Abdelnour, Mohammed Gamal. 2024. 'The Straight Path (al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm)', St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology. Edited by Brendan N. Wolfe et al. https://www.saet.ac.uk/Islam/TheStraightPathAbdelnour, Mohammed Gamal. "The Straight Path (al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm)." In St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology, edited by Brendan N. Wolfe et al. University of St Andrews, 2022–. Article published August 1, 2024. https://www.saet.ac.uk/Islam/TheStraightPath.Abdelnour, M. (2024) The Straight Path (al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm). In: B. N. Wolfe et al., eds. St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology. University of St Andrews. Available at: https://www.saet.ac.uk/Islam/TheStraightPath [Accessed ].Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour, 'The Straight Path (al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm)', in St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology, ed. by Brendan N. Wolfe et al. (University of St Andrews, 2024) <https://www.saet.ac.uk/Islam/TheStraightPath>
1 Introduction
Al-Ṣirāṭ (Arabic: الصراط ,السراط , الزراط) on its own constitutes a soteriological concept, being a reference to the bridge which every human must pass over on the Day of Judgment in order to enter Paradise. In this sense, it occurs in the Qur’an several times and is described in a hadith as being thinner than a strand of hair and sharper than the sharpest sword, thereby denoting its danger (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, īmān 360). On Judgment Day, after the dead have been resurrected, assembled, and brought before God, they will be divided into the saved and the damned; the saved ones will traverse over Hellfire via the ṣirāṭ, while the sinners will fall in the fires of Hell below. While the faithful will cross the path easily and swiftly, the damned (temporarily or permanently, depending on the gravity of their sins) will fall from the bridge into the Hellfire. The saved ones then reach ḥawḍ al-kawthar (the Pond of Abundance). While this specific event is not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an, it is said to underlie verses 36:66 and 37:23–24 (Smith and Haddad 1981: 78–79).
While such embodies the mainstream Islamic view of ṣirāṭ as a soteriological concept, the early Muslim theological school known as the Muʿtazilites had some reservations. Despite the popular belief that the Muʿtazilites deny the ṣirāṭ as such, the renowned Muʿtazilite theologian, ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad (d. 415/1025), upheld it as a foundational creedal belief. However, the Muʿtazilites did not accept much of the descriptive detail mentioned above. Their key rationale for rejecting it hinged upon their belief that it is this world alone that is the abode of taklīf (religious responsibility) and not the Hereafter. In other words, humans will not to be asked to pass over the ṣirāṭ on the Day of Judgment as doing so would turn the Hereafter into an abode of practice when it is meant to be an abode of accountability (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1996: 737). Apart from that, ʿAbd al-Jabbār asserted that rejecting ṣirāṭ completely amounted to rejecting the Word of God (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1996: 738).
When al-ṣirāṭ is joined with al-mustaqīm (Arabic: الصراط المستقيم) they form an epistemological concept that is often translated as ‘the straight path’, understood as ‘the right path’ or ‘the middle way’ that pleases God. Closely related to this is the concept of al-Sabīl (The Way), which revolves around the idea of pursuing and sticking to the straight path, e.g. Q. 5:16. In his al-Mīzān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān (The Balance in Interpretation of the Qur’an) Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981) draws our attention to the fact that while the Qur’an always uses ṣirāṭ in the singular form, it uses sabīl in the plural as well as the singular (consider Q. 5:18 and 29:69). This is because, while the ṣirāṭ is pure and never mixes with deviation or falsehood, the sabīl may get mixed with deviation and that is why it comes at times in the plural form, e.g. Q. 12:106–118. Reflecting on Qur’anic verse 13:19, Ṭabāṭabāʾī contended that sabīl’s relationship to falsehood can be likened to the rain and foam. That is, when the rain descends from the sky, it often gets mixed with the foam, as opposed to the ṣirāṭ, which remains intact. By virtue of being pure or straight, al-ṣirāṭ is well-positioned to watch over the various subul (pl. of sabīl), acting as a criterion that distinguishes the elements of truth from the elements of falsehood contained therein (Ṭabāṭabāʾī [n.d.]: 29–31).
2 Exegetical reflections
In the Qur’an, the concept of al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm occurs more than forty times. For instance, as part of the Qur’an’s opening chapter, verse 1:6 asks for guidance to the ‘straight path’. Qur’anic verses 6:151–153 enumerate the various principles and practices that constitute part of the Islamic conception of this straight path, while verse 11:56 literally states that God Himself is on a ‘straight path’, meaning that ‘God is upon the path of truth, is Just, and does not let wrongdoers escape Him. It also means that He will not forsake one who relies upon Him’ (Nasr et al. 2015: 1284). Qur’anic verses 6: 83–88 show that God guided His messengers to the ‘straight path’, and hence asks Prophet Muḥammad to follow in their footsteps. Verse 6:161 describes the path that Ibrāhīm (Abraham) treads as ‘straight’, while the same is said of the prophets Mūsā (Moses) and Hārūn (Aaron) in verse 37:118. In verse 7:16, Iblīs says to God: ‘It is because you put me in error, I will sit and wait for them [the humans] on Your Straight Path.’ With that being said, the question that poses itself here is how commentators on the Qur’an (mufassirūn) have understood this Qur’anic concept?
Generally, the mufassirūn have understood references to the Straight Path in the Qur’an as being to Islam, the religion of truth that keeps its followers away from deviation while shielding them from crookedness. In his Qur’anic exegesis, Taʾwīlāt ahl al-sunna (Interpretations of the People of the Sunna), Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) states that commentators differed as to what is meant by the ‘straight path’ mentioned in verse 1:6. While some say it refers to the Qur’an itself, others say it refers to Islam in general or to īmān (faith) specifically. He added that mustaqīm either means that the Qur’an itself is straight or that it is the book through which one is made straight. As for Qur’anic verse 1:7 (‘[guide us towards] the path of those upon whom you have bestowed favour, not of those who have evoked your wrath or of those who are misled’), al-Māturīdī offered two interpretations. The first corresponds with the popular view linking the first referenced group to the Jews (‘those who have evoked your wrath’) and the second to the Christians (‘those who are misled’). The second interpretation, however, states that sin can be divided into two categories: major sins, e.g. disbelief, which incur God’s wrath, and minor sins, e.g. cursing, which lead to misguidance (Māturīdī 2004: 10–11 [vol. 1]).
When explaining Qur’anic verses 1:6–7 in his Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān (Collection of Statements on the Interpretation of Verses of the Qur’an), Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 314/923) argued that the people who follow the Straight Path are Muslims. To support this view, he quoted Q. 4:69 (Ṭabarī 1994: 75–76 [vol. 1]). As for ‘those who have evoked God’s wrath’, he argued that these are the ones described in Q. 5:60 (Ṭabarī 1994: 80), which says:
Say: ‘Shall I inform you of something much worse than this as a punishment from God? It is that of those who incurred the curse of God and His wrath, those of whom some He transformed into apes and swine, those who worshipped evil – these are (many times) worse in rank, and far more astray from the even path!’
Regarding ‘those who are misled’, he contended that these are the ones described in Q. 5:77, which states:
Say: ‘O people of the Book! Do not exceed the bounds of your religion, trespassing beyond the truth, nor follow the vain desires of people who went wrong in times gone by – who misled many, and strayed (themselves) from the Straight Path.’
The context in which Qur’anic verses 5:60 and 5:77 were revealed, he claimed, indicated that the first verse referenced the Jews and the second the Christians (Ṭabarī 1994: 80).
In a similar vein, Abū al-Fiḍāʾ ʿImād al-Dīn Ismāʿīl ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) emphasized the centrality of truth to the Straight Path in his Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm (Interpretation of the Glorious Qur’an), notably by appealing to a Prophetic parable in which the nature of this path is indicated. It is worth quoting this tradition at length:
God has set forth a parable: a Straight Path that is surrounded by two walls on both sides, with several open doors within the walls covered by curtains. A caller on the gate of the Path calls out, ‘O people! Stay on the Path and do not deviate from it.’ Meanwhile, a caller from above the Path is also warning any person who wants to open any of these doors, ‘Woe unto you! Do not open it, for if you open it, you will fall through.’ The Straight Path is Islam, the two walls are the limits set by God, while the doors refer to what God has forbidden. The caller on the gate of the Path is the Book of God, while the caller above the Path is God’s admonishment present in the heart of every Muslim. (Ibn Kathīr 1999: 138–139 [vol. 1])
To argue that this path includes only Muslims and thus excludes Jews and Christians, Ibn Kathīr quoted Qur’anic verse 4:69, writing: ‘The Path of the people of [true] faith is composed of knowing the truth and acting upon it; the Jews abandoned practice, while Christians lost the truth. This is why [God’s] “wrath” was inflicted upon the Jews, while being characterized as “led astray” was more befitting for the Christians’ (Ibn Kathīr 1999: 141). While both have incurred God’s wrath and been led astray, said Ibn Kathīr, ‘wrath’ is the particular attribute of the Jews and being ‘led astray’ the most befitting attribute of the Christians (1999: 141). The Jews, according to this view, deserved this labelling because they murdered many of their prophets while their wrongdoings contributed to moral corruption and social disintegration. As for the Christians, despite their early commitment to the teachings of Jesus (ʿĪsā), with the passage of time they succumbed to the influence of those who had already deviated from the right path, i.e. the Romans, which allowed the introduction of many foreign elements into their tradition (Leaman 2006: 614).
Even though Abū ʿAbdullāh al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1272) demonstrated that there are minority interpretations linking the above references to the disbelievers and hypocrites instead, he highlighted that the vast majority of Qur’anic exegetes have interpreted these verses in the light of a hadith that says, ‘The Jews are those who God is angry with, and the Christians are those who have gone astray.’ In his own words:
The majority opinion is that those with wrath on them are the Jews and the misguided are the Christians. That was interpreted by the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, in the ḥadīth of ʿAdī b. Ḥātim and the story of how he became a Muslim, transmitted by Abū Dāwūd in his Musnad and al-Tirmidhī in his Jāmiʿ (two collections of ḥadīth). The interpretation is also attested to by the Almighty [i.e. elsewhere in the Qur'an] who says about the Jews, ‘They brought down anger from God upon themselves’ (2:61, 3:112) and He [God] says, ‘God is angry with them’ (48:6). He says about the Christians that they, ‘were misguided previously and have misguided many others, and are far from the right way’ (2:61, 3:112). (Qurṭubī 2006: 230–231 [vol. 1])
In their Tafsīr al-Jalālayn (Exegesis of the two Jalāls), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 864/1460) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) reiterate the same narrative. In the words of al-Maḥallī:
It [verse 6] is followed by its appositive [in verse 7], ‘…the Path of those You are blessed,’ with guidance, ‘not of those with wrath upon them,’ who are the Jews, ‘nor of the misguided,’ who are the Christians. The grammatical structure here indicates that those who are guided are not the Jews or the Christians. (Maḥallī and Suyūṭī 2003: 1)
Many Shīʿī commentaries, chief amongst them being Abū ʿAli al-Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Faḍl al-Ṭabrisī’s (d. 548/1154) Majmaʿ al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān (Complete Clarification in Qur’anic Interpretation), offer interpretations akin to those of the Sunnī authors just cited, emphasizing that the blessed ones are the Muslims, that God directs His wrath at the Jews, and that the Christians are misled. However, al-Ṭabrisī particularly emphasized that the nature of the Straight Path is that it leads to belief in Divine Unity and Divine Justice (Ṭabrisī 2005: 34–39), two essential creedal articles in both Shīʿī and Sunnī theology. Several other Shīʿī commentators have argued for a view that excludes all non-Shīʿa from the Straight Path. For example, ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qummī (d. 329/939) in his Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, not only excludes the Jews and Christians from being upon the Straight Path, but any who revile the figure of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, identifying them as the nuṣṣāb, a term designating the adversaries of ʿAlī (Qummī 2014: 54 [vol.1]). Instead, he identifies the ‘Straight Path’ as the path that recognizes the imāmate of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (Qummī 2014: 53 [vol.1]).
Ibn Bābawayh al-Qummī (d. 381/991), in his Maʿānī al-akhbār (Meanings of the Traditions), relates a quotation that, ascribed to al-Imām al-Ḥusayn (the Prophet Muḥammad's grandson), links the epistemological Path to the soteriological one. It says:
It is two Straight Paths; one is in the Here and another is in the Hereafter. As for the one of the Here, it is [following] the Imam whose obedience is mandatory; whoever knows him in the Here and follow his footsteps, passing on the Hereafter’s Path for them will be made possible. Whoever does not get to recognize him in the Here, they will fail to pass on the Hereafter’s Straight Path and will fall in Hell. (Qummī 2014: 52 [vol.1])
Abū al-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), in his al-Kashshāf (The Revealer), represents the Muʿtazilite position on the Straight Path. Although the Muʿtazilite school is often seen by Sunnī Muslims as unorthodox, al-Zamakhsharī’s opinion transcends any denomination-based view of the Straight Path, elucidating that what is meant by that term in the Qur’an is the Path of Truth (that is, Islam), while reiterating that those who receive God’s wrath in Q. 1:7 are the Jews and those who are misguided are the Christians (Zamakhsharī 2009: 30).
Mystically orientated Qur’anic exegeses have affinities with the preceding interpretations. Aḥmad ibn ʿAjība (d. 1224/1809), in his al-Baḥr al-madīd fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-majīd (The Vast Sea in the Interpretation of the Glorious Qur’an) largely follows the interpretations of the preceding scholars, identifying the blessed ones with the Muslims, those who possess God’s wrath with the Jews, and those who are misled with the Christians (Ibn ʿAjība 1999: 65–66 [vol.1]). It is noteworthy, however, that Ibn ʿAjība generally defines the Straight Path as that which combines the ḥaqīqa (the esoteric way) with sharīʿa (the exoteric way; Islamic law) (Ibn ʿAjība 1999: 62). Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 412/1021) argued along the same lines in his Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr (Truths of Interpretation) (Sulamī 2001: 40 [vol. 1]).
There are three common denominators between these interpretations: the centrality of the Prophet Muḥammad to the Straight Path, an emphasis on ‘truth’ as the surety that one is upon the Straight Path that leads to God, and the linking of ‘those who are blessed’ with Muslims, those who evoked God’s wrath with the Jews, and those who are misled with the Christians.
This view uses two exegetical mechanisms. Firstly, it reads the seventh verse of Sūrat al-Fātiḥa in light of other Qur’anic verses that speak negatively of Jews and Christians (such as Q. 2:61, 90; 3:112; 5:60; and 5:77). Secondly, it appeals to a saying attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad, though not considered to be of the highest degree of authenticity, identifying the Jews as worthy of God’s wrath and the Christians as going astray. Narrated in Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī’s (d. 279/869) collection, the hadith says: ‘The Jews are those who God is angry with, and the Christians have strayed’ (al-Tirmidhī, Jāmiʿ, Sunan, tafsīr al-Qurʾān 6). As for those Qur’anic verses that speak positively of Jews and Christians, commentators often resort to one of two mechanisms to qualify them. The first is the theory of naskh (supersessionism), by which they argue that (for instance) Q. 2:62 is abrogated by Q. 3:85. The former says: ‘Indeed, those who believe and those who are Jews or Christians or Sabeans – anyone who believed in God and the Last Day and did good - will have their reward with their Lord, and no fear will there be concerning them, nor will they grieve.’ The latter states: ‘And whoever desires other than Islam as a religion – never will it be accepted from him, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers.’ The second mechanism is by specifying the generality of verses such as 2:62, a mechanism known as (takhṣīṣ). In this case, the Jews and Christians acknowledged in Q. 2:62 are those who adhered to their religion before the advent of the Prophet Muḥammad, but subsequently abandoned their traditions and followed his Straight Path once he had appeared (see McAuliffe 1991: 93–128).
Examples of exceptions to this pattern include Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905). While in his Laṭāʾif al-Ishārāt (The Subtle Allusions), al-Qushayrī agreed that the Straight Path is the Path of Truth as exposed in the Qur’an and the Sunna, he did not associate it with Muslims exclusively. Instead, he opted for a more spiritually oriented interpretation, associating the blessed ones with the awliyāʾ (friends) of God, or those whose hearts are occupied with nothing but Him. As for the other two groups, they include those who are deluded by Satan, distracted by their own egos, or distanced from God by their whims (Qushayrī 2001: 14–15 [vol. 1]). In his interpretation of Qur’anic verse 2:62, al-Qushayrī contended that the diversity of paths between Jews, Christians, and Muslims does not negate the unity of their origin (Qushayrī 2001: 50).
In his al-Tafsīr al-kabīr (The Large Commentary), also known as Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Keys of the Unseen), al-Rāzī offered some critical insights into Qur’anic verses 1:6–7. He contended that associating Jews with God’s anger and Christians with misguidance was ill-founded. This is because polytheists, atheists, and hypocrites are far worse than Jews and Christians and, as such, are more worthy of such disparagements. Alternatively, he argued that such negative attributes may apply to each and every person who does wrong and to each and every person who is misled in belief. Al-Rāzī’s rationale for this conclusion was that the verses in question are ‘generic’ in their linguistic connotations and thus should not be qualified on the basis of ill-grounded premises (Rāzī 1981: 264 [vol.1]). In his Asās al-Taqdīs (The Foundation of Divine Transcendence), therefore, he argued that it is problematic to base such a weighty theological matter (identifying the followers of the Straight Path) on an āḥād hadith (a report narrated by only one narrator), as such cannot establish sufficient certainty (Rāzī 1986: 215–219).
This does not mean, however, that al-Rāzī accepted Christianity and Judaism as partakers in the Straight Path. In his commentary on Qur’anic verse 11:17, he cites the following hadith:
By Him in Whose hand is the life of Muḥammad, he who amongst the community of Jews or Christians hears about me, but does not affirm his belief in that with which I have been sent and dies in this state (of disbelief), he shall be but one of the denizens of Hell-Fire. (Rāzī 1981: 211 [vol. 17])
In his engagement with verse 2:62, al-Rāzī argues that the phrase ‘faith in God’ necessarily demands and requires belief in the Prophet Muḥammad (Rāzī 1981: 111–114 [vol. 3]). In other words, a belief in God cannot be true if not accompanied by a belief in the Prophet Muḥammad. Therefore, Jews and Christians are not seen as partakers of the Straight Path.
Moving to ʿAbduh, he critiqued usage of naskh as an exegetical device. Thus, he took verse 2:62 at face value, understanding it to mean that Jews and Christians are partakers of the Straight Path alongside Muslims (see Abdelnour 2021: 140–144). In doing so, he also appealed to Qur’anic verses 4:123–25, quoting a tradition associated with their revelation that attributed such to a quarrel between a group of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, with each asserting claims to ultimate superiority. ʿAbduh sketched some of the implications of this excessive obsession with religious allegiance, arguing that God’s reproach was occasioned by the imbalance that developed when an individual’s interest in being identified with a religion outweighed the fervour with which they practised it (ʿAbduh and Riḍā 1910: 432–433 [vol. 5]). On the basis of such verses, ʿAbduh thought that belief in God, the Last Day, and doing good constituted the key prerequisites for one to be on the Straight Path leading to truth and salvation (ʿAbduh and Riḍā 1947: 336–337 [vol. 1]).
Consolidating this view of the Straight Path, and in accordance with Qur’anic verse 6:90, ʿAbduh understood previous revelations as examples of guidance to Muslims. In doing so, he raised the following question: how could pre-Islamic revelations be taken as a source of guidance when the Islamic revelation contains instructions previous revelations did not, with Islam being more pertinent for our time and the next? ʿAbduh’s response to this was that the Qur’an is clear about the fact that God’s religion is at essence one; although forms may differ, the essence does not. In support of this, he quoted Qur’anic verses 3:64 and 4:163 by way of demonstrating the unifying threads between Prophet Muḥammad’s message and those of earlier prophets. Verse 3:64 therefore translates as:
Say, ‘O People of the Book, come to a word that is common between us and you – that we will not worship anything except God and not associate anything with Him and not take one another as lords instead of God’. But if they turn away, then say, ‘Bear witness that we are submitting to Him’.
Verse 4:163, on the other hand, reads:
Indeed, We have revealed to you, [O Muḥammad], as We revealed to Noah and the prophets after him. And we revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, the Descendants, Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron, and Solomon, and to David We gave the book [of Psalms].
But what then does he make of the references in verse 1:7 to those who receive God’s wrath and those who are misled? ʿAbduh argued that those with whom God is angry are those who have rejected the divine guidance after it has been made clear to them and who arrogantly scorn it. As for the misled ones, he divided these into four classes: (1) those the divine guidance never reached or who received it in a manner that did not compel them to reflect upon it; (2) those who received guidance in a compelling manner and duly reflected upon it but who were not aided in the acceptance of such so that they continued their pursuit for truth, dying while still in that state. While the fate of this group is moot, they remain in a better state than those who arrogantly reject guidance; (3) those to whom guidance was delivered and who accepted it, but blindly and without reflection. Their faith is based on taqlīd (uncritical acceptance) and they include deviators and heretics, being the cause of sectarianism; and (4) a group whose misguidance is not to do with their ‘faith’ but rather with how they ‘practise’ that faith, namely, that they may practise the formal rituals of Islam but miss the ‘spiritual’ dimensions, or merely observe such rituals in an opportunistic manner (e.g. Muslims who attempt to avoid zakāh by lending what they own to others until the appointed time for paying the levy passes and then they get their money back). Such Muslims distort the meaning of the Islamic revelation and, according to ʿAbduh, are surely misled (ʿAbduh and Riḍā 1947: 68–72 [vol. 1]).
Responding to those who exclude Jews and Christians from the Straight Path, ʿAbduh re-interpreted Qur’anic verse 3:85 (quoted earlier). Although often invoked to support an exclusivist view of the Straight Path, ʿAbduh contended that such constituted a misreading of the verse that stood guilty of confusing islām, in the sense of living in a state of submission to God, with Islam, the religion. The Straight Path that leads to salvation is based on the former rather than the latter (ʿAbduh and Riḍā 1910: 432–433 [vol. 5]).
3 Theological reflections
If the concept of al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm has enjoyed some significant centrality among Qur’anic exegetes, who have each attempted to define this Path and identify who its followers are, Muslim theologians have also grappled with the concept, but under the rubric of al-firqa al-nājīya (the saved group). What follows will explore how the key theological schools have wrestled with this question.
The notion of al-firqa al-nājīya is predicated on the popular hadith,
there will befall my nation (Muslims) what befell the children of Israel. The children of Israel divided into seventy-two religious groups and my community will divide into seventy-three religious groups, one more than they. All of them are in hellfire except one group. That is the jamāʿa (mainstream or main body). (Ibn Mājah, Sunan, fitan 68)
It is worth noting here that this form of the hadith is found in Ibn Mājah (d. 273/886), Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī (d. 275/888), al-Tirmiḏhī (d. 279/892), and al-Nasāʾī (d. 303/915), four of the six canonical Sunnī collections of hadith. However, it is not present within al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) or Muslim (d. 261/875), the two most authentic hadith collections (see Mottahedeh 2010: 32).
It is worthy of note that the three principal theological schools within Sunnī Islam (the Atharī, Ashʿarī, and Māturīdī) made some significant use of this notion, especially in their formative phases (see Halverson 2010). The Atharī (Traditionist) school is a good starting point in this regard, as it has placed particular emphasis on this notion, which remains prevalent among its followers even today. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), after whom the school is shaped and often named, commented on the above hadith as follows: ‘If it [the saved group] does not refer to the proponents of Hadith, I do not know who they are!’ (Baghdādī 1996: 61). Another influential figure in the Atharī tradition, Taqī al-Dīn ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), dedicated an entire book to the identification of the traits of the followers of the Straight Path leading to salvation, namely his Kitāb iqtiḍāʾ al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm mukhālafat aṣḥāb al-jaḥīm (The Book of Discerning the Straight Path from the Companions of Hell). Throughout this book and his other writings, Ibn Taymiyya presents his mission as being to purify Islam of all inauthentic outgrowths by returning to the interpretations of the salaf (the early predecessors). Any idea not found in those fundamental interpretations was to be considered a form of bidʿa (heresy). Against this backdrop, Ibn Taymiyya engaged in fierce debates with Ashʿarī, Muʿtazilī, and Shīʿī theologians, denouncing many of their interpretations as heresy guilty of altering the meaning of scripture (Morrissey 2021: 137; Ibn Taymiyya 1998: 134 [vol. 1]). Modern Wahhabism, which is often seen as an extension of the Atharī tradition, extensively employs the notion of the saved group, claiming that ‘he who grasps this seventy-three tradition, grasps the essence of Islam’ (Duwayyish 2003: 152 [vol. 2]).
The Ashʿarī school, too, employed the concept of al-firqa al-nājīya, but while possessing a broader understanding of it. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/924), the eponymous founder of the school, accepted the Atharī (technically Ḥanbalī) position as well as his own, presenting them as the only valid and effective ways to the Straight Path. George Makdisi points out that al-Ashʿarī, therefore, followed two middle paths:
(1) that of the Pious Ancestors who were anxious to avoid two extremes: taʾwīl and tashbīh; and (2) that of the ‘kalam-using orthodox’ who wanted to uphold the divine attributes, against the Muʿtazilites, and uphold the use of taʾwīl in order to avoid falling into tashbīh. The former attitude is regarded by the Ashʿarites as being ṭarīq as-salāma, the road of salvation, and the latter is regarded by them as being ṭarīq al-ḥikma, the road of wisdom; both of which roads were travelled by Ashʿarī himself. By virtue of Ashʿari’s two middle roads, those who followed the one or the other were equally Ashʿarite, equally orthodox. (Makdisi 1962: 52)
This does not mean that al-Ashʿarī considered other groups to be kuffār (infidels), but rather that he described them as mistaken believers. In his Risāla ilā ahl al-thaghr (An Epistle to the People of the Frontier), he stated that the righteous predecessors (salaf) agreed unanimously that whoever believes in God and all that the Prophet has called for has faith (īmān) that cannot be invalidated except through explicit infidelity (kufr) (Ashʿarī 2002: 274). Furthermore, in his al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna (Elucidation Concerning the Principles of Religion), al-Ashʿarī confirmed:
It is our opinion that we ought not to declare a single one of the People of the Qibla [i.e. Muslims] an infidel for a sin of which they are guilty, such as fornication or theft or the drinking of wine as long as they do not commit such acts believing they are lawful acts. (Ashʿarī 1977: 26)
When death approached him, al-Ashʿarī said to one of his disciples: ‘Be a witness that I accuse none of the People of this Qibla of unbelief, for although they disagree on the phrases they use, they all still refer to the One God’ (Ibn ʿAsākir 1928: 149).
Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) is another Ashʿarī theologian who relied upon the hadith of the seventy-three groups, considering the Ahl al-Sunna wa-a’l-Jamāʿa (People of the Sunna and Community) to be the key vehicle of the Straight Path. Al-Bāqillānī frequently joined the term Ahl al-Sunna wa-a’l-Jamāʿa with Ahl al-Ḥaqq (People of Truth), underlining his view that non-Ashʿarīs are not among the People of Truth and, hence, not on the Straight Path (Bāqillānī 2000: 105). This category (that is, Ahl al-Ḥaqq) encompasses the two trajectories travelled by al-Ashʿarī previously. Al-Bāqillānī did not see any significant differences between the theology of the followers of al-Ashʿarī and of Ibn Ḥanbal. In fact, on several occasions, he identified himself as a Ḥanbalī, signing some of his epistles with ‘al-Ḥanbalī’ (the Ḥanbalī; Ibn Taymiyya 1971: 270).
Echoing the same narrative, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d.429/1037) wrote several catechistic Ashʿarī treaties, among them al-Farq bayna al-firaq wa bayān al-firqa al-nājīya minhum (Characteristics of Muslim Denominations and Identifying the Saved among Them), in which he dealt with the hadith of the seventy-three schema, accepting it at face value and formulating his book accordingly. He studied and evaluated each Islamic denomination from an Ashʿarī standpoint, condemning them as deviators from the Straight Path. Following his predecessors, he saw Ahl al-Sunna wa-a'l-Jamāʿa as comprising two categories: farīq al-raʾī (philosophical theologians, i.e. Ashʿarī theologians) and Farīq al-ḥadīth (adherents of Hadith, i.e. the Traditionists who followed Ibn Ḥanbal; Baghdādī 1988: 22–27).
Despite the fact that the Māturīdī school, together with the Ashʿarī and the Atharī schools, would later constitute what came to be known as Sunnī orthodox theology (see Thiele 2016: 225–241; Henderson 1998: 55–58), in its earliest phases, the Māturīdī school also possessed a denominational understanding of the Straight Path. Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115), for example, a key theologian within the school, in his Tabṣirat al-adilla fī uṣūl al-dīn (Exposition of the Proofs in the Basic Principles of Religion), demonstrates how early Māturīdī theologians would identify themselves as Ahl al-Ḥaqq (Companions of Truth), while critiquing the views of the Ashʿarī and Atharī schools (Nasafī 2011: 902, 1068 [vol. 1]).
Apart from these Sunnī schools, some non-Sunnī schools also made use of the notion of the saved group, most notably the Muʿtazila. They also identified themselves with the Straight Path, arguing that whoever rejects their al-uṣūl al-khamsa (five fundamental doctrines) is either a disbeliever (kuffār), wrongdoer (fussāq), or mistaken (mukhṭʾūn). These five doctrines are: (1) divine unity; (2) divine justice; (3) the inevitability of the threats and promises of God; (4) the intermediary position (i.e. Muslims who die after committing a grave sin but without repenting are neither believers nor non-believers, but in an intermediate position known as fussāq); and (5) the injunction of right and the prohibition of wrong (Ibn Aḥmad 1996: 125–126).
Since these various schools decided on the definition and identification of the Straight Path ‘internally’, the exclusion of non-Islamic religions from the Path was taken for granted. For example, ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) devoted an entire chapter of his al-Irshād ilā qawāṭʿ al-adilla (A Guide to Conclusive Proofs) to the theory of naskh, wherein he responded to the Jews who rejected that theory, contending that one of their most articulate arguments was their claim that Muslims believe in the principle of naskh in a selective manner. That is, they do not apply it to their own tradition. When the Jews ask Muslims, ‘What proof do you rely on to establish the continuity of your Law?’, Muslims respond that this is what Muḥammad has told us. The Jews then say: ‘Our prophet [Moses] did the same; he told us that his Law is not to be superseded.’ Al-Juwaynī responded with two objections. First, if the claim of the Jews were true, God would not have revealed Himself through Jesus and Muḥammad, both of whom came after Moses. Second, if it is truly said in the Torah that there is no prophet to come after Moses, why did those Jews who were contemporaneous with Muḥammad not show him this in their scripture, even though they were keen on falsifying his prophethood? The fact that they did not questions the authenticity of their report (Juwaynī 2009: 271–272).
However, the cardinal figure of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) charted a new path by replacing the centrality of al-firqa al-nājīya with the centrality of the Prophet Muḥammad, and hence furnished a more inclusivist understanding of the Straight Path. However, this inclusivity was only internal. That is, he argued that all Muslim denominations are treading the Straight Path so long as they believe in God as described within the Qur’anic revelation. Thus, the Prophet Muḥammad, not al-firqa al-nājīya, became central to his understanding of the Straight Path, uniting competing Muslim denominations. But how did al-Ghazālī then deal with the tradition of al-firqa al-nājīya?
In his Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa-a’l-zandaqa (The Decisive Criterion between Islam and Masked Infidelity), al-Ghazālī problematized al-firqa al-nājīya, demoting its status by arguing that, although the version of the above hadith in which only one of seventy-three denominations leads to salvation is the most popular, another less well-known narration claims the opposite, i.e. that only one of the seventy-three will lead to damnation. Reconciling these two narrations, al-Ghazālī contended that each must apply to a different class of Muslims, and that the saved group is the one that will neither be exposed to the Fire nor need intercession (shafāʿa), i.e. they will be saved by virtue of their faith and righteous deeds. As for the less popular narration which assigns only one group to damnation, he argued that this references those that will be exposed to Hellfire first and then, after being purified therein, find admission into Paradise. Hence, the hadith calls such groups ‘damned’ due to their ‘initial’ state, for anyone who is admitted to Hell, even if only for a short period, cannot be called ‘saved’ despite becoming so later on. Based upon this, the ‘damned’ group in the less popular narration relates to the small group that is to be in Hell ‘permanently’ (Ghazālī 1961: 81–85). As for the remaining seventy-two groups, al-Ghazālī explained in one of his Persian letters that:
The [Muslim] community consists of three groups: the best, the worst and the middling. The best of the community are the Sufis, who have devoted all of their own personal will and desire to the will of God. The worst are the morally vicious, and those people who exercise oppression, drink wine and commit fornication, and give free rein to the desire for whatever they want and are able to do. They deceive themselves in thinking that Almighty God is generous and merciful, and they depend upon this (mercy). In the middle are the people among the masses of mankind who possess moral soundness (ṣalaḥ). So, every one of these divisions has twenty-four parts, and together they make seventy-two parts (firaq). (Ghazālī 1972: 147)
If this is conceded, al-Ghazālī wrote, ‘You should keep your tongue from accusing the People of the Qibla (Muslims) as long as they firmly confess that there is no god but God and that Muḥammad is his messenger, and as long as they do not contradict it’ (Ghazālī 1961: 61). To define the Straight Path even further, al-Ghazālī identified three fundamental doctrinal principles that he considered to constitute that path in its generic sense: ‘acknowledging the existence of God, the prophethood of His Prophet, and the reality of the Last Day. Everything else is secondary’ (Jackson 2002: 112). The result is that ‘all Muslim denominations’ became partakers of this Straight Path and not only one single denomination (Abdelnour 2021: 86–101).
It is noteworthy, however, that while al-Ghazālī’s view of the Straight Path was accommodating and inclusive, it did not extend beyond the realm of the Islamic tradition. That is, he saw no authentic path to the truth and, hence, to salvation in any religion other than Islam. This exclusivism was naturally concomitant with his subscription to the theory of naskh, or the belief that the Islamic revelation superseded all previous revelations (excepting that whatever God affirms remains), with God favouring Muḥammad over all other prophets. Belief in Muḥammad could not, therefore, be separated from belief in God (Griffel 2009: 106–108).
It should be borne in mind, however, that while al-Ghazālī’s epistemology was Muḥammad-based, his soteriology took God’s divine mercy as its starting point and, thus, divided non-Muslims into three categories in the Hereafter. He wrote:
But I say in addition that God’s mercy will encompass many bygone communities as well, even if most of them may be briefly exposed to the Hellfire for a second or an hour or some period of time, by virtue of which they earn the title, ‘party of the Hellfire.’ In fact, I would say that, God willing, most of the Christians of Byzantium and the Turks of this age will be covered by God’s mercy. I am referring here to those who reside in the far regions of Byzantium and Anatolia who have not come in contact with the message of Islam. These people fall into three categories: 1) A party who never heard so much as the name ‘Muḥammad.’ These people are excused. 2) A party among those who lived in lands adjacent to the lands of Islam and had contact, therefore, with Muslims, who knew his name, his character, and the miracles he wrought. These are the blasphemous Unbelievers. 3) A third party whose case falls between these two poles. These people knew the name ‘Muḥammad’, but nothing of his character and attributes. Instead, all they heard since childhood was that some arch-liar carrying the name ‘Muḥammad’ claimed to be a prophet, just as our children heard that an arch-liar and deceiver called al-Muqaffaʿ falsely claimed that God sent him (as a prophet) and then challenged people to disprove his claim. This group, in my opinion, is like the first group. Even though they heard his name, they heard the opposite of what his true attributes were. And this does not provide enough incentive to compel them to investigate (his true status). (Jackson 2002: 126)
Unpacking the above quotation, we see that al-Ghazālī divides the situation of non-Muslims in the Hereafter into three categories based on whether they recognized Muḥammad’s prophethood or not. One category refers to those who never heard the name Muḥammad: their unbelief is excused. The second comprises those who have heard his name and learned of his character and miracles while living alongside Muslims and interacting with them: their unbelief is not excused. The third category, on the other hand, contains those in between the previous two. While Muḥammad’s name has reached their ears, they do not know his true character. Al-Ghazālī believed such people would be excused like those of the first category, for while they had heard of Muḥammad, they had heard the opposite of his real qualities. And hearing such things would not normally rouse one to find out what a person really was like.
The question that remains, however, is whether non-Muslims are to be considered ‘infidels’ due to their lack of belief in the Prophet Muḥammad. Al-Ghazālī seems ambivalent about applying the term kufr (unbelief) to Jews and Christians. He seems to differentiate between kufr in its ultimate sense (kufr ʿāmm) and kufr in its particular/partial sense (kufr khāṣṣ). That is, those who do not believe in the truthfulness of the Prophet Muḥammad and yet believe in God, such as Jews and Christians, have committed the latter form of kufr and not the former. Hence, they cannot be called unbelievers or infidels in the ultimate sense, as they still believe in God. In fact, in one of his later epistles, al-Ghazālī considered Judaism and Christianity to be monotheistic religions (Ghazālī 1972: 49). In his Ghazālī and the Poetics of Imagination, Ebrahim Moosa clarified this point, writing:
When a Christian living in the post-Muḥammadan period rejects him as a prophet, such a person is, in Ghazālī’s view, an ‘unbeliever’ – but, surprisingly, he is an unbeliever only to the extent that he rejects Muḥammad. The deficiency in his Christian doctrine does not invalidate the remaining monotheistic belief that he affirms. (Moosa 2005: 149)
There are thus different degrees of monotheism, and a Christian’s belief in the Trinity does not mean that God is deemed to be numerically three in essence. In fact, Christians themselves admit that this is not what they mean. They mean that God is one in essence but has three attributes. In their own terminology, God is ‘One in substance (jawhar) and three by way of hypostasis (uqnūmīya).’ By ‘hypostases’, they refer to the Divine attributes (Ghazālī 1972: 49).
Beyond al-Ghazālī, Fahkr al-Dīn al-Rāzī also engaged with the tradition of the seventy-three firqas in his commentary on Qur’anic verse 21:92. Although he considered the hadith to be authentic, the interpretation he offered differed from that of his predecessors by affirming that the report referred not to the Hereafter, but the here-and-now. That is, Muslims will divide into seventy-three sects in certain situations in this world. The saved group is the one that sticks to the majority and does not deviate (Rāzī 1981: 219 [vol. 22]). In his Iʿtiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa-al-mushrikīn (Creeds of Muslim Denominations and the Polytheists), al-Rāzī also gave an apologetic account of the seventy-three scheme, asking:
What if someone said: ‘How is it that the number of the denominations exceeded the number prophesized by the Prophet?’ He answered that the Prophet could have meant the major denominations rather than the minor ones. Another possibility, since the Prophet prophesized the number as 73, it cannot be less, but it could be more (the Arabs use the seventies to exaggerate). (Rāzī 1938: 74–75)
Hence, he continued along al-Ghazālī’s path, placing the Prophet Muḥammad at the centre of the Straight Path.
Indeed, the centrality of the Prophet Muḥammad to this path became the mainstream position until the advent of modernity, when ʿAbduh’s writings came to constitute a major turning point, as discussed earlier. However, his opinion received mixed responses. Two renowned scholars, both of whom like ʿAbduh also occupied the highest position at al-Azhar, the great Islamic centre of learning, namely Maḥmūd Shaltūt (d. 1963) and ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd (d. 1978), can serve as examples of twentieth-century Muslim divergence on this question. Shaltūt, therefore, had a broad understanding of the Straight Path, one that was inclusive at both the internal (Muslim) and external (non-Muslim) levels. Internally, he played a – if not the – major role in twentieth-century Islamic ecumenism. His efforts at dismantling the long-standing historical division between the Sunnīs and the Shīʿa were remarkable and proved instrumental in making Egypt ‘the home of the only noticeable ecumenical society in modern Islam’, the Jamāʿat al-taqrīb bayn al-madhāhib al-islāmīya (Association for the Rapprochement of the Islamic Schools of Law). The most important output of this Association was Shaltūt’s fatwā making it clear that Shīʿism was to be considered a legitimate fifth madhhab alongside the four Sunnī ones, and that it was acceptable to convert from Sunnī to Shī’a Islam and vice versa (Bengio and Litvak 2011: 223–234).
Externally, Shaltūt’s view of the Straight Path manifested in his claim that Christians should not be labelled as unbelievers or polytheists, even though they believe in the Trinity, deny Muḥammad’s prophethood, and call Jesus the Son of God (Zebiri 1993: 69). In his interpretation of Qur’anic verse 3:85, Shaltūt followed ʿAbduh, albeit while (uniquely) contending that ‘Islam’ is one of the terms that has been distorted by Muslim common usage. That is, early followers of Muḥammad lived in a state of islām, i.e. submission, yet subsequent generations largely transformed that ‘lived state’ into a ‘nominal title.’ When the Qur’an praises Islam, it praises the lived state of islām, not the nominal ‘Islam’ that many Muslims associate with today (Shaltūt 2004a: 42–46).
This view had important implications for Shaltūt’s worldview. In traditional exegesis, non-Muslims are largely categorized into two: kāfirūn (unbelievers, i.e. the polytheists, mushrikūn) and ahl al-kitāb (people of the book, i.e. Jews and Christians), who have a status superior to that of the kāfirūn (Zebiri 1993: 67). Shaltūt maintained that the term kāfir needs to be significantly restricted; it should only be applied to someone who has received the truth clearly yet rejected it due to arrogance and pride. Any eschatological punishment mentioned in the Qur’an is only applicable to such a person (Shaltūt 2001: 19–20). Finally, Shaltūt thought that not everyone who carries the title ‘Muslim’ is necessarily a muslim (one who submits) in God’s eyes. Nominal Islam is only acceptable in this world and is primarily for practical matters, such as marriage, inheritance, burial in Muslim cemeteries, etc. Furthermore, if someone does not identify as a Muslim, there is a right to call them a non-Muslim, but not to call them a kāfir, for kufr is known to God alone. Hence, for Shaltūt, it is not part of the Muslim creed to identify who a kāfir is (Shaltūt 2004b: 182).
In contrast to the above, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd saw the Straight Path as being exclusively orientated around Muḥammad. Maḥmūd recognized that the term ‘Islam’ has a linguistic as well as a technical meaning, but contended that the two are identical. That is, one cannot submit to God correctly without being a Muslim in the technical sense of the term. To reiterate, there are several verses in the Qur’an where the word ‘Islam’ is used, such as when Abraham is introduced as a Muslim. This raises a question, however, about what type of Muslim the Qur’an refers to. Is it someone who acts in loving obedience to God, as exemplified by Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son and thereby surrender to God’s Will? Or does it refer to Islam as defined by Muslim theologians and jurists with reference to their interpretations of the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad? For Maḥmūd, the latter constitutes the proper answer; linguistic Islam is inextricably linked with technical Islam, the latter constituting nothing but an explanation of the former (Maḥmūd 1979: 79 [vol. 1]). It goes without saying that Maḥmūd’s interpretation represents a continuation of the traditional view of the Straight Path, which remains the more popular interpretation.
4 Mystical reflections
While al-firqa al-nājīya constitutes the theological carrier of the Straight Path, within Sunnī and Shīʿī iterations of Sufi Islam, the concept of al-ṭarīqa (spiritual path) performs the same function, going beyond ‘correct knowledge’ of God to the ‘correct experience’ of God. A Sufi ṭarīqa (order), therefore, provides its followers with a level of spiritual discipline by which the seeker of God can ‘purify’ themselves of the veils obscuring their way to God, who is the ultimate reality. Unlike the concept of al-firqa al-nājīya, which is exclusivistic in nature, Sufi ṭarīqas are pluralistic and recognize a multiplicity of paths towards God. While the Sufi experience in formative and classical Islam was primarily an individual-based experience, in post-classical Islam, the ṭarīqa-based route swept across the Muslim world to become one of its most dominant social structures. Individuals who joined a ṭarīqa were moved by a desire to go back to what they considered to be the purity and simplicity of the Prophet's life and, by a profound devotional love of God, quested for a direct and personal experience of the presence of God in this world (Esposito 2011: 124). To this end, the ṭarīqa system emerged to keep seekers away from any spiritual or theological deviations that may have clouded their experience.
Al-Ghazālī’s contribution to the spiritual Straight Path was no less than his contribution to its theological equivalent. Towards the end of his life, he set up one of the first Sufi lodges (zāwiya or khānqā), where seekers of God gathered not only to live an ascetic life, but also to be trained by a spiritual guide. By virtue of al-Ghazālī’s centralization of Sufism, among other factors, such orders increased in number and attracted people of all social classes and backgrounds (Esposito 2011: 128–130).
To maintain the ‘straightness’ of this path, such orders had Sufi masters whose religious authority lay in a silsila, or chain of spiritual transmission that acted as a link between them and a series of other masters, culminating in the Prophet and his example. While early Sufis did not consider having a Sufi master to be an obligatory component of the spiritual experience, e.g. the Uwaysīs, later Sufis emphasized the necessity of possessing such to ensure the straightness of the path being followed (Muḥāsibī 1971: 38–40).
It is worth stating here that Sufis also engaged with the notion of al-firqa al-nājīya, but while possessing a more inclusive understanding of it. Returning to the seventy-three-scheme mentioned earlier, the Persian poet Ḥāfiẓ (d. 791/1389–1390) epitomizes the Sufis’ rejection of it in the following verses:
Heaven was too weak to bear the burden of responsibility – they
gave it to my poor crazy self.
Forgive the war of the seventy-two warring religions; Since they did
not see the truth they have struck out on the road of fancy. (Mottahedeh 2010: 37)
Further, in a poem by Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī (d. 672/1273), a Sunnī addressing himself to a Predestinarian opponent (a follower of the Jabrīya school), it is emphasized how they both glorify God; even though one may be correct in relation to a specific article of creed, and one may be wrong, both beliefs express diverse aspects of divine self-manifestation. While making mention of the seventy-three notions in the poem, Rūmī wrote:
Each glorifies [Thee] in a different fashion, and that one is
unaware of the state of this one. Man disbelieves in the
glorification uttered by inanimate objects, but these inanimate
objects are masters [in performing] worship.
Nay, the two-and-seventy sects, every one, are unaware of [the real
states of] each other and in a [great] doubt.
Since two speakers have no knowledge of each other’s state how will
[it] be [with] wall and door?
Since I am heedless of the glorification uttered by one who speaks,
how should my heart know the glorification performed by that
which is mute?
The Sunni is unaware of the [Predestinarian’s] [mode of] glorification.
The Sunni has a particular [mode of] glorification; the
Predestinarian has the opposite thereof in [taking] refuge [with God].
(Mottahedeh 2010: 39, emphasis added)
Rūmī’s interpretation of al-firqa al-nājīya takes it beyond the Islamic tradition, anchoring it in two key premises: human experience of the divine and how humans ‘perceive and experience the reality differently’ (Khaki 2015: 9). Using stories and metaphors, he brought to the fore the subjective nature of humanity’s experience of the divine, which leads to a multiplicity of perspectives that can only be reconciled via a ‘holistic’ understanding of the question at hand. An example of his treatment of the subject is his usage of the story of the elephant in the dark, whereby a group of Hindus brought an elephant to a town at night. The people of the town, impatient to wait until morning, went to the dark room where the elephant was being kept. Unable to see the animal, they could only perceive it by touching it. But, upon touching different parts of the elephant’s body, each person described the elephant differently. One who touched its ear described it as being similar to a fan. Another, who touched its trunk, said the elephant was like a gutter. A third man, who touched its leg, described the elephant as similar to a pillar. Finally, a person who touched its back described it as like a bed. If each of them had a candle at hand, there would have been no difference in their statements (Masroori 2010: 250). A detailed discussion of this parable is beyond the scope of this entry, but in essence it demonstrates the inevitable subjectivity of the human experience, whether with relation to physical or metaphysical beings. Although each person ‘perceived’ their section of the elephant correctly, each of their descriptions constituted only a partial understanding of the ‘whole’. The parable thereby highlights the issue of contextual deficiency, whereby any limitation in perception of reality is not due to an inherent disability within the human mind, but to the darkness (context) surrounding it (Abdelnour 2022: 66).
Although the Muḥammad-centric view of the Straight Path became widely accepted among early and classical Muslim scholars (Bājūrī 2002: 126), Ibn ʿArabī al-Ṭāʼī (d. 638/1240) constituted another exception to the norm. In his magnum opus, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya (The Meccan Revelations), he reinterpreted the theory of naskh (abrogation) in a way that left scope for Judaism and Christianity to be considered partakers in the Straight Path. To explain, he argued that all the revealed religions are ‘lights’. While the lights of all the prophets before Muḥammad were like the stars, that of Muḥammad himself is like the sun. When the sun appears, the lights of the stars hide, although they do not disappear. He then says:
That is why we [Muslims], have been asked to have faith in the truth of all messengers and all the revealed religions. Namely, they are not rendered null (bāṭil) by abrogation – that is the opinion of the ignorant ones. (Ibn ʿArabī al-Ṭāʼī 2011: 227 [vol 6]).
Moreover, in his Tarjumān al-Ashwāq (The Interpreter of Desires), Ibn ʿArabī’s view of the Straight Path seems to move even beyond the Abrahamic tradition. He puts it poetically in this way:
My heart has become capable of every form; it is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks,
And a temple for idols and the pilgrim’s Kaʿba and the scrolls of the Torah and the book of the Qur’an.
I follow the religion of Love: whatever way Love’s camels take, that is my religion and my faith. (Ibn ʿArabī al-Ṭāʼī 2005: 62–63)
5 Some contemporary voices
Some more peripheral voices on this question have emerged within contemporary Islam, including the Algerian Mohammed Arkoun (d. 2010), the Iranian Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945), the Indian Hassan Askari (d. 2008), the South African Farid Esack (b. 1955), and the London-born Reza Shah-Kazemi (b. 1960). Arkoun, for example, has advocated a multiplicity of straight paths leading to God. He has argued that the tools of legitimization used in classical Islamic theology no longer possess any ‘epistemological relevance for us today’, as their findings are compromised by the ‘biases imposed by the ruling class and its intellectual servants’ (Atay 1999: 37). He distinguishes between three levels of divine revelation. First is the absolute level, which is unknowable by humankind, although the prophets revealed fragments of it as part of the Word of God. Second are the prophetic manifestations of the Word of God itself, produced during a period when revelation was orally transmitted and preserved through memorization. The third level then constitutes the textual objectification of God’s Word in the Torah, the New Testament, and the Qur’an. He calls these three holy books the ‘Closed Official Corpus’ (Atay 1999: 45–46). If this is conceded, no single faith community can claim to have an absolute monopoly on the Straight Path.
A more open view of this theocentrism (a theology that focuses on God, as opposed to being prophet- or denomination-centred) is that advanced by Abdolkarim Soroush in his essay, Straight Paths: An Essay on Religious Pluralism (2009). His interpretation of the Kantian distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (the former referring to knowledge that is acquired independently of any particular experience, the latter to that which is derived from experience), leaves a mark on his view of the Straight Path, wherein he maintains that one should differentiate between religion as divinely revealed and as the product of human interpretation, i.e. religious knowledge based on socio-historical factors. If this is conceded, our understanding of religious texts should not only be pluralistic, but also fluid. This
is because a text is silent and, when it comes to understanding religious texts and interpreting them – whether we are looking at jurisprudence [fiqh], the sayings of the Prophet or Qur’anic exegesis – we invariably draw on our own expectations, questions and assumptions. (Soroush 2009: 120)
No interpretation is possible without appealing to our assumptions and, since those assumptions often originate outside religion, and since they are changeable, fluid, and constantly growing, the interpretations reached in light of them will naturally ‘be diverse, changeable and evolving’ (Soroush 2009: 120). Therefore, as far as the Qur’an is concerned, there exists several Straights Paths and not only one (Soroush 2009: 119–155).
Hassan Askari proposed his theory of theocentrism in two books, one co-edited with John Hick (the father of Christian pluralism): The Experience of Religious Diversity (1985) and Spiritual Quest: An Inter-Religious Dimension (1991). Askari endorsed Hick’s theocentric pluralism, reading ‘religious differences in a metaphorical sense’ (Dag 2017: 104). Farid Esack, in his Qurʾān, Liberation and Religious Pluralism (1997), endorsed an ethical form of pluralism largely influenced by the textual-hermeneutical methods of Mohammed Arkoun and Fazlur Rahman (Dag 2017: 106–109). Esack advanced two arguments. Firstly, religious plurality is the will of God – that is to say, the Qur’an accepts religious others, their spirituality, and their salvation (Esack 1997: 155–160). Secondly, the Qur’an asks humanity to collaborate in supporting justice and righteousness (1997: 180). In The Other in the Light of the One (2006), Reza Shah-Kazemi argues for a theory of ‘universalism’, in which he follows Hick by positing that each religion manifests a different response to the same reality. He differs from Hick, however, by considering religious diversity to be God’s will, rather than a human construct (Dag 2017: 109–110).
6 Conclusion
This entry has sought to explicate the concept of al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm (the Straight Path) with a view to unpacking how various Muslim denominations and major figures have understood it, as well as what it has meant for the wider Muslim community. The entry divided the discussion into three types of reflection: exegetical, theological, and mystical. The two most obvious implications to emerge from the discussion are methodological and theological. In terms of methodology, the entry showed how the mufassirūn differed concerning their understanding of the Straight Path. While some of them took the approach of tafsīr al-Qurʾān bi-al-Qurʾān (interpreting the Qur’an through the Qur’an), others appealed to the Sunna by way of reading the Qur’an in the light of the Hadith tradition.
In terms of theology, the entry has shown that, while the key objective of the mufassirūn was to understand whether or not this path includes Jews and Christians, the mukallimūn were more concerned with the question of whether all Muslim denominations tread the Straight Path. Hence, they wrestled with the concept of the Straight Path under the rubric of al-firqa al-nājīya. Having briefly traced the concept of al-firqa al-nājīya, we saw how it was pivotal during the formative phase of the Islamic tradition, and how it was re-interpreted within classical and post-classical theology.
Furthermore, scratching the surface of the Sufi tradition, the article highlighted how Sufis were primarily concerned with ‘experiencing’ the Straight Path, as compared to ‘following’ the Straight Path. They, therefore, introduced the institution of the Sufi order to maintain the ‘straightness’ of their spiritual endeavours. Within this context, many Sufi figures were critical of the notion of al-firqa al-nājīya, having a broader understanding of the Straight Path that took into account human subjectivities and prejudices.
Finally, the entry ended by briefly engaging with a number of contemporary theologians who have charted a different trajectory in their understanding of the Straight Path. While such scholars have engaged with tradition, their views are often seen as unorthodox and are not shared by mainstream theologians.
