1.1 Fiṭra in the Qur’an (Q. 30:30) and its connection to a primordial covenant (Q. 7:172)

The word fiṭra derives from the Arabic root f-ṭ-r, which has a number of significations, including breaking or cleaving open, or creating something. It has been suggested that this latter meaning, used in the Qur’an, more closely follows a distinct loan from Ethiopic (Jeffery 2007: 221). Based on this meaning, fiṭra is equivalent to khilqa, the creation of a thing with an intrinsic or original character, nature, or disposition (see Lane 2003: 2416 [vol. 2]).

The primary scriptural source for the concept of fiṭra is Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30, which can be securely dated to the Meccan period of the Prophet Muḥammad’s mission due both to its theme and opening verses (Q. 30:2–4), which allude to a defeat of the Byzantines (al-Rūm) by the Sassanid Persians. The sūra focuses on signs in the world as evidence for monotheism, rebutting the rejection of the Prophet’s message by the associators (mushrikūn) who associate partners with God. The verse reads:

Stand firm in the religion as a true devotee: the primordial (or: natural) disposition of God that He has instilled in people. There is no alteration in the creation of God. That is the right religion, yet most people do not know (fa-aqim wajhaka lil-dīn ḥanīfan fiṭrat allāh allatī faṭara al-nās ʿalayhā lā tabdīl li-khalq allāh dhālika al-dīn al-qayyim wa-lākinna akthar al-nās lā yaʿlamūn). (Q. 30:30; Qur’anic translations in this entry are by the author).

The first sentence in this verse is addressed in the singular. This has led some commentators to understand it as being directed to the Prophet Muḥammad specifically. Others point out, however, that this linguistic form is used elsewhere in the Qur’an with a general intent (Al-Māturīdī 2006: 185 [vol. 11]). The word ḥanīf, translated above as ‘true devotee’, is rich in meaning. The term has the sense of someone who does not incline to falsity or idolatry and in the Qur’an it is applied to one following the religion of Abraham (or Ibrāhīm, see Q. 2:135; 3:67, 95; 4:125; 6:79, 161). The significance of this term is to be located within the context of the religious polemics between the Prophet and the associators in Mecca, and subsequently with Jews and Christians in Medina. It positions Abraham as a shared model of ethical monotheism and ritual practice, whose way had been abandoned in various respects by these rival traditions, only to be revived in the mission of Muḥammad (Watt, ‘Ḥanīf’). Fiṭra, then, is most naturally understood as the disposition created in every human being that inclines them to the natural form of religion practised by Abraham. Nevertheless, it has also been interpreted as al-islām, the name given in the Qur’an to the primordial form of monotheism, which means submission or devotion to God (Al-Ṭabarī 2001: 493 [vol. 18]). Following this interpretation, God has not granted people a natural disposition to incline towards monotheism during their lives but rather instilled its full realization in their initial constitution. This subtle distinction profoundly affects the interpretation of the main scriptural texts and sets the tone for the theological perspectives that build upon them.

The phrase ‘there is no alteration in the creation of God’ can be understood in several ways. Most immediately, the word creation (khalq) refers back to the fiṭra under discussion (see above). Some commentators, however, take khalq to refer to religion (dīn), as mentioned earlier in the verse (Al-Ṭabarī 2001: 494–496 [vol. 18]). The negation can then be taken in two main senses. Either it is indicative, meaning that the natural disposition, or primordial religion, given to each human being is invariant, or it is subjunctive: one ought not to alter it by leaving the right religion, or by corrupting it. These shades of meaning are unpacked by the hadith ‘Every child is born upon the fiṭra’, which amounts to a prophetic commentary on this verse (see section 1.2 below). Finally, there is an acknowledgment in verse 30:30 that ‘most people do not know’. Hence, the inbuilt knowledge, or capacity thereof, is contrasted with the possibility or even likelihood of its loss, clouding, or forgetting (see Sinai 2023: 664).

A second Qur'anic verse with great significance for the understanding of fiṭra is 7:172, which is linked to 30:30 in early exegesis (Al-Ṭabarī 2001: 493 [vol. 18]). This verse follows a recounting of the specific agreement the Children of Israel entered into at Sinai to hold on to the Torah (see Q. 7:171). The implication of Qur’anic verse 7:172 is of a more fundamental covenant applying to all human beings:

When your Lord took from the backs [or loins] of the children of Adam their progeny and made them bear witness about themselves: ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes, we bear witness’. That is lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘We were unaware of this.’

As will be explored in more detail in the sections to come, the interpretation given to Qur’anic verse 7:172 has become an important element of theological debate over the meaning of the fiṭra. One strand of interpretation takes it to refer to a primordial event experienced by all human souls; a position connected to the doctrine of strong predestinationism, when the event is interpreted as God creating individuals for Paradise or Hell. Another view takes it as a statement of the natural capacity that every human being possesses to come to knowledge of the divine within their worldly life. (Note that the debate over free will and the divine decree [qadar] is one of the most vexed in Islamic theology and cannot be substantially broached within this entry. Strong predestinationism will be used to refer to a doctrine of fatalism, such that each soul’s destination in either Paradise or Hell irrevocably follows the divine decree without room for meaningful exercise of free will. Many theologians attempted to avoid the implication of such strong predestinationism by proposing subtle reconciliations that affirmed both the decree and free will).

1.2 Fiṭra in the Hadith (‘every child is born upon the fiṭra…’; ‘five [practices] from the fiṭra’; ‘you have been guided to fiṭra’)

By far the most significant theological group of prophetic hadiths on this topic concern the idea that every child is born in the state of fiṭra. This report is recorded in several versions in the canonical collections of Hadith, almost always on the authority of the prolific narrator Abū Hurayra. The largest cluster of these traditions is found in the collection of Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj (d. 261/875) (see Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd yūladu ʿalā al-fiṭra wa-ḥukm mawt aṭfāl al-kuffār wa-aṭfāl al-muslimīn. Note: all Hadith references in this entry are to the Thesaurus Islamicus editions with translations by the author). In the places within the other canonical collections in which similar reports appear, they closely mirror the material collected by Muslim. It is useful to begin by discussing the first hadith, which is reported via a chain passing through Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742) to Abū Hurayra:

The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, said: ‘There is not a child born, except upon the natural disposition (al-fiṭra), then his parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a Zoroastrian. This is just as one animal is brought forth from another whole; do you perceive in it any mutilation?’ Then Abū Hurayra said: ‘If you wish, you may recite: “The natural disposition of God that He has instilled in people. There is no alteration in the creation of God… [Q. 30:30].”’ (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6926)

This version of the tradition arguably presents the heart of the Prophet Muḥammad’s teachings on the idea of fiṭra, which are closely aligned to related Qur’anic ideas. In consonance with Qur’anic verse 30:30, to which Abū Hurayra explicitly connects this hadith, the fiṭra is referred to as the natural disposition of human beings to pure faith in God, which is implied to accord with the Prophet Muḥammad’s own restoration of the religion of Abraham (see Q. 2:135 and Van Ess 1975: 103). The same three religions that are said to take the child from the natural state of faith are also mentioned in Qur’anic verse 22:17 (with the addition of the Sabians and associators). A final element is an analogy that compares such a change to the mutilation that animals receive from human beings. As well as the allusion to verse 30:30, there is a possible echo here of Qur’anic verse 4:119: ‘I [the Devil] will mislead them, arouse desires in them; I will command them to slit the ears of cattle and to change the creation of God…’ Another narration of the hadith alludes to this with the variation: ‘Just as you rear the camel; do you find it mutilated until you yourselves mutilate it?’ (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6931).

Yet despite this close connection to Qur’anic themes, the arrangement of the narrations within Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (though the chapter divisions and their names were fixed after the lifetime of Muslim, see Pavlovitch 2023: 220–221), as well as other versions of the hadith collected therein, suggest a complex history. The material appears to reflect an interaction between the core tradition and theological debates over predestination and the fate of deceased infants that occurred in the first two centuries of Islam. While the prophetic tradition was very likely used to oppose the view of the Azāriqa sect of the Khawārij that children who die before maturity are unbelievers, this does not necessarily imply that it was generated for this purpose (on this claim, see Wensinck 2008: 42–44; Adang 2000: 393–394). Rather, that usage appears to be a repurposing of its content, which initially dealt with the interreligious polemics of the Prophet’s own era, rather than the intra-Muslim sectarian ones that followed (see Van Ess 1975: 104).

Support for this interpretation comes from the pattern observed between the content of the hadith text (matn) in its various versions, its main narrator, Abū Hurayra, and those major second/eighth-century collectors who Muslim drew upon. All the versions of the fiṭra hadith that Muslim takes from Abū Hurayra via al-Zuhrī, though differing in some minor details, make no mention of the fate of children (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6926, 6927, 6928). In a separate hadith of Abū Hurayra via al-Zuhrī, however, the Prophet is asked about the children of the associators, and he replies, ‘God knows best what they (would) have done (bi-mā kānū ʿāmilīn)’ (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6933). The connection to the doctrine of predestination is highlighted by another version on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās: ‘God knew best what they (would) have done when He created them (bi-mā kānū ʿāmilīn idh khalaqahum)’ (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6936). From this, it can be inferred that al-Zuhrī distinguished between Abū Hurayra’s narration of material on the fiṭra and on the fate of deceased children. Other collectors from outside Medina, such as Sulaymān al-Aʿmash (d. 148/765) (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6929) and Maʿmar b. Rashīd (d. 153/771) (Muslim, al-qadar, Bāb maʿnā kull mawlūd, no. 6931), though recording versions of the fiṭra tradition from Abū Hurayra, append an addition to it. In these reports, either a man or a group follow up the Prophet’s statement by asking what happens if the child dies young (in other words, while still in the state of fiṭra), and he answers, ‘God knows best what they (would) have done’.

It can thus be concluded, based on the material collected by Muslim, that the addition to the fiṭra tradition of the problem of the deceased child, and its link to predestination, is likely to be a secondary polemical development within initially separate reports of Abū Hurayra. An example of this context is reported by the prominent jurist and traditionist Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795). Upon being told that deviant sectarians (ahl al-ahwāʾ) argue using this hadith (i.e. they use the first part of the fiṭra hadith to argue against predestination), Mālik responded: ‘Argue with them on the basis of the end of it’ (Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, al-sunna, Bāb fi dharāriyy al-mushrikīn, no. 4717). The preceding analysis does not, of course, decide the wider question of the relationship of these predestinationist theological doctrines to the prophetic Hadith corpus. But it is significant for underscoring that the hadith’s core meaning about the birth of the child upon the fiṭra, with its rich Qur’anic resonances, predates these first/seventh- and second/eighth-century sectarian controversies.

A second prominent group of hadiths refers to practices of bodily purity as being from the fiṭra. In various narrations of a hadith transmitted on the authority of Abū Hurayra through al-Zuhrī, the Prophet declares: ‘The fiṭra consists of five [practices]’, or ‘Five [practices] are from the fiṭra…’ (al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-libās, Bāb qaṣṣ al-shārib, no. 5950; Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-ṭahāra, Bāb khiṣāl al-fiṭra, no. 620). These are given as circumcision, shaving the pubic hairs, shaving the armpits, clipping the nails, and trimming the moustache. The same five practices are consistently reported, though the order varies, especially in the case of the last three (see: al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-libās, Bāb qaṣṣ al-shārib, no. 5950, Bāb taqlīm al-aẓfār, no. 5952, al-istiʾdhān, Bāb al-khitān baʿd al-kibar wa-natf al-ibṭ, no. 6370; Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-ṭahāra, Bāb khiṣāl al-fiṭra, no. 620; al-Tirmidhī, Sunan, al-adab, Bāb mā jāʾ fī taqlīm al-aẓfār, no. 2981; al-Nasāʾī, Sunan, al-ṭahāra, Bāb taqlīm al-aẓfār, no. 10). Separate reports from Ibn ʿUmar mention just trimming the moustache or shaving the pubic hairs, clipping the nails, and trimming the moustache as from the fiṭra (al-Bukhārī, al-libās, Bāb qaṣṣ al-shārib, no. 5949, Bāb taqlīm al-aẓfār, no. 5951).

An alternative series of hadiths transmitted through the narrators Muṣʿab - Ṭalq - Ibn al-Zubayr - ʿĀʾisha, have the Prophet saying: ‘Ten are from the fiṭra: trimming the moustache, growing the beard, using the toothstick, snuffing water in the nose, clipping the nails, washing the finger joints, shaving the armpits, shaving the pubic hair, and washing the private parts.’ Muṣʿab then says: ‘I forgot the tenth, it could have been rinsing the mouth’ (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-ṭahāra, Bāb khiṣāl al-fiṭra, no. 627). In another narration without Muṣʿab, ten practices are reported, including rinsing the mouth, whereas circumcision and washing the bottom replace washing the finger joints and private parts. This version, however, is not a prophetic hadith, but a saying of Ṭalq. Moreover, Muṣʿab is declared by the collector as rejected (munkar) (al-Nasāʾī, Sunan, al-zīna min al-sunan, Bāb al-fiṭra, no. 5059). An inference that can be drawn from this state of affairs is that lists of five additional purity practices started to be attributed to the Prophet as ‘from the fiṭra’ in the generation of the successors.

A related hadith is essential for understanding the deeper significance of these narrations on the fiṭra, even if it does not mention the term itself. This is the report, once again from Abū Hurayra, that Abraham circumcised himself with an adze (a tool similar to an axe) when he was over eighty years old (al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-istiʾdhān, Bāb al-khitān baʿd al-kibar wa-natf al-ibṭ, no. 6371). Circumcision, which is usually mentioned first in the ‘five from the fiṭra’ hadiths, is deeply connected to the ritual practices of Abraham (see Gen 17:24). Given all five of the verified practices involve cutting something taken to be extraneous to the body, the idea is that it is the natural disposition of the human being to seek cleanliness in these ways, and that this confirms a person in the primordial religion as practised by Abraham. Despite the resonances with the text of the Bible, there is no mention in the Islamic scriptural texts of Abraham’s circumcision as a covenant.

A final hadith on the topic of fiṭra concerns the Prophet Muḥammad’s miraculous Night Journey and Ascension (al-isrāʾ wa-al-miʿrāj). A commonly recorded version is as follows:

When the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, was taken on a night journey to Jerusalem, he was presented with two vessels, of wine and milk. He looked at them and took the vessel containing milk. Gabriel said: ‘All praise is for God who has guided you to the natural disposition. Had you taken the wine, your community would have strayed’. (al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-ashriba, Bāb wa-qawl allāh taʿālā innamā al-khamr, no. 5635)

In another version, a vessel of honey is also offered, such that the options reflect an additional one of the four heavenly rivers mentioned in Qur’anic verse 47:15 (see al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, al-ashriba, Bāb shurb al-laban, no. 5670, though puzzlingly only two heavenly rivers are mentioned in the hadith). Nevertheless, the association of milk and its nurturing function with the idea of the natural disposition comes through clearly in the Prophet’s choice. A further element is, once more, a connection to Abraham. In another narration, the Prophet Muḥammad reports meeting Moses (Mūsā), Jesus (ʿĪsā) and Abraham. He then says that of all of Abraham’s descendants, he is the one who resembles him the most (al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, aḥādīth al-anbiyāʾ, Bāb qawl allāh taʿālā wa-hal atāka ḥadīth mūsā, no. 3430). The segment discussing the two vessels then follows immediately. This version of the hadith thus presents the Prophet as physically akin to his ancestor Abraham, and through the choice of milk, confirms him as possessing a related internal characteristic: the original monotheistic nature that will prevent his community from straying (as opposed to the result of the choice of wine).

To sum up, Islamic scriptural discourses on the fiṭra, though open to a range of interpretations, present a coherent basic idea. This is that the human being has been unrestrictedly formed in a complete fashion with an inclination towards good, which is first and foremost monotheistic belief. The contrast with the Christian notion of the fall is stark (see Winter 2022: 3). None of the references to fiṭra in either the Qur’an or the Hadith are directly connected to the narrative of Adam and his wife eating from the tree, though this episode is significant elsewhere as part of the origin story for humanity. Instead, the fiṭra is consistently connected with the monotheism and ritual practices of the Prophet Abraham, which on the one hand are indicative of the capacities that are available for every human being, and on the other hand are renewed by the Prophet Muḥammad with his revealed dispensation.

2.1 Metaphysical interpretations of fiṭra

In early exegetical materials on Qur’anic verse 7:172 (quoted in section 1.1, above), God is described as taking all the descendants of Adam from the latter’s back, such that they emerge and bear witness to His lordship (Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1997: 1613 [vol. 5]). It is in this sense that human beings are seen as initially being created in recognition of and in devotion to God, such that their subsequent worldly lives act as confirmation or rejection of the original belief affirmed in that covenant. A report ascribed to ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb adds that God ‘anointed’ (masaḥa) Adam’s back with His right hand and those of his descendants who emerged were decreed Paradise. Then He extracted the remainder of his descendants and consigned them to a destination in Hell (Mālik, al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, al-qadar, Bāb al-nahy ʿan al-qawl bi-al-qadar, no. 1627). From various versions of these reports, it becomes clear that mention of a left hand is avoided; in fact, in one version there is an addition stating that both of God’s hands are right (Al-Ṭabarī 2001: 554 [vol. 10]). But there is some criticism of the chain of narration for all versions of ʿUmar’s report, which features an unreliable missing link, making it again seem a product of early debates over the idea of predestination (see the discussion of the hadiths in Al-Qurṭubī 2006: 375–377 [vol. 9]). There are other versions of the predestinationist hadiths that are not transmitted by ʿUmar, but note the critical reception they have received from both Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymīya (d. 728/1328) cited below (and see Holtzmann 2015: 171–178). Exegetes also explored various interpretations of the state of human beings during the covenant if it is taken as a primordial event. One possibility is that God extracted the souls (al-arwāḥ) of individuals from Adam before the creation of their bodies and gave them the awareness to know what He said to them. Another is that He brought forth the likenesses of bodies with their souls (Al-Qurṭubī 2006: 375 [vol. 9]).

In order to provide a clearer link between the metaphysical interpretation of fiṭra and creedal authority among those associated with Traditionalist currents of thought, it is possible to turn to one opinion derived from the words of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 240/855) by the theologian Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1065-66). Ibn Ḥanbal defines the fiṭra as ‘the profession of knowledge of God Most High (al-iqrār bi-maʿrifat allāh taʿālā)’, which he explains through the primordial covenant event described in the above hadith and connected to Qur’anic verse 7:172 (Ibn Taymiyya 1991: 359 [vol. 8]). Ibn Taymīya, who quotes the passage from Abū Yaʿlā, rejects this as a reliable narration from Ibn Ḥanbal, which reflects the general difficulty in establishing the latter’s theological views (Ibn Taymiyya 1991: 361 [vol. 8]; see Holtzmann 2015: 167–168, who only mentions Ibn Taymīya’s own preferred reading). A second opinion ascribed to Ibn Ḥanbal is that the fiṭra is the felicity (saʿāda) or wretchedness (shaqāwa) already imprinted on the foetus developing within the mother’s womb (Ibn Taymiyya 1991: 359 [vol. 8]). This view jettisons the primordial covenant event, but unlike all the views discussed below in section 2.2, continues to embrace the strong predestinationist elements often associated with it.

The primordial covenant is most immediately understood as the soul’s experience of direct witnessing before God, including (at the very least) hearing His speech. One of the potential theological ramifications of this position is that it shifts the significance of fiṭra in the worldly life to a reawakening of that initial encounter of the divine presence (Winter 2022: 8). According to this reading, the function of the Qur’an as a reminder (dhikr) takes on a more literal hue: the descent of revelation prompts the recall of the covenant that one has already made in the primordial realm. Joseph Lumbard puts the point in this way:

[B]efore falling from grace, Adam and Eve lived in adherence to the first general covenant and were in no need of a particular covenant to remind them of it. But, having forgotten, Adam and Eve, and thus all human beings, must now have periodic reminders if they are to reaffirm the covenant and be brought back to what the Qur’an maintains is their natural state as those who recognize the oneness of God and worship none but God. (Lumbard 2015: 11)

It was noted above that the Islamic scriptural grounds for positing a connection between the fiṭra and the state of Adam and Eve before their exit from the Garden are slim. Nevertheless, a kind of forgetting or separation event is often associated with metaphysical interpretations. Sufis elaborated on the idea of the primordial covenant as a state of union with God, from which human beings are separated within the realm of worldly existence and then reunited with in their mystical return to Him. One of the most significant early treatments of this topic was by al-Junayd al-Baghdādī (d. 297/910), who remarks in a short treatise as follows:

In (their) timeless existence before Him [fī kawn al-azal ʿindahu] and in (their) state of unity with Him, it is He who had granted them their being. When He called them and they answered quickly, their answer was a generous and gracious gift from Him, it was His answer on their behalf when He granted them their being, their function being that of interlocutors. He gave them knowledge of Him when they were only concepts which He had conceived [or: a will that He made stand in front of Him: mashīʾa aqāmahā bayna yadayhi]. (Abdel-Kader 1962: 160–161; Al-Junayd 2003: 42)

Al-Junayd’s interpretation of the primordial covenant reflects Neoplatonic currents within his milieu of third/ninth-century Baghdad, an important centre for the translation of the philosophical works of Plotinus (Gutas 1998: 145). In particular, there are unmistakable parallels in the basic structure of his depiction of the descent of the soul from its real being in unity with the One to its forgetful and somewhat unreal being in the world (Abdel-Kader 1962: 78–79).

The rich mystical associations of the above covenant were developed further by subsequent Sufi philosophers and poets. A case in point is Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672/1273), who returns to the theme of the covenant many times in his Masnavī through a variety of spiritual metaphors suited to the point at hand (see Schimmel 1980: 248–250). In the context of the trial of the human being and the ability to distinguish good from evil within the world, Rūmī compares the covenant to a mother’s milk:

Give him milk, O mother of Moses, and cast him into the water: be not afraid of (putting him to) the trial.
Whoever drank that milk on the Day of Alast [i.e. the primordial covenant] distinguishes the milk (in this world), even as Moses (distinguished and knew his mother’s milk). (Nicholson 1926: 375)

Though the main allusion here is to Qur’anic verses 28:7–13, in which the infant Moses refuses his nursemaids, the symbolism of drinking primordial milk for true discrimination within the world recalls the third group of hadiths on fiṭra discussed above. In another place, Rūmī uses the image of wine to depict the covenant:

The spirit of that one who at the time of Am not I (your Lord)? Saw his Lord and became beside himself and intoxicated—
He (that spirit) knows the scent of the wine because he drank it (before); when he has not drunk it, he cannot scent it. (Nicholson 1926: 307)

Here, the theme of mystical unity, as found in al-Junayd, returns to the fore. In commentaries on these couplets, three levels of response are identified, corresponding to the Elect (al-sābiqūn), the People of the Right (aṣḥāb al-maymana), and the People of the Left (aṣḥāb al-mashʾama) as enumerated in Qur’anic verses 56:8–10. Though all answered, ‘Yes, we bear witness’, it is only the elect that adore God and were truly intoxicated. Ordinary believers responded faithfully, whereas disbelievers and hypocrites were veiled and answered unwillingly (Nicholson 1937: 300–301). Herein is the continued association between the covenant and strong predestinationism, as affirmed in some of the related hadiths.

Drawing a close connection between the primordial covenant and the fiṭra remains popular in contemporary Islamic thought. The Malaysian philosopher Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas weaves a tight conceptual web between key Qur’anic terms, which he interprets through the conceptual categories of philosophical Sufism. He proposes that human beings have a natural inclination to serve and worship God, which he connects to the word dīn (often translated as religion, but for al-Attas here connoting custom, habit, and disposition). Yet he notes that dīn in this sense is equivalent to fiṭra, the divine pattern upon which God has created everything. Introducing the primordial covenant, al-Attas argues that if human beings are rightly guided, they will remember the covenant that they have pledged and act for God’s sake alone (Al-Attas 1995: 51–52). Subsequently, he elaborates that it is the ‘rational soul’, an Avicennan concept, which was addressed during the covenant, and that when it tames the lower ‘animal soul’, it is described as the ‘tranquil soul’ (al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinna), drawing on Qur’anic verse 89:27. Thus, remembrance of the covenant is ultimately a matter of spiritual knowledge (maʿrifa; Al-Attas 1995: 59–60; see also Al-Attas 2023: 17–20).

Similarly, the Moroccan philosopher Taha Abderrahmane describes the fiṭra in terms of the initial disposition that souls remain upon due to the divine manifestation (tajallī) that they experienced during the covenant. The fiṭra, therefore, is imprinted with subtle divine meanings that act to preserve ethical values (Abderrahmane 2021: 75 [vol. 1]). Abderrahmane thus puts the fiṭra, as derived from the covenant, at the heart of his moral philosophy.

2.2 Physical interpretations of fiṭra

Contrasting with a metaphysical interpretation of fiṭra is a physical one in which that concept is understood as a disposition solely possessed within the worldly life. Proponents of this reading draw on the apparent meaning of Qur’anic verse 30:30 and the hadith ‘every child is born upon the fiṭra’, seeking to explicate it without relying on the idea of a primordial covenant. Doing so, however, requires an alternative interpretation of verse 7:172. Such exegesis, in itself, is not unusual. It seems that many exegetes entertained a reading of 7:172 distinct from the primordial covenant elaborated upon in the hadith, yet without necessarily rejecting the occurrence of that metaphysical event. For the present section, however, the more interesting case pertains to those who did follow through with the theological implications of such a rejection.

Alternative explanations of Qur’anic verse 7:172 are often closely associated with the Muʿtazila. A major concern of this school was to avoid the strongly predestinationist implications that had become closely connected to the doctrine of the primordial covenant, with a secondary motivation being to rebut proponents of the transmigration of souls (ahl al-tanāsukh) who were seen to gain support from the idea of souls existing before their present bodies (Al-Jishumī 2018: 2773).

The Muʿtazilī exegete al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 494/1101), who converted late in life to Zaydī Shīʿism and was subsequently influential within both the Zaydī and Twelver traditions (see Madelung 2014: 532; Mourad 2010: 83–86), describes two alternative exegetical strategies. In the first, the extraction of progeny from the loins of the children of Adam is explained as the insemination of their mothers along with the stage-by-stage embryonic development described in the Qur’an (for instance in verse 22:5). The result is a ‘well-proportioned, living, responsible human being (basharan sawīyan ḥayyan mukallafan)’. At that point, a person ponders upon the marvels of their creation, which indicate the oneness of their creator, and thereby believes in Him. In this scenario, the fiṭra is that natural, healthy state from which the human being has the responsibility to rationally infer God’s existence and worthiness of worship. The question from God, and its response, are understood as poetic descriptions of an underlying reality, as for instance in the Qur’anic verse: ‘So, He said to it [the heavens] and the earth, “Come willingly or unwillingly,” and they said, “We come willingly”’ (Q. 41:11). Whether or not a given person verbally assents to God’s lordship, the effects of His handiwork upon them bears witness to it (Al-Jishumī 2018: 2773–2774 [vol. 4]). A second view, which al-Jishumī also takes as sound, proceeds in the same way as the first, except this time God is understood to ask, ‘Am I not your Lord?’ on the tongues of His prophets (or presumably their inheritors). Al-Jishumī suggests that this question, which is to remove the excuse of ignorance about the monotheistic message, is delivered to a restricted group of people – those who have not grown up within a believing family (Al-Jishumī 2018: 2775[vol. 4]). Moreover, assuming that the response in this case is also vocalized, it is patently not universally answered in the affirmative.

An explicit denial of a metaphysical reading of the covenant is also found as an opinion within Sunnī theology. Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī and his student Abū al-Ḥasan al-Rustughfānī (d. c. 345/956) support a version of the first view described by al-Jishumī. From a text by al-Rustughfānī, it seems that in the polemical context of fourth/tenth century Samarqand there was a concern that the metaphysical interpretation, with the consequent emergence of all the descendants of Adam until the Day of Judgement, strengthened the view of the Dahrīs (Eternalists) about the persistence of matter through time (see Harvey 2021a: 112, note 83). Al-Māturīdī mentions a number of narrations concerning the witnessing of the souls and their predestination to Paradise and Hell, but sounds a characteristically cautious note, writing: ‘We consider in respect of these narrations that which protects – and especially that which protects the masses and the people of weakness – from conveying them is more secure, of greater benefit, and further from the doubtfulness of narrating them and the strain of shedding light on them’ (Al-Māturīdī 2006: 102 [vol. 6]).

Al-Māturīdī has several concerns about understanding verse 7:172 as referring to a primordial covenant. One of them is that 7:172 mentions the taking out of the children of Adam, not Adam himself as in the hadiths. Another pertains to the final statement, ‘That is lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, “We were unaware of this.”’ He argues that this fails as a warning due to our inability to remember the event (Al-Māturīdī 2006: 104 [vol. 6]). Al-Māturīdī goes on to explain that in his own preferred interpretation, the statement ‘Yes (balā)’ has two related aspects; as a verbal articulation (nuṭqan) and as an inherent disposition (khilqatan). In each case, the human being’s natural disposition (fiṭra) provides an answer based on rational reflection. Verbal articulation of ‘Yes’, according to al-Māturīdī, entails that everyone affirms their creator unless taught otherwise. Here he refers to the Qur’anic verses that mention: ‘If you ask them who created the heavens and the earth, then they will say God’ (Q. 31:25; 39:38). The dispositional aspect of ‘Yes’ relates to the human being’s need, like everything else, for a sustainer. Such inherent contingency is itself an eloquent profession of divine lordship (Al-Māturīdī 2006: 106 [vol. 6]).

Similar themes are addressed by Ibn Taymīya and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya (d. 750/1350). Ibn Taymīya tersely interprets verse 7:172 as announcing that human beings are created to be disposed to knowledge (maʿrifa) of God. He dismisses the hadiths referring to a primordial event as unsound (Ibn Taymiyya 1984: 11 [vol. 1]). Ibn Qayyim points out that the person who bears witness to something must be able to remember that which is witnessed. This, he suggests, is only possible after the emergence of human beings into worldly life. Additionally, he states:

God Most High informs that the wisdom of this witnessing is to establish a proof against them, lest they say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘We were unaware of this.’ Yet the proof is only established upon them by the messengers and the natural disposition upon which they have been created, just as He Most High says: ‘Messengers giving glad tidings and warning, so there will not be any argument for humanity against God after the messengers [Q. 4:165]’. (Ibn Qayyim 2004: 284)

Ibn Qayyim’s view, as expressed here, is generally close to al-Māturīdī in the theological ramifications of Qur’anic verse 7:172 concerning the fiṭra. He differs, however, by premising human accountability on the arrival of messengers, a position which shares some features with al-Jishumī’s second interpretation.

3.1 Knowledge of God due to the fiṭra

With respect to a metaphysical interpretation of fiṭra, there are two relevant stages to knowledge of God, corresponding respectively to the initial covenantal event and the recall of it in this world. Such readings should be envisaged across an interpretive spectrum. One associated with Traditionalism is that God was encountered as an empirical entity by all of humanity when He extracted them from Adam and directly addressed them. Yet evidently human beings do not consciously recall that primordial event as a memory (a point of criticism raised both by al-Māturīdī and Ibn Qayyim). Therefore, insofar as the profession of faith at the primordial covenant is indicative of a fiṭra that has impacted the embodied soul, it may be implicitly understood to remain hidden until prompted by revelation. Here the Qur’anic self-representation as a reminder can take on additional levels of significance. A good example of this Traditionalist position can be found in Abū Isḥāq al-Thaʿlabī’s (d. 427/1035) exegesis of verse 7:172:

He said to them altogether [i.e. the souls brought forth from Adam]: ‘Know that there is no deity save Me. I am your lord, and there is no lord for you save Me. So, do not associate anything with Me. I shall send to you men who will remind you of My pact and covenant, and I will reveal for you books.’ They spoke and said, ‘We bear witness that You are our lord, our deity, and there is no lord for us save you.’ So, all of them testified on that day, an obedient group and, by implication, a dissimulating group… (Al-Thaʿlabī 2002: 303 [vol. 4])

As discussed in section 2, the details of Sufi-inspired accounts of the primordial covenant and its relationship to the concept of fiṭra are diverse. A common thread running through them is that the covenant event represents a state of heightened spiritual realization, or even mystical union, that was lost in the descent to the lower life of worldly appetites. The means to regain this realization is to unlock the hidden secret of divine manifestation within the fiṭra by walking upon the spiritual path. This recourse to gnosis solves the problem of memory; there is, in principle, a way to recall the covenant independently of learning about it through revelation. Yet this knowledge has the disadvantage of no longer remaining part of the publicly accessible epistemic sources: perception, testimony, and rational argument (see Harvey 2021b: 19–20; Harvey 2023: 408–411).

Turning to physical interpretations, in these cases fiṭra takes its meaning from the conscious experience and capacities of the human being within this world. Here fiṭra is typically understood as operating in an instinctual manner that grounds a human being’s epistemic comportment to the environment, and more importantly, to God. But Islamic scholars differed in the exact details, including the relationship of the fiṭra to human reason. A more evidentialist and internalist tendency, exemplified by Muʿtazilīs such as al-Jishumī (discussed above), as well as Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs, tended to see the fiṭra as providing the precondition for reflection leading to warranted belief in God. Others, most notably Ibn Taymīya and his followers, enhanced the scope of the fiṭra to allow for direct recognition of God’s existence without the need for rational arguments.

Al-Māturīdī, in his commentary on Qur’anic verse 30:30, entertains both of these readings of fiṭra as extensions of the Qur’anic concept. He starts by stating that fiṭra can be understood as the knowledge that God grants to every child from infancy about His oneness and lordship. Quoting the ‘every child is born upon the fiṭra’ hadith, he compares this to the mountains’ knowledge of divine glorification (as mentioned in Q. 21:79). A second interpretation is that human beings have been created with a nature that intrinsically indicates the oneness and lordship of God (presumably in terms of the contingency mentioned in his commentary on Q. 7:172). If they are merely left alone with their intellects, human beings will realize this important truth (Al-Māturīdī 2006: 185–186 [vol. 11]). Based on his statements elsewhere that knowledge of God and His command are reached in the world via inference (Al-Māturīdī 2010: 145, 205–206), the second view can be confirmed as his own theological position.

Another scholar who can be placed in the present category with respect to the epistemological dimension of the fiṭra is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), though in his exegesis he affirms the connection between Q. 30:30 and a primordial covenant reading of Q. 7:172 (Al-Rāzī 1938: 119–120 [vol. 25]). Al-Rāzī suggests that the fiṭra is a kind of basic instinctual knowledge that grounds principles of reason as well as certain natural reactions. He writes that the knowledge that two equal possibilities requires a preponderant (murajjiḥ), a significant aspect of cosmological arguments for God’s existence, is possessed due to the natural disposition of the intellect (fiṭrat al-ʿaql). He suggests that the reality of such knowledge is made all the more evident by the fact that even beasts understand that it is impossible to hear objects in the environment without those objects being present (Al-Tilmsānī 2010: 128). Additional functions for the fiṭra include testifying that imperfections are inconceivable for God; judging the baseness of bodily pleasures; and preparing oneself to ward off harm, such as that threatened by animals or other people (Shihadeh 2006: 107, 157, 173).

An expanded epistemic role for fiṭra is championed by Ibn Taymīya, a feature that also makes his ideas impactful regarding the concept’s social dimensions (see section 4). For him, the fiṭra is the natural inclination that leads human beings to see the truth of God’s existence without requiring a formal rational process of argumentation, as practised within ʿilm al-kalām. According to Ibn Taymīya, under normal conditions a human being is disposed to believe in God (Anjum 2012: 221–222; El-Tobgui 2020: 260–262). As the position is explained by David Jalajel: ‘Children are born with an innate yearning for God like the yearning they have for their mother’s milk. As their minds develop, this yearning develops into recognition of God, and only external corruptive influences can remove them from this knowledge’ (Jalajel 2022: 476). Additionally, this can be termed a version of epistemic externalism. That is, so long as the correct conditions are in place, the belief in God that spontaneously wells up in a person is basic and warranted (see Turner 2021: 775). Those holding this position typically excuse someone who fails to generate such a belief due to the absence of revelation as a trigger (see Khalil 2012: 191, note 130).

In a study of the prominent theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Frank Griffel demonstrates the centrality of Avicennan ideas for the former’s concept of the fiṭra: ‘a set of judgments that all humans agree upon, no matter how they live and what they have learned.’ (Griffel 2012: 28). According to his account, this consists of the first intelligibles (awwalīyāt) that are certainly true, and the judgements of estimation (wahmīyāt) that may be true or false, requiring a rational argument to determine which is the case. Commonly accepted judgements, or mere social conventions (mashhūrāt), are not included within the fiṭra, as they depend on the particularities of human education (Griffel 2012: 28–29). Moreover, there are even hints that al-Ghazālī may have gone beyond Avicenna (d. 427/1037) to anticipate Ibn Taymīya’s idea of a fiṭra-based belief in God (Griffel 2012: 30–31). In Griffel’s view, ‘Avicenna’s teachings about fiṭra are central for the whole Muslim tradition’ (Griffel 2012: 31), and though that seems something of an exaggeration given the concept’s wider scriptural valence, these ideas are undoubtedly important in the influential stream of thought running through al-Ghazāli to figures such as al-Rāzī and Ibn Taymīya.

3.2 Knowledge of moral values due to the fiṭra

The relationship between moral determination and fiṭra follows that related to knowledge of God. The extent that the fiṭra can inform moral valuation (al-taḥṣīn wa-al-taqbīḥ) on a metaphysical reading of its origin would seem to resolve to two main possibilities. In typical Traditionalist versions, the fiṭra would remain dormant until activated by contact with revealed scripture. In this case, the revealed Sharīʿa would be the primary source for moral valuation. In more Sufi-influenced versions, this knowledge can also be reached directly by mystical unveiling, for instance in Rūmī’s reference to milk above.

Concerning a physical reading, differences emerge between the various theological schools of thought. The general Muʿtazilī stance is that human nature allowed immediate access to a range of general propositions with fixed moral values, for instance of the evil of wrongdoing and lying, as well as to propositions with a more limited scope, such as the evil of inflicting pain without the enactment of justice or a future benefit (Hourani 1985: 103–104). Al-Māturīdī holds that the fiṭra provided a capacity to distinguish between good and bad, with more advanced judgements, such as those pertaining to prohibited actions, being built up through experience and reasoning (Harvey 2018: 37). Finally, Ibn Taymīya makes the concept of fiṭra the linchpin of his ethics. He argues that human beings are naturally motivated to seek out what benefits them and avoid what harms them. Then, the uncorrupted fiṭra will dispose them to seek out the good and avoid the bad (Vasalou 2016: 68–89). Just as in the case of knowledge of God, the fiṭra here takes on a larger role than for most other thinkers, one that can underpin the success of rational and ethical activity altogether.

3.3 The fiṭra and modern cognitive science

Modern science has challenged traditional Islamic discourses on the nature of human beings through the adoption of an evolutionary paradigm that places homo sapiens within a wider taxonomy of species on planet Earth. In the context of the present section, a potential argument rooted in evolution can be developed against Ibn Taymīya’s idea of a fiṭra that establishes genuine knowledge of God’s existence. As discussed in section 3.1, Ibn Taymīya gives a significant role to the fiṭra, such that the healthy and uncorrupted human being will come to recognize that the entire world has been created by God. A strand of modern evolutionary science has argued that human beings are hard-wired to posit agency to account for the phenomena they observe in their environments. This draws on ideas of the cognitive development of a theory of mind (Van Slyke 2011: 125). The contention in evolutionary terms is that this confers important adaptive benefits. Specifically, the cost of failing to detect an agent in the surrounding environment, whether a predator or hostile competitor, is much greater than falsely attributing one (Maij, Schie and Elk 2019: 23–25). Whereas this research may support the Taymiyan assertion that human beings are cognitively disposed to believe in a supernatural agent for the totality of phenomena, it may also undermine the reasons for thinking that this reflects a true state of affairs, rather than an evolutionary advantageous fiction.

Although there is nothing within Ibn Taymīya’s concept of fiṭra that necessarily rules out the idea of human evolution, it is far from certain that a Muslim supporter of his epistemological ideas would accept such a process has occurred. Nevertheless, an interlocutor could still press the point that human beings seem to inherently detect agency in ordinary situations, which tells against the idea that cognitive function provides a good inference to the existence of God. A response to this line of argument from within the premises of Ibn Taymīya’s own theological system could proceed as follows. It may be granted that a proclivity to detect agency is beneficial when negotiating threats to life. According to a theistic perspective, however, it is also beneficial for avoiding the even graver threat of punishment in the Hereafter. Yet, crucially, the fact that a given cognitive state confers adaptive benefits does not prevent it from furnishing the truth. Rather, such a situation can be considered merely the result of the progression of cause and effect that has been instituted in the world by divine wisdom. Therefore, proponents of a Taymiyan epistemic view of the fiṭra could nullify the attack by suggesting that all the evidence produced by the opponent is only to be expected.

4.1 The fiṭra within communal life

The concept of fiṭra has an important role within communal life, both between Muslims and in relation to those of other faiths. With its scriptural emphases on Abrahamic monotheism and practices of bodily purity, fiṭra links both Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy to the primordial nature of the human being. Furthermore, at least vis-à-vis Jews and Christians, it can be said to point to Islam as the true inheritor of their great shared patriarch. Fiṭra, as a grounding quality common to all humanity, transcends the particularity of the Prophet Muḥammad’s own community of followers. At the same time, it provides a normative expectation that people, if not otherwise taught, will naturally be inclined to Islam.

The notion of fiṭra can also be turned to more political goals. Al-Attas uses the metaphysical interpretation of fiṭra through the primordial covenant to ground social life. He particularly emphasizes that the believers who abide by that covenant can recognize each other due to their kinship during the event. Their shared destiny causes them to enjoy a special type of unity. At the same time, each individual is bound to a contract with God alone, not to a social contract with other human beings (Al-Attas 1995: 63–64). In the case of Ibn Taymīya, the fiṭra becomes a way of contesting the authority of the ʿulamāʾ as unique conduits to knowledge through spiritual unveiling (kashf) and rational proof (naẓar). Rather, the shared possession of the fiṭra by upright common believers grounds the community’s epistemic claims to truth and guidance (Anjum 2012: 229–230). The twentieth-century Moroccan scholar, ʿAllāl al-Fāsī, defended the naturalness of the Sharīʿa in the face of colonial legal institutions with reference to its harmony with the fiṭra. According to him, the fiṭra is the quintessential aspect of human beings that distinguishes them from animals and inclines them to the guidance of the Sharīʿa, even as their baser natures find its rules at times demanding (March 2015: 54–55). This idea, that the rulings of divine law are a uniquely harmonious fit to the human fiṭra, has garnered widespread acceptance within modern projects for Islamic revival and reform. As Andrew March puts it, the monotheism known through the fiṭra is seen as emancipatory for the human being, and ensures that ‘[God’s] law is not received as arbitrary or frustrating, but rather as identical to happiness and flourishing’ (March 2019: 90).

4.2 The loss or clouding of the fiṭra

Just as the core scriptural texts of Qur’anic verse 30:30 and the ‘every child is born upon the fiṭra’ hadith provide a strong normative case within Islamic thought that each person originally possesses fiṭra, they also imply it can be lost or, at least, obscured. As discussed above, according to metaphysical interpretations of fiṭra, it is almost inevitable that this will be the case, except when a person is reached by the reminder of revelation or experiences the fruits of gnosis. With respect to physical interpretations, there are at least at first glance reasons to suppose that the fiṭra could remain undimmed. Yet this does not necessarily occur due to the pressures of a person’s social environment. In this vein, Carl Sharif El-Tobgui extracts seven ways in which Ibn Taymīya holds that the fiṭra can be suppressed:

(1) accepting (unexamined) inherited beliefs (iʿtiqādāt mawrūtha); (2) following whims, preconceived biases, or stubbornly clinging to personal opinion in the face of countervailing evidence (hawā); (3) engaging in conjecture (ẓann); (4) entertaining doubts or confusions caused by specious objections (shubuhāt); (5) harboring ulterior motives or personal interests (gharaḍ); (6) following habit (ʿāda) blindly without reflection; and (7) engaging in blind imitation (taqlīd). (El-Tobgui 2020: 264)