1.1.1 Cognitive science

Cognitive science is ‘the interdisciplinary study of the mind and intelligence, embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology’ (Thagard 2005: ix). The object of study is cognition, which may include all thought processes such as ‘attention, conceptualization, decision-making, imagery, imagination, language, learning, memory, perception, and sensation’ (Barrett and Greenway 2017a: 95). Cognitive scientists may focus on a specific cognitive process situated within one of these topics, the interaction of various processes, or how these processes influence a particular domain (e.g. religion and CSR), but ‘[w]hat earns them all the title “cognitive scientists” […] is that they bring scientific evidence to bear on claims and predictions about how humans think and the character of the human mind, and attempt to discover naturalistic explanations for the phenomena the data reveal’ (Barrett 2011b: 12).

1.1.2 Application to religion

As a sub-field of cognitive science, CSR also draws from various disciplines and scientific approaches. CSR typically focuses on pan-cultural human thought processes to generate causal explanations of (usually) recurrent forms of cultural expression regarded as ‘religious’ (Guthrie 1995), rather than the distinctive beliefs or practices of a specific religious denomination or tradition. CSR also typically takes a piecemeal approach to understanding religion and selecting topics that are considered religious, focusing on those beliefs and practices that occur across the globe rather than attempting to form a singular definition of what might be considered religious. Relatedly, CSR is methodologically pluralistic, employing different research procedures including ‘interviews, ethnographies, computer modelling, archaeology, and historiography’ (Barrett and Greenway 2017b: 96).

Given this piecemeal approach, various religious topics have received different degrees of attention and study. This entry will focus on topics that have received significant attention from cognitive scientists and are relevant to Christian theologians: how supernatural beings are conceived, understandings of the design and origin of the world, beliefs related to death and afterlife, ritual behaviours, interactions with sacred texts and objects, and morality. CSR scholars have also studied other topics that will not be covered in depth here, including magic (Sorenson 2005), spirit possession (Cohen 2007), splinter cults and initiation rites (Whitehouse 1995), and the formation of religious systems (Whitehouse 2004).

1.2.1 Agency detection

One cognitive ability believed to contribute to and influence belief in supernatural beings is the human capacity to distinguish agents from other objects. Agents are special objects that have an internal, renewable force that enables them to initiate action; they act in pursuit of goals, and they do so by virtue of their mental states with regard to those goals (Leslie 1995). The capacity to distinguish agents from objects, though likely taken for granted by adults, is important, as it couples with other cognitive processes and enables social interactions. Even at a young age, children understand that people and animals respond differently than trees, rocks, or other inanimate objects. Once agents are identified, various beliefs are readily applied to agents. Though objects and agents may share certain properties (e.g. cohesion and tangibility), agents act in ways consistent with their goals and may cooperate if help is needed (Barrett 2008a).

The distinction between agents and objects, though typically automatic and accurate, is not always made without difficulties. Computers may be treated as agents when they freeze unexpectedly and appear guilty of sabotage, and people may be treated as objects and shoved aside when someone is moving quickly through crowds (Greenway and Barrett 2017). This distinction may be particularly difficult in religious settings when objects possess agential qualities. Though made of natural materials and unable to move on their own, a statue that weeps or an icon that bleeds may be ascribed select agential qualities and religious practitioners may interact with these objects accordingly (Greenway 2022). This easy tendency to see agents and agency everywhere is at the core of Guthrie’s anthropomorphism theory of the origins of gods (Guthrie 1980; 1995).

The human ability to detect agents is believed to both enable the identification of natural agents and also encourage belief in supernatural agents. More specifically, agency detection among humans is hypothesized to be easily triggered even with scant or ambiguous ‘evidence’ (leading some to describe this capacity as a hypersensitive agency detection device or HADD), encouraging the attribution or consideration of agency for otherwise non-agential stimuli. Some scholars argue that the tendency to err toward attributions of agency was adaptive, in that perceiving agency where none existed bore fewer costs than failing to identify an agent when one was present (e.g. running from the sound of a snapping twig believed to be a lion when no lion is present bears fewer costs than failing to run when a lion is actually present). This tendency to attribute agency may lead individuals to consider the existence of unseen, supernatural agents when no cause for an activity can be identified (e.g. a falling tree narrowly missing an individual may lead them to consider the existence of an unseen agent). Though agency detection may increase the likelihood of belief in the existence of supernatural agents, many scholars believe additional thought processes are required for further development of these beliefs, and a sensitive tuning of agency detection systems in humans may be insufficient to account for the spread of god concepts (Greenway and Barrett 2017). Likewise, there is little evidence to date that individual variation in human-like agency detection sensitivity is associated with varying commitment levels to the existence of a particular god (Van Leeuwen and Van Elk 2019), but this is not a prediction entailed by Guthrie’s theory or the related agency detection hypothesis (Van Eyghen 2022).

1.2.2 Theory of mind

Another cognitive ability connected to agency detection is the capacity to reason about the mental states of other beings, often known as theory of mind, ‘mind-reading’, or mentalizing (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg and Cohen 2003). Theory of mind enables humans to consider the thoughts, beliefs, emotions, goals, and other cognitions present within the minds of others and act based on those considerations. Theory of mind is important for a variety of reasons, including cooperation, joint attention, and the inference of intentions (related to ‘teleological reasoning’, see section 1.3.1; Greenway and Barrett 2016; Tomasello 2019).

Precursors to what is typically considered a fully developed theory of mind (or higher-order theory of mind, see below) include agency detection and the ability to identify goals, desires, and beliefs. Other species may consider the desires and goals of conspecifics and other species (e.g. a pet dog may understand that it and a child are looking at and chasing the same ball), but the human capacity and use of theory of mind is believed to be unparalleled. A fully developed theory of mind is often believed to have developed when children can identify false beliefs (e.g. Anne knows that Sally believes the toy is in a basket, but Anne also knows that the toy is actually in a box). The identification of false beliefs suggests an understanding that the beliefs of others may differ from reality, and often develops around the age of four (Wellman, Cross and Watson 2001).

Importantly, the human capacity to consider the mental states of others enables humans to reason about and act upon their understanding of varying abilities. Humans understand that some people have better eyesight or memory than others (e.g. a child may know her grandmother cannot see well or that some things slip from her memory), or that some animals have better hearing than others (e.g. a child may understand their dog hears noises they cannot). This cognitive flexibility can be extended to beliefs in superhuman agents as well. An individual may understand their actions are not visible to any other people, but belief in a deity may lead them to consider the oversight of that deity and whether there may still be consequences for their actions. Various studies have investigated children’s development of theory of mind including their application to various supernatural beings, and some research provides evidence that younger children may err toward attributing superhuman ability until theory of mind develops further and agents provide evidence otherwise (Greenway and Barrett 2017; Barrett, Richert and Driesenga 2001; Knight 2008; Knight et al. 2004; Greenway et al. 2017; Burdett 2013; Wigger, Paxson and Ryan 2013; Burdett, Wigger and Barrett 2021). Such a developmental pattern may further enable and encourage beliefs in supernatural agents.

1.2.3 Application to Christian theology and practice

The study of agency detection and theory of mind bear applications for Christian theology and practice, particularly related to theological arguments for a sensus divinitatis (or sense of the divine; see section 2.2, below) and for Christian education that aims to influence belief in God (Greenway and Barrett 2018; Wigger 2016).

Relatedly, Christian educational practices may be nuanced and informed by CSR. CSR suggests that belief in some sort of supernatural being may be quite natural, especially for children, and may require little instruction or argument. Stated differently, the existence of God and angels may be readily adopted by children due to natural cognitive processes, casual talk about these entities, and participation in religious practices. Formal religious education or indoctrination may be unnecessary (Wigger 2016; Richert 2022). Christian teachers and pastors may accordingly focus on details concerning Christian belief in a supernatural being (who God is, rather than evidence for his existence), and particularly on details that may be less cognitively natural (e.g. the trinitarian nature of God; Greenway and Barrett 2018).

1.3.1 Teleological reasoning

This natural propensity to consider design and purpose when examining novel objects, both natural and human-made, and the preference for such explanations is often termed teleological reasoning (Kelemen 1999). Various studies led by Deborah Kelemen (e.g. Kelemen and Rosset 2009; Kelemen and DiYanni 2005) confirm children’s preference for both purpose-based explanations for human-made artifacts, natural objects, and animals, and a connection between such teleological reasoning and beliefs about the origins of natural objects. These intuitions extend into adulthood, even among non-theists, though adults often suppress such explanations when considering natural objects and when given enough time to reason further (Kelemen, Rottman and Seston 2013; Järnefelt, Canfield and Kelemen 2015). This ability to consider design and purpose (and an inclination towards such considerations) may be adaptive as it enables humans to infer the purpose of tools, use them accordingly, and improve them.

1.3.2 Application to Christian theology and practice

Though agency detection and theory of mind may increase the likelihood of belief in an active, supernatural agent, the human tendency to see design and purpose in the world may build on and shape such beliefs (Greenway and Barrett 2018; Scott and Barrett 2022). Coupled with other cognitive processes, teleological reasoning may then incline the human mind towards beliefs in supernatural agents that designed the natural world with purpose, and may continue to sustain and influence the world according to those purposes.

Interestingly, cognitive science investigating teleological reasoning may offer an explanation for why evolutionary theory is at times difficult for children (and adults) to believe and understand (Evans 2000). Evolutionary science offers no explanation of a creator, so for children who perceive purpose and design in the world, religious explanations for the origins of the universe may be more intuitively satisfying than scientific explanations that cannot point to some creative being.

Because teleological reasoning is an easy tendency, but not necessarily truth-aimed, Laird Edman and Myron Penner suggest that believers should exercise caution when tempted to attribute ordinary events to special divine action, such as weather-related events, election outcomes, or even finding a good parking space. Greater scrutiny of what God’s purposes might be in those moments and whether such purposes are credible may be prudent (Edman and Penner 2022).

1.4.1 Intuitive dualism

Some scholars argue that the belief in some dichotomy between body and non-material aspects of the self, such as a soul (or mind), is cognitively natural, often termed intuitive dualism (Bloom 2005; 2007). This intuitive dualism is believed to result from two distinct cognitive systems that separately address physical objects and the minds of agents (see object-agent distinction in section 1.2.1, above). According to this line of thought, objects typically trigger the cognitive system that addresses physical objects, but humans (and other agents) often trigger both systems because humans have both physical and psychological properties. Similar to the cognitive system that addresses physical objects, the cognitive system that addresses the minds of agents may also operate independently. When this occurs, the system addressing psychological stimuli may consider various agents that possess souls or minds but lack bodies. These agents could include beliefs in imaginary friends (Wigger, Paxson and Ryan 2013), spirits, or ghosts. This intuitive dualism may also support or encourage belief in the afterlife (Barrett 2022a; see also Barrett et al. 2021). The cognitive system that addresses physical objects may recognize that a human is no longer animated after death, but the cognitive system addressing psychological processes may continue operating independently, even though a corpse may no longer house the mind or soul of an individual (e.g. the cessation of physical activity does not necessarily require the recognition of a cessation of psychological activity). More complex accounts also suggest that an additional cognitive system concerns whether an object has a life force or spirit that is also distinguishable from mere physicality (Richert and Lesage 2022).

1.4.2 Application to Christian theology and practice

As with beliefs concerning supernatural beings, CSR can offer insight into difficulties educators may encounter when teaching about the human mind or soul. Educators may find that teaching monism faces greater obstacles than some versions of dualism due to monism being less cognitively natural. Similarly, little convincing may be required to instil belief in the afterlife or spirits of various sorts, and so non-orthodox beliefs about ghosts, ancestor-spirits, and other afterlife beliefs may emerge even in Christian contexts that do not theologically encourage such beliefs (Boyer 2020).

1.5.1 Ritual form hypothesis

Philosopher Robert N. McCauley and religious studies scholar E. Thomas Lawson (2022), both cognitive scientists of religion who have studied religious rituals extensively, specify that religious rituals involve a supernatural being, but note the role of that supernatural being in the ritual informs the characteristics and perceived effects of that ritual. Each ritual typically includes an active agent who acts upon a patient (usually another agent), sometimes using an instrument. A supernatural being may be directly present or implicated in any of those roles (agent, patient, or instrument), and McCauley and Lawson label religious rituals accordingly (special agent, special patient, or special instrument rituals). Depending upon this ritual form, they hypothesize that participants and observers will have convergent intuitions regarding certain other features of the religious ritual that, in turn, impact the performance of these rituals. That is, it is ordinary human cognition working on various ritual forms that leads to some recurrent features of religious rituals across traditions and cultures.

Special agent rituals (SARs) occur when a supernatural being is believed to be acting upon some patient. An example of a special agent ritual in the Christian tradition is baptism. God (or God’s ordained representative, a pastor or priest) acts upon some patient (the one being baptized), using an instrument (water). The effects of SARs are typically believed to be potentially reversible, in that a special agent can undo them (e.g. through excommunication, in this example), and non-repeatable, in that the effects are lasting and need not be performed again. Because these rituals involve the action of a supernatural being and typically happen once in any individual’s lifetime, these rituals are often accompanied by a high degree of sensory pageantry (‘bells and smells’), including special clothing and other celebratory elements. The SARs of the Christian tradition – most commonly baptism and marriage – match the theorized effects of ritual form hypothesis (Hornbeck and Barrett 2020). Both of these rituals are believed to have lasting effects such that the rituals need not be repeated (i.e. baptism as it is traditionally understood is not performed multiple times). These rituals may be reversed, though, when the supernatural agent or their representative acts (e.g. divorce).

Special patient rituals (SPRs) occur when a supernatural being is believed to be acted upon by another agent. An example of a special patient ritual in the Christian tradition is communion or the Eucharist. Christians act upon the patient, the body and blood of Christ. The effects of SPRs are typically believed to be irreversible but repeatable, in that the ritual can be performed many times over the course of one’s life, but you cannot undo it ritually or otherwise. Examples of special instrument rituals (SIRs) within the Christian tradition may include the use of holy water or holy oil for cleansings and blessings. Because SPRs and SIRs are not focused on the initiating action of a supernatural being (ordinary humans are in the initiating agent role) and occur more regularly, these rituals are often accompanied by less sensory pageantry.

1.5.2 Divergent modes of religiosity theory

Harvey Whitehouse has developed a psychologically informed account of how different sorts of rituals, rites, and ceremonies can yield different psychological consequences and, hence, encourage different sociopolitical arrangements. He has dubbed this account divergent modes of religiosity (Whitehouse 2004; Whitehouse and Kavanagh 2022). In brief, Whitehouse proposes that through a process of cultural evolution, religious traditions often gravitate towards an emphasis on one of two primary modes. The imagistic mode features rarely performed, highly evocative, often dysphoric rites at its core that fuse the identity of relatively small groups of participants into a tightly cohesive community. Identity is not defined so much by right beliefs, doctrine, or orthodoxy, but by shared memories of a common formative experience. In contrast, the doctrinal mode is characterized by a focus on frequently performed, relatively staid events that allow for the reinforcement of doctrinal propositions. Instead of episodic memory taking centre stage, semantic memory takes the lead and helps develop large communities who share common belief commitments. Many traditional Christian groups are clear examples of the doctrinal mode tradition.

1.5.3 Application to Christian theology and practice

Cognitive approaches provide new ways of categorizing religious practices aside from theological meanings attributed to these events (Malley and Barrett 2007). For instance, Whitehouse’s theory uses a broad sense of ‘ritual’ to include many possible types of religious rites (Whitehouse 2004), whereas Lawson and McCauley circumscribe ‘religious ritual’ much more tightly and identify subtypes (Lawson and McCauley 1990; McCauley and Lawson 2002). Because Whitehouse’s theory is more concerned with memory dynamics, the role of religious events and ceremonies as vehicles for reinforcing orthodoxy, and subsequent social arrangements, his account may concern a broad range of practices. Christian worship services, Mass, weddings, special baptism ceremonies, and many others could, in principle, feature in Whitehouse’s account. That Christian corporate life centres on weekly community ‘rituals’ enables Christianity to successfully create a sense of a universal church, to place doctrinal teachings at the core of Christian identity, to spread effectively into new places and cultures, and to tend towards hierarchy and policed orthodoxy (Whitehouse 2004). By Whitehouse’s lights, a Christianity that centred on rarely occurring, emotional rites of passage – such as group initiations (e.g. through baptism) – would be more likely to bond small groups of fellow initiates into tight-knit communities that are relatively hard to grow or spread, and far less likely to be concerned with orthodox beliefs.

In contrast, ritual form hypothesis explicitly requires that a religious ritual include some connection to a superhuman agent in the action structure (e.g. through a priest, a sacred object, etc.; McCauley and Lawson 2002). It is by virtue of this connection to superhuman agency that observers and participants will tend towards the specified intuitions and emotional responses that characterize the rituals. Without such connections, the events in question might still be religious events, but they will not necessarily have the same psychological consequences. Though ritual form hypothesis is still undergoing further examination and investigation (Hornbeck, Bentley and Barrett 2015; Hornbeck and Barrett 2021), it may bear many implications for Christian practice by giving new causal accounts for the intuitions, emotions, and social structures that surround specific religious rituals because of their differing forms, even if their histories, theological meanings, and many features are not so different. For instance, not all instances of baptism or communion as performed in the Christian tradition would be considered rituals as defined by ritual form hypothesis. Though most baptisms in the Catholic or Orthodox Christian traditions would be considered rituals because a supernatural agent is believed to be acting, other Protestant traditions may not believe a supernatural agent is acting similarly and baptism or communion within these traditions may not fit McCauley and Lawson’s (2002) definition of ritual. Consequently, these seemingly similar variants of baptism and communion may be accompanied by different psychological and social consequences. Likewise, these dynamics concerning the psychological and social consequences of particular ritual forms may inform historical studies of early Christianity (Czachesz 2017; Uro 2016; Martin 2007).

1.6.1 Minimally counterintuitive ideas

One area of CSR that offers insight into the nature of special objects is the study of intuitive and counterintuitive concepts (Boyer 2001). ‘Counterintuitive’ is used here as a technical term indicating the violation of one or more domain-specific intuitive assumptions that arise as the result of typical maturation (McCauley 2011). People conceptualize various objects based on their ontology and the domain-specific intuitive assumptions that ontology includes. For instance, bounded physical objects (e.g. a mug, a car, a chair) are intuitively believed to possess the qualities of cohesion, visibility, and tangibility. A rock that did not possess one or more of those qualities (e.g. an invisible rock), would be conceptually counterintuitive. Importantly, objects or agents are only considered counterintuitive by this account if they violate various properties core to their intuitive ontology. A very large rock or an oddly shaped rock, while novel and unique, would be considered counterschematic because they violate previous knowledge but not domain-specific intuitive assumptions tied to their ontological category (Greenway 2022; see also Purzycki and Willard 2016 for their distinction between ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ inferences and some critiques of minimally counterintuitive [MCI] theory). Those concepts that do not violate any domain-specific intuitive assumptions are considered intuitive, those concepts that violate one or two intuitive assumptions are considered minimally counterintuitive (MCI), and those concepts that violate many intuitive assumptions are considered extremely counterintuitive (XCI). Some research finds that MCI are more memorable than intuitive or XCI concepts, particularly for adolescents and young adults (Gregory and Greenway 2017; Gregory, Greenway and Keys 2019).

Scholars theorize that many religious beliefs are connected to MCI concepts. Certain agents, such as ghosts or talking animals, may be considered MCI in that they violate minimal intuitive concepts. Other religious beliefs, however, are more counterintuitive (e.g. belief in the God of the Abrahamic faith traditions) and may require further cultural scaffolding to support theologically correct belief (Greenway and Barrett 2017; Barrett 2004; Boyer 2001).

1.6.2 Special objects and rituals

MCI theory suggests that special, religious objects are likely to be only modestly counterintuitive in the properties attributed to them. Likewise, the means by which objects are alleged to have become unusual are likely to have an intuitive causal core. For instance, powerful relics will tend to have been in close contact with an especially powerful or holy person and, thus, acquired their power through a contagion-like mechanism. Such special objects, then, may be used in religious rituals, particularly special instrument rituals, or in magical practices that play off of the ability of the object to further contaminate other objects through contact or proximity. Alternatively, religious rituals could be used to create special objects (Barrett et al. 2017). In Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, blessing the Host prior to Holy Communion is an example of such a special agent ritual that makes ordinary objects extraordinary (McCauley and Lawson 2002).

1.6.3 Sacred texts

A common feature of many contemporary religions is that they have sacred texts or scriptures – texts that appear to influence individual and group identity, values, and behaviours by virtue of some kind of unusual authority. But the reckoning of a text as authoritative and the actions of individuals around and in response to texts are psychological dynamics. As such, questions concerning how texts become (and remain) sacred, why and in what sense they are regarded as authoritative, the pathways by which they impact individuals and groups, and how people go about using and interpreting these texts are all psychological questions. A cognitive science approach to scripturalism is not only possible,but may be critical to a full-bodied understanding of these special texts. Nevertheless, a cognitive science of scripturalism remains in its infancy, with Brian Malley being one of the only scholars explicitly locating a treatment of scripture in a CSR framework (Malley 2004; Malley 2022).

1.6.4 Application to Christian theology and practice

Considerations of the intuitive or counterintuitive nature of various concepts may be helpful for religious educators. MCI concepts are theorized to be more memorable and attention grabbing than intuitive or XCI concepts. Educators may consider how to incorporate MCI concepts in lessons, and when additional scaffolding may be needed when XCI concepts are being taught. The relative advantage for adolescents and younger adults (as compared with older adults) may also suggest the importance of exposing these younger groups to more complex theological concepts.

The ease with which religious rituals may create or reinforce the idea that objects or texts have special power may be grounds for caution in how objects are used in liturgical contexts. Because rituals tacitly trigger intuitive cognition they may, for instance, lead observers to regard the objects used in sacraments as quasi-magical and able to be manipulated for such ends, as in using communion wine as an elixir for healing. Similarly, CSR-type accounts suggest that it is easy to trigger fanciful or even superstitious intuitions about the causal power of biblical passages, or the Bible, as sacred objects. For these and other reasons, it has been suggested that CSR may be helpful in understanding idolatry or errors in Christian thought and practice (Jong, Kavanagh and Visala 2015; Boyer 2020; Barrett 1999).

Applications of cognitive science perspectives to the historical and hermeneutical reflections on biblical texts is receiving increasing attention (Czachesz 2017). Gerd Theissen and István Czachesz have argued that CSR, and related cognitive and psychological perspectives, can contribute to a number of enduring problems in New Testament and related textual studies. These problems include the nature of relation between texts and cognition, how to account for the stability and change in texts as they are transmitted, cognitive factors impacting synchronic analyses of texts, how to account for the long-term success of some texts, and why it is that some texts become sacred or canonical (Czachesz and Theissen 2019).

1.7.1 Moral foundations theory

Historically moral psychology has emphasized the importance of reflective moral reasoning for moral decision-making. More recently, scholars have turned to natural cognitive and affective dynamics that may account for cross-culturally recurrent patterns in moral intuitions. For instance, MFT has emphasized the importance of intuitive thought, often described as brief ‘flashes’ of approval or disapproval (Haidt and Graham 2007). More specifically, MFT argues that at least five moral foundations underlie much of human moral decision-making: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.

Each of these foundations are ‘tuned up’ differently, similar to the taste buds of the mouth. Though humans across the planet are typically capable of tasting sweet, salty, sour, umami, and bitter, each culture ‘tunes up’ an individual’s taste buds differently, emphasizing some flavours more than others. Similarly, humans across the planet are believed to possess common moral foundations sensitive to certain stimuli (e.g. harm/care). Certain stimuli may readily trigger these foundations across cultures (e.g. a crying baby may nearly universally trigger the harm/care foundation), while others may be more culturally specific (e.g. certain purity norms may be largely influenced by an individual’s context).

Interestingly, Haidt and colleagues have identified patterns revealing how moral intuitions are tuned up and relied upon differently across various subgroups. For instance, Haidt and colleagues argue that US Republicans tend to rely on intuitions tied to all five foundations, whereas US Democrats tend to rely on intuitions tied to harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. Similar patterns and additional profiles have been identified across other groups, including religious groups (e.g. Unitarian Universalists and Southern Baptists within the United States; Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Milojev et al. 2014; Greenway et al. 2019).

1.7.2 Morality and gods

Numerous evolutionary approaches to religion have stressed the role gods may have played in social regulation, often of a sort that overlaps with what would generally be considered morality (Shariff, Norenzayan and Henrich 2011; Norenzayan 2013; Bering and Johnson 2005; Johnson 2016). A common feature of such accounts is that belief in gods has become common because belief in gods somehow helped groups live together more harmoniously. Individuals who get along with others, or groups characterized by high degrees of cooperation and harmony, have a selective advantage over less prosocial ones. These accounts may differ in terms of exactly what evolutionary problem the gods purport to solve, and just how gods may have solved these problems (Schloss and Murray 2011). Nonetheless, there is something of an uneasy consensus that, somehow, broadly prosocial norms for life and the presence of gods or ancestors who are actively interested in humans behaving morally are mutually reinforcing. Exactly when and why such morally interested superhuman entities evolved and what their attributes are is an area of considerable disagreement (for instance, Baumard et al. 2015; Brazil and Farias 2016).

1.7.3 Application to Christian theology and practice

MFT may shed light on some difficulties experienced across Christian traditions and denominations. Jonathan Haidt (2005) argues that reliance on intuitions tied to different foundations may produce an ‘invisible fence’ such that Christians may experience discord because they fail to recognize intuitions that are core to the arguments of others. Christian communities may also consider how various moral intuitions (and other intuitive beliefs) fit into Christian formation. For instance, some traditions may heavily emphasize the individual’s ability to reason and understand certain theological beliefs, but these traditions may ignore intuitive thought and moral emotion. Other traditions may emphasize one’s experience within worship services and the emotions tied to those experiences, but similarly neglect intuitive thought and other types of cognition. Ministries may accordingly focus on holistic formation throughout their ministry, attending to various forms of cognition and how those types of cognition are developed within their ministry (Greenway, Schnitker and Shepherd 2017; Greenway et al. 2019).

It may prove that some kind of morally interested god, such as the Christian God, was a critical ingredient in moving people beyond parochial moral intuitions towards a broader moral circle (e.g. Norenzayan 2013), and could remain the most efficient and effective social glue due to evolved psychosocial dynamics (Barrett and King 2021). If so, the social consequences of theologies that de-emphasize God’s interest in human morality, or even secularization, may have far-reaching, unintended societal consequences.

2.1.1 Higher-order theory of mind

One capacity that is unique to the human species (at least in degree and typical use) is higher-order theory of mind (HO-ToM). Theory of mind (see section 1.2.2 on theory of mind, above) enables humans to consider the mental states of others. Theory of mind may be understood on a continuum, and when theory of mind extends to understand the existence of false beliefs (and the passing of false-belief tasks, which require individuals to attribute a false-belief to others), this form of theory of mind may be termed HO-ToM (Barrett and Greenway 2017c; Barrett and Jarvinen 2015).

HO-ToM enables a wide variety of relational activities, including the ability to consider what an individual believes about the mental states of others. For instance, Person A may consider what Person B believes about Person C. Such an ability may be considered essential for the kind of relationship humanity may have with God. Without HO-ToM, considerations of the will, intentions, and goals of God and relationships of the sort articulated in scripture would not be possible (Barrett and Greenway 2017c; Barrett and Jarvinen 2015).

2.2.1 Naturalness of religion

CSR as a whole often argues that religion may be considered cognitively natural in that human cognitive capacities often incline the human mind to adopt certain religious beliefs and expressions (e.g. agency detection and theory of mind enabling belief in supernatural agents), though these capacities may not incline the human mind toward belief in a specific supernatural agent. Indeed, on their own these capacities may lead to belief in some deity that creates and perhaps sustains, but further specifics may be culturally variable. Furthermore, certain characteristics of various supernatural agents may be counterintuitive (e.g. the trinitarian nature of God; McCauley 2011; Greenway and Barrett 2018).

2.2.2 Religion as evolutionary adaptation or byproduct

Debates concerning the degree to which religious thought and expression may be understood as either an evolutionary adaptation or byproduct may be helpful for the theological study of the sensus divinitatis as well. Some scholars argue that religion (i.e. belief in gods and associated rituals in response to those beliefs) is adaptive for humans and evolved because of the fitness-enhancing benefits it offers, usually by way of helping humans build larger cooperative groups (Szocik and Eyghen 2021; Norenzayan 2013). Others argue that religious thought and action are evolutionary byproducts, in that they did not evolve because of fitness-enhancing benefits they offer, but other capacities evolved for the benefits they offer, and these capacities in turn made religious thought and practice attractive (Greenway and Barrett 2017). The particulars of the accounts matter, but at a basic level, adaptationist accounts suggest that something like a sensus divinitatis is an add-on to human nature, becoming widespread with larger societies. From a byproduct perspective the sensus divinitatis is an emergent property of what it means to be human and is, likely, much more ancient than the shift to larger societies. It also appears that the adaptationist’s sensus divinitatis is a product of cultural evolution (not genetic evolution) and is more specific: a morally interested high god is a ‘natural’ feature of many cultural conditions. The byproduct sensus divinitatis appears to be more inchoate. Hence, these scientific debates may contribute to theological discussions of the sensus divinitatis by informing scholars about the nature of the cognitive capacities that enable religious thought and behaviour.