, and the rapid decline in the number of biological species. By using the term Anthropocene, critics not only address specific behaviours and the economic and political structures leading to the climate crisis but also question the underlying philosophical assumptions.

One of the interpretations of imago Dei that has had significant influence in theological discussions about humanity’s role in nature in relation to the climate crisis is Philip Hefner’s concept of the created co-creator (Hefner 1993: 213–275). Hefner maintains the unique status of humans but reinterprets it by emphasizing that nature is not merely material for human freedom but rather the source of human life. Humans are themselves nature, and their freedom and agency are fundamentally instruments for God’s ‘enabling the creation […] to participate in the intentional fulfillment of God’s purposes’. Both Hefner and others, particularly those associated with the Zygon Center for Religion and Science (eg. Case-Winters 2004), have since then fruitfully applied Hefner’s proposal interdisciplinarily in relation to the ecological crisis. They have sought to develop a theology of imago Dei that critiques traditional notions of stewardship and seeks alternatives to a theology that opposes nature and culture.

In this context, Jan-Olav Henriksen has argued that the very symbol of ‘the image of God’ itself expresses a specific human ‘capacity for relating to the world that has emerged in the course of human evolution’ (Henriksen 2023: 69). He interprets it as human representation of God in desire and vulnerability, normatively pointing towards a practice in which humanity, as part of the created nature, lives in faith, hope, and love.

5 Conclusion

The Gen 1:26 concept of humanity’s creation in the image of God does indeed serve as a heading, not only for biblical anthropology but for theological anthropology as such. This is evident from Second Temple Jewish thought, through Paul, and throughout the history of Christian theology up to its contemporary interdisciplinary engagement.

Imago Dei has been interpreted through various philosophical anthropologies and theological premises. The distinction made in this article between mimetic, relational, and dynamic understandings of human resemblance of God does not claim to be the only possible way to categorize the interpretations within Christian tradition. Nevertheless, the article demonstrates that this categorization allows for comparative analysis of influential interpretations regarding three key questions: the content of the God-human likeness, whether humans are created as the image or according to the image (bet essentiae or bet normae), and whether being created in the image of God is a static or dynamic reality.

The article shows that imago Dei, both in the Bible and its diverse use in theological tradition, pertains to a specific aspect of anthropology, namely human knowledge of and relation to God. This is true for mimetic understandings of human nature, as in the tradition from Irenaeus and Augustine, which distinguishes between imago and similitudo, with the imago-nature representing what grace builds upon and completes. It is also true for the Reformers’ emphatic rejection of this distinction. The doctrine of the lost image, which is restored only through a unique work of God, ultimately denies any form of human contribution to the knowledge of and fellowship with God that imago Dei signifies. Further, it applies to the relational understandings in Bonhoeffer and Barth, who see the knowledge of God and covenant-fellowship with God as reflected in human relationality. Finally, it pertains to dynamic understandings, particularly in Herder and Pannenberg, who view imago Dei as the human destiny to participate in God’s life.

The tradition’s understanding of imago Dei being oriented around the knowledge of God and communion with God is undoubtedly due to the Christological use of the concept in the Pauline letters. As we have seen, crucial aspects of this image-Christology remain debated. However, the Christological foundation of anthropology has proven to be a valuable resource in contemporary theological anthropology and is expected to continue to be so in the years to come.

Attributions

Copyright Peter Søes (CC BY-NC)

Preprint: this text represents an accepted version of the article. A full published version is forthcoming.

Bibliography

  • Further reading

    • Henriksen, Jan-Olav. 2023. Theological Anthropology in the Anthropocene. Reconsidering Human Agency and Its Limits. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Kugler, Chris. 2022. Paul and the Image of God. Lanham: Fortress Academic.
    • Søes, Peter. 2019. Image of God, Knowledge of God. The Theological Anthropologies of Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg in Light of Tertullian. København: Faculty of theology, University of Copenhagen.
    • Welz, Claudia. 2016. Humanity in God’s Image. An Interdisciplinary Exploration. Oxford: University Press.

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